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1 Introduction
1.1 The surplus-division problem and Rubinstein bargaining
The main theme of this dissertation is bargaining power. Strategic sources of bargaining power
are addressed as well as its importance in a particular context of economic decision-making.
The topic is treated from the angle of microeconomic theory and, in particular, non-cooperative
game theory.
The basic economic problem which underlies the dissertation is the division of gains from
cooperation. There are a number of players who can create or access some surplus. However,
each individual player can only consume any of this surplus once all the players have agreed on
how the surplus should be divided among them.
One approach which economic theorists have taken to this problem is to assume that the
parties involved engage in a formal bargaining process in order to ﬁnd an agreement. This
bargaining process can then be modeled as a non-cooperative game and analyzed with the
relevant game-theoretic tools.
A seminal paper by Rubinstein (1982) has inspired a rich literature on bargaining games.
In a typical model of Rubinstein bargaining, the bargaining process is subdivided into rounds,
each of which has the following structure. First, one particular player is designated as the
proposer according to some rule (the protocol). Second, the proposer suggests a particular
division of the surplus. Third, the other players accept or reject this proposal. If a proposal
has been approved by all players, then the surplus is divided according to this proposal and
the game ends. If, however, a proposal is not accepted by all players, then a new round of
bargaining starts. However, the disagreement and ensuing delay to the next round comes at
a cost. This cost is either represented in the model as discounting future consumption in the
players’ utility functions, or as an exogenously given risk that negotiations break down for
good after the rejection of a proposal. In either case, the cost of delay is often referred to as
bargaining friction.
The ﬁrst two chapters of the dissertation deal with sources of strategic power in a Rubinstein
bargaining situation. In the ﬁrst chapter, I study the role of the bargaining protocol (that is,
the rule determining which player proposes in which round) as a source of bargaining power. In
the second chapter, I study a situation where players can make commitments before they come
to the bargaining table, and I am interested in the role of the ability to commit as a source
of bargaining power. In the third chapter, I apply the insights gained on surplus division by
bargaining to a situation where a number of shareholders jointly own a ﬁrm and need to agree
(through a bargaining process) on the choice of a production plan for their ﬁrm.
1.2 Proposal Power
One of the crucial ingredients in a Rubinstein bargaining model is the protocol which determines
the proposer in each round of bargaining. The speciﬁcation of a protocol is a very important
modeling choice since the right to make proposals is arguably the most recognized and discussed
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source of strategic power in bargaining games. It can be interpreted as corresponding to the
common sense idea that the “right to set the agenda” confers power in a bargaining situation.
Shaked and Sutton (1984) have concisely pointed out that in Rubinstein bargaining a
player’s payoﬀ “coincides with the sum of the shrinkages” of the surplus which occur while
that player is the proposer. Before addressing the contribution of my dissertation, I will brieﬂy
summarize the intuition underlying Shaked and Sutton’s statement. To this end, suppose that
two players, Miss One and Mister Two, bargain about the division of a surplus of size one. If
they do not agree in the current round, then only a part of the surplus will be left on the table
in the next round, while the rest will be lost – indeed, delay is costly. Let Miss One be the
proposer in the current round. Why would Mister Two ever reject Miss One’s proposal? He
would do so only if that proposal gives him less of the surplus than what he hopes to get in
the sequel of the bargaining process (his continuation payoﬀ). Clearly, this amount can never
exceed that which will be left in the next round. Suppose for the sake of the argument that
Miss One can slice up the surplus into two pieces, namely the one which will disappear if no
agreement is reached in the current round, and the one which will be left on the table in the
next round. In order to give Mister Two his continuation payoﬀ, she has to use only (part
of) the piece which will remain in the next round. Conversely, she can appropriate the piece
which would disappear for herself. Since the same argument can be repeated for each round of
bargaining, a player’s payoﬀ will indeed correspond to the sum of all those pieces of the surplus
which would disappear over time if her proposals were to be rejected.
With this intuition in mind, the main result of Chapter 2 should have some natural appeal.
It says the following.
If the degree of bargaining friction is suﬃciently small, then a player’s bargaining power is
given by the frequency with which this player expects to be the proposer in the long-run.
I will now provide some more detail on the model in Chapter 2, and brieﬂy discuss a number
of technical issues. On the basis of this discussion, I will then be able to restate the main result
in a more precise way.
The model in Chapter 2 of the dissertation is one where some ﬁnite number of players
need to choose one payoﬀ allocation from a set of feasible allocations. Players are assumed
to be expected utility maximizers, but utility does not need to be transferable among them.
The bargaining friction is embodied in an exogenous risk of breakdown at each instance of
disagreement. The bargaining protocol is such that proposers are selected through a Markov
process. That is, in each round the proposer is drawn from some probability distribution, and
which probability distribution this is in a particular round depends solely on the identity of the
player who proposed in the previous round. We impose assumptions on this Markov process
which guarantee that it has a unique stationary distribution. Loosely speaking, this means that
the probability with which a player expects to be the proposer in the long-run is independent
of the identity of the current proposer.
The bargaining protocol based on the Markov process generalizes several protocols which are
well-established in the bargaining literature. One such protocol is the one where the proposer in
each round is drawn from one and the same probability distribution, see for instance Miyakawa
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(2008). This case corresponds to a Markov process in which all rows of the transition matrix
are identical. Another well-known protocol involves a ﬁxed order of proposers. That is, the
proposers are selected one after the other in a deterministic way. This case corresponds to a
Markov process for which the transition matrix is a permutation matrix. It can be seen as a
natural extension of Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating oﬀer protocol to the case with more than
two players.
The solution concept applied to the game in Chapter 2 of the dissertation is the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies. In the aforementioned bargaining model
with two players due to Rubinstein (1982), the standard subgame-perfect equilibrium con-
cept uniquely predicts a payoﬀ allocation. However, it is well-known in the literature that this
uniqueness is lost when one extends the model to more than two players (at least if one is
interested in unanimous agreement among all players at once). In order to narrow down the set
of equilibrium payoﬀs, many authors have restricted attention to those subgame-perfect equi-
libria which are in stationary strategies. In the context of Rubinstein bargaining, a stationary
strategy has a player make the same proposal whenever she is the proposer. Moreover, whether
a player accepts or rejects a proposal under a stationary strategy depends only on the proposal
(and the proposer).
The Nash bargaining solution is a well-known solution concept in bargaining theory. It
chooses a particular element of a set of feasible payoﬀ allocations by maximizing the product
of the gains which players make relative to a disagreement point. Nash (1953) shows that this
solution is unique in satisfying a number of axioms: Symmetry, Invariance, Pareto-optimality,
and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is a
generalization of the Nash bargaining solution in which the payoﬀs of diﬀerent players may
have diﬀerent weights. Mathematically, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is found by
maximizing a product of players’ payoﬀs where each factor is raised to some power. If the
exponent is the same across players we have the standard Nash bargaining solution.
In Chapter 2, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is obtained as the payoﬀ allocation
corresponding to subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. A more formal statement
of the main result is the following.
In the limit as the risk of breakdown goes to zero, all subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary
strategies lead to the payoﬀ allocation which corresponds to the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution with bargaining weights given by the stationary distribution of the Markov process.
As pointed out before, the assumption that the selection of the proposer follows a Markov
process admits two special cases which have some prominence in the literature. The ﬁrst case
is where the proposer in each bargaining round is drawn from one and the same probability
distribution on the players. For this case, the result in Chapter 2 implies previous ﬁndings by
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Miyakawa (2008) and Laruelle and Valenciano (2008). The second
case is where players propose in a ﬁxed order. For that case, our result implies the previous
ﬁnding by Kultti and Vartiainen (2007). The result provided in Chapter 2 uniﬁes a number of
existing results in the literature and substantially generalizes them.
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1.3 Commitment power
While Chapter 1 of the dissertation has focussed on strategic power derived from the protocol,
we now consider pre-bargaining commitment as a source of power.
In a game-theoretic context, a commitment is a way in which a player can rule out some
possible course of action which he might otherwise have taken in the future. Diﬀerently put, a
commitment is a way in which a player can “tie his own hands” to obtain a strategic advantage.
Schelling (1960) has highlighted the importance of commitment power in bargaining.
“The power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself; [. . .]
in bargaining, weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to capitulate,
and to burn bridges behind one may suﬃce to undo the opponent.”
In the bargaining context of this dissertation, a commitment should be thought of as a
credible announcement by a player before the bargaining process not to enter into certain
agreements.
One very well-known illustration of pre-bargaining commitment is mentioned by Schelling
(1956). In this example, a ﬁrm and a union are about to bargain about the future wage of the
workers. Before bargaining starts, the negotiators who are going to represent the union at the
bargaining table address the crowd of workers with a dramatic announcement to the eﬀect that
they will never settle for less than a certain wage. This announcement is observable by the
ﬁrm’s management. The idea is that the union negotiators can now claim at the bargaining
table that their hands are tied so as not to accept less than the wage they had announced
to the workers. After all, if they were to settle for less, these workers would live out their
disappointment and treat their negotiators in a number of unpleasant ways, such as unseating
the union leadership, throwing tomatoes, etc. In a more game-theoretic terminology, the ability
to raise expectations and arouse emotions among the workers gives the negotiators the chance
to make credible threats at the bargaining table.
One important problem is to decide how committed a player can be. To see where the
problem lies, suppose that we want to assume that before bargaining, one player can indeed
make a commitment not to settle for less than some amount. Assume furthermore that this
commitment is indeed perfect, that is, it is binding and observable by the opponent. In that
case, the power of commitment totally overrules any form of power derived from the actual
bargaining situation. The strategic situation resembles that in the well-known ultimatum game,
and the committed player can receive the entire surplus in equilibrium. In Schelling’s (1960)
original terms, the ability to make a perfect commitment allows a player to “squeeze the range
of indeterminacy down to the point most favorable to him”.
If we would like to assume instead that both players can simultaneously make a pre-
bargaining commitment, then we create a strategic situation similar to that in a version of
the Nash demand game (Nash 1953) without noise: Any (eﬃcient) division of the surplus could
be supported by an equilibrium. The conclusion is that perfect pre-bargaining commitments
lead either to an extreme prediction or no prediction at all on the allocation of the surplus.
The literature has developed somewhat weaker notions of commitment. For instance, both
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making and breaking the commitment may come at a cost. It may cost a player something
to make a commitment credible, or a player may be able to revoke a standing commitment
at some (non-prohibitive) cost (Muthoo 1992, Muthoo 1996). Another approach has been the
introduction of an imperfect information framework in which players are uncertain about each
other’s rationality (Abreu and Gul 2000, Kambe 1999). The approach which I have taken in
the dissertation is diﬀerent from the existing literature. I have taken the notion of perfect
commitment as a starting point and tried to limit the degree to which commitment is “perfect”
– not by writing a more sophisticated model but by imposing two restrictions on commitment
which I ﬁnd rather mild and naturally appealing. The two restrictions which I impose on the
ability to commit can be summarized intuitively as follows.
1. One cannot commit to what one does not care about.
2. One cannot remain committed to what has become impossible.
I discuss both restrictions in turn. In the existing literature on commitment in bargaining, it
is often the case that commitments are expressed in terms of a percentage share of the surplus to
be divided. At the same time, however, it is assumed that the players care about the discounted
present value of their consumption. Hence, the players are assumed to be committed in terms
which are diﬀerent from those from which they derive utility. Li (2007) has suggested that
it would be more credible to let players express their commitments in those terms which also
enter the utility function, and he has called this approach value-commitment as opposed to the
aforementioned share-commitment. The ﬁrst of the restrictions which I have imposed is in the
spirit of Li (2007) in that it means that players make value-commitments. I assume that the
available surplus shrinks over time and that players commit prior to bargaining to some amount
(rather than a share) of that surplus. Consequently, when disagreement lasts long enough, the
size of the surplus will eventually shrink below the amount of the commitment. Now, the
second restriction above means that player 1’s commitment is no longer credible and thus no
longer binding from that point onwards. The two restrictions on commitment create a trade-oﬀ
for the player. Bold commitments lose their binding power soon, while milder commitments
remain in force longer. This makes it intuitively clear that is no longer optimal to commit to
the entire surplus.
I study three versions of this game: one in which only one player makes a pre-bargaining
commitment, and the cases in which both players can do so either simultaneously or sequentially.
For each case, I devise a solution concept which is a slight reﬁnement of subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium. When the discount factor is suﬃciently small, I obtain results which are similar
to those in the case of perfect commitment. That is, in equilibrium the committed player
obtains the entire surplus if only one player can commit, and (almost) every eﬃcient allocation
is an equilibrium if both players can commit. In the limit as the discount factor becomes large,
however, these results substantially change. One noteworthy result is that if the proposal power
is concentrated in one player while the other player can commit then the division converges to
the equal split. In this particular sense, proposal power and commitment power are equally
important determinants of the bargaining outcome.
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In the case where both players make simultaneous commitments prior to the bargaining
process, I ﬁnd a range of eﬃcient surplus divisions which can be supported by equilibria. If the
discount factor is large, this range consists of at most one ﬁfth of the range of feasible eﬃcient
divisions. The endpoints of the range are determined by the recognition probabilities. The
equal split is the unique division which is an equilibrium for any values of the discount factor
and the recognition probabilities.
1.4 Theory of the ﬁrm
Chapters 2 and 3 address sources of strategic power in bargaining. In the ﬁnal chapter of the
dissertation, the idea is to apply bargaining theory to the problem of decision-making within
the ﬁrm when ﬁnancial markets are incomplete.
Suppose that a ﬁrm is jointly owned by several shareholders. This ﬁrm exists in an envi-
ronment with two time periods (today and tomorrow) in which there is uncertainty about the
future. Diﬀerently put, the owners of the ﬁrm are aware today that one out of many states
of the world is going to realize tomorrow but neither do they know which one, nor do they
necessarily have a common belief on the probability of the states. Facing this uncertainty, the
owners have to decide on a production plan for the ﬁrm. That is, there is a set of productive
activities which the ﬁrm could undertake, one of which has to be chosen jointly by the owners.
A production plan can be thought of as a speciﬁcation of an input or output today, and an
input and output for each possible state of the world tomorrow.
It can be the case that the diﬀerent owners of the ﬁrm have diﬀerent preferences over
consumption today and in the diﬀerent possible states of the world tomorrow. For example,
one owner may be more patient than the other and therefore ﬁnd consumption today relatively
less important. Moreover, one owner may believe with a very high probability that a particular
state of the world will occur tomorrow and will therefore ﬁnd the consumption in that state
very important. Another owner may have a diﬀerent belief about the future and thus diﬀerent
preferences over consumption in those states.
How can the owners come to an agreement? In economic theory, the easiest way to deal with
this problem is to assume the existence of complete ﬁnancial markets. When ﬁnancial markets
are complete, it is possible for the agents in an economy to trade oﬀ consumption across time
and across all states of the world. But when trades are possible across time and states, then
this eﬀectively creates prices for consumption in each state. As a result, all agents can agree
on maximizing the proﬁt of the ﬁrm. They can then split this proﬁt and individually access
the ﬁnancial markets in order to purchase they most desirable consumption bundle they can
aﬀord.
This approach breaks down, however, in a world of incomplete ﬁnancial markets. It is
well-known in the literature that when some or all asset markets are missing, the diﬀerent
shareholders of a ﬁrm tend to have a conﬂict about the choice of a production plan. How
should this conﬂict be dealt with in a formal economic model? The existing literature has
often taken a normative approach to the question: Based on the idea of constrained Pareto-
optimality, Dre`ze (1974) and Grossman and Hart (1979) have designed criteria for the choice of
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a production plan which rely, loosely speaking, on a weighted average of the owners’ valuations
of consumption in diﬀerent states. These criteria form the basis for the standard equilibrium
concepts in the literature on incomplete markets. As pointed out in the authoritative textbook
of Magill and Quinzii (1996), those equilibrium concepts suﬀer from the drawback that they
are not as yet supported by an explicit bargaining process by which the owners would choose a
production plan satisfying some normative criterion. The main contribution of Chapter 4 is to
develop and analyze such a bargaining process. The results derived from this model are only
partially in line with standard economic theory.
The bargaining process used in Chapter 4 is similar to Rubinstein bargaining as described
earlier. The proposer is selected from the same probability distribution in each round of bargain-
ing, and unanimous approval is required for a proposal to pass. The time horizon is potentially
inﬁnite but there is an exogenous risk of breakdown after each instance of disagreement. As
pointed out before, this protocol is a special case of the protocol analyzed in Chapter 2. The
main diﬀerence between the bargaining process in Chapter 4 and Rubinstein bargaining is that
a proposal in this context does not consist of a payoﬀ allocation but rather of a production
plan and a scheme of transfers, that is, side-payments among the owners of the ﬁrm which are
expressed in terms of consumption today. It is demonstrated that under some assumptions
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the problem of choosing a production plan (plus
a scheme of transfer payments) and the problem of choosing a payoﬀ allocation from a set of
feasible allocations as in Chapter 2. Put another way, it is shown that the economic problem
discussed in Chapter 4 can be seen as an instance of the abstract problem analyzed in Chapter
2. While Chapter 2 assumes that some abstract set of feasible payoﬀ allocations has certain
properties, it turns out in Chapter 4 that the problem of decision-making within the ﬁrm under
incomplete ﬁnancial markets gives rise to a set of feasible payoﬀ allocations which does have
those same properties.
In the special case where markets are complete, the equilibrium of the bargaining model
in Chapter 4 does involve the proﬁt-maximizing production plan. However, the generated
proﬁts need not be distributed to the owners according to their shares of ownership alone. In
fact, redistribution through transfers does occur generically in the initial endowments which
parameterize the economy and in the distribution of bargaining power among the owners (which
need not be identical with the shares of ownership). Hence, compared to standard economic
theory, the bargaining model in this dissertation predicts the same production plan but not
the same payoﬀ allocation in the case with complete markets. In the case with incomplete
markets, the bargaining model makes predictions about the choice of a production plan and
the concomitant payoﬀ allocation which are generically diﬀerent from standard theory.
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2 Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash
Bargaining Solution
2.1 Introduction
This paper 1 contributes to the Nash program of supporting solution concepts from cooperative
game theory by obtaining them as equilibrium outcomes of suitably constructed non-cooperative
games. More speciﬁcally, we will be concerned with the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
Consider a situation where two players receive a given pair of payoﬀs if they disagree, but may
obtain any element of a convex set of other (superior) payoﬀ pairs if they mutually agree on
one such element. The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) is that payoﬀ pair which maximizes
the product of players’ gains over their disagreement payoﬀ. Nash (1950) showed that this is
the unique bargaining solution satisfying the axioms of scale invariance, symmetry, eﬃciency,
and independence of irrelevant alternatives. One can generalize the NBS by assigning diﬀerent
weights to the players. The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) is that payoﬀ pair
which maximizes a weighted product of players’ gains over their disagreement payoﬀ, see Kalai
(1977).
The ANBS is used to gain insights on a wide variety of problems in economics. For instance,
Bester (1993) compares the eﬀects of diﬀerent pricing mechanisms on price and quality of a
product. In particular, posted pricing is compared to bargaining between a buyer and a seller.
In the latter case, the ANBS is taken to be the outcome of the bargaining interaction.
Another common application is wage bargaining between a ﬁrm and a union: Firm owners
and workers can agree to produce and hence create a surplus. A part of the surplus goes to the
workers as their wage, and the rest goes to the shareholders. If, however, the two sides cannot
ﬁnd an agreement, the workers may strike or the ﬁrm may shut down so that no surplus is
generated. In a seminal paper on wage bargaining, Grout (1984) studies the eﬀect of diﬀerent
legal frameworks on wage bargaining. Throughout the analysis, it is assumed that bargaining
between the ﬁrm and the union leads to the outcome predicted by the ANBS.
The prominent use of the ANBS in applications highlights the need for strong non-
cooperative underpinnings of this concept. In the case of the ANBS, it is imperative to examine
the non-cooperative or strategic sources of players’ “bargaining power” which is borne out in
the weight vector of the ANBS. Nash (1953) presents a non-cooperative demand game with two
players who are uncertain about which payoﬀ pairs are feasible. In the limit as the uncertainty
vanishes, equilibrium payoﬀs converge to those predicted by the NBS. Carlsson (1991) takes a
similar approach, but with a diﬀerent source of uncertainty: While the set of feasible payoﬀs
is known to both players, their actions are subject to noise. If players make demands which
do not exhaust the available surplus, the remainder is distributed according to an exogenously
ﬁxed rule. In the limit as the noise vanishes, there is a unique eﬃcient equilibrium. The payoﬀ
1This chapter corresponds to the paper V.Britz, P.J.J.Herings, and A.Predtetchinski (2010), ”Non-
cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution”, Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 1951-
1967.
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pair is a particular ANBS; the bargaining weights are determined by the exogenous division
rule.
In a seminal paper, Rubinstein (1982) provides a non-cooperative game in which two players
negotiate on the division of a pie. The players take turns acting as the proposer. The division
of the pie in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium depends upon how strongly players prefer
current over future payoﬀs. In the limit as players become perfectly patient, the equilibrium di-
vision converges to the NBS. In their discussion of cooperative and non-cooperative approaches
to bargaining, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) obtain the NBS in the limit if either
players’ impatience or the risk of an exogenous breakdown of the negotiations is vanishing.
Although the relationship between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to bargain-
ing are well understood for the case of two players, such is far less the case when more than
two players are involved in the negotiation process. While it is straightforward to generalize
the ANBS to n players, the extension of its non-cooperative justiﬁcation has turned out to
be a much more diﬃcult problem. Krishna and Serrano (1996) make use of Lensberg’s (1988)
stability (consistency) property. They design a non-cooperative bargaining protocol in which
players can exit after partial agreements. This game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
and the payoﬀs implied by that equilibrium converge to the NBS as the discount factor goes
to one. Chae and Yang (1994) obtain uniqueness of perfect equilibrium and convergence to
the NBS in a game where a proposer negotiates with one responder at a time. In both papers,
the results come at the cost of allowing partial agreements, rather than requiring unanimous
consent to a comprehensive proposal.
For the case with unanimous consent, an early support result for the NBS in the n player
case is implied by the analysis of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). More recently, support results
for the ANBS have been given by Miyakawa (2008) and Laruelle and Valenciano (2008). All
these papers consider a bargaining game where the proposer in each period is drawn from an
invariant probability distribution. The stationary equilibrium payoﬀs turn out to converge to
the ANBS with that probability distribution as the weight vector. Our analysis covers this
result as a special case. Another special case is a ﬁxed order of proposers, as analyzed by
Kultti and Vartiainen (2007), who also show that diﬀerentiability of the payoﬀ set’s Pareto
frontier is essential for the convergence result if there are at least three players.
Other strands of the bargaining literature consider much more general bargaining protocols.
For instance, in their analysis of uniqueness and eﬃciency of equilibria in bargaining games,
Merlo and Wilson (1995) assume that both the size of the cake to be divided and the order
in which players propose and respond follow a Markov process. Kalandrakis (2004) examines
no-delay equilibria in stationary strategies under a Markov selection protocol, where agreement
does not necessarily require unanimous consent of all players, but only of those within a winning
coalition. The set of such equilibria is characterized and shown to be non-empty. Herings and
Predtetchinski (2007) study a game with Markov recognition probabilities, where the set of
alternatives is one-dimensional. While studying delay or ineﬃciencies in bargaining games,
other authors have used proposer protocols following stochastic processes, see for instance Cho
and Duggan (2005) and Hyndman and Ray (2007) . In these papers, the stochastic process
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is not even required to have the Markov property, so the choice of the proposer may depend
on aspects of history other than the identity of the previous proposer. Since more general
selection protocols are used in much of the bargaining literature, we ﬁnd it important to extend
this approach to the support results for the ANBS.
In this paper we take a general approach towards multilateral bargaining. We aim at results
for the case with n players, a general set of feasible payoﬀs, and a general bargaining protocol.
An informal description of the game we consider in this paper is as follows.
In the ﬁrst period of an inﬁnitely repeated bargaining game, the identity of the proposer is
completely arbitrary. In each subsequent period, one out of the n players is recognized as the
proposer according to an irreducible Markov process. Upon recognition, the proposer oﬀers a
particular element of a convex and comprehensive set of feasible payoﬀs. If all players accept
the oﬀer, it is implemented. If a player rejects the oﬀer, with some exogenously given and
constant breakdown probability the game ends, whereas with the complementary probability
the next period starts.
We show that subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies exist and we characterize
the set of such equilibria. We then study the limit of an arbitrary sequence of such equilibria
corresponding to a sequence of vanishing breakdown probabilities. We show that in the limit
all players make the same proposal. Our main result is that in the limit this common proposal
coincides with the ANBS with the stationary distribution of the Markov proposer selection
process as the weight vector. Hence, equilibrium payoﬀs depend only on the set of feasible
payoﬀs and the stationary distribution associated with the matrix of transition probabilities.
The proof of our result goes well beyond mere technical generalizations of existing proof
strategies. Since the reservation payoﬀ of a responding player depends on the identity of the
current proposer, reservation payoﬀs cannot be expressed by a single vector, but correspond
to a matrix. For any value of the exogenous breakdown probability, we consider the vectors
corresponding to the diﬀerence between the equilibrium proposals of a pair of players. We
show that in the limit as the breakdown probability vanishes, these vectors span an (n − 1)-
dimensional supporting hyperplane to the set of feasible payoﬀs at the point corresponding
to the common limit proposal of the players. Finally, we demonstrate that the unique nor-
mal vector to this supporting hyperplane is proportional to the gradient of the asymmetric
Nash product with weights equal to the stationary distribution associated with the matrix of
transition probabilities.
Our analysis includes two very frequently encountered proposer protocols as special cases.
First, consider the protocol where the proposer in each round is drawn from the same probability
distribution. This corresponds to a Markov chain where all the rows of the transition matrix
are the same. Our result implies that stationary equilibrium payoﬀs converge to the ANBS with
the time-invariant probability distribution as bargaining weights. Consequently, our ﬁndings
cover the support results of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Miyakawa (2008), and Laruelle and
Valenciano (2008). Second, suppose that players make proposals in some ﬁxed order, which
is a straight-forward n-player extension of the alternating-oﬀer protocol in the classical paper
by Rubinstein (1982). The ﬁxed order of proposers induces a stationary distribution of the
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Markov chain with equal weights for all players. The limit equilibrium then corresponds to the
NBS, the result shown by Kultti and Vartiainen (2007). In the current paper, we reveal how
the aforementioned results are instances of a much more generally valid principle.
We assume that the set of feasible payoﬀs is comprehensive from below and that all weakly
Pareto-eﬃcient payoﬀs are also strongly Pareto-eﬃcient, implying that the relevant bargaining
space is (n − 1)-dimensional. Herings and Predtetchinski (2007) consider the same proposer
selection protocol as in this paper, but study the case of a 1-dimensional set of alternatives
where players have utility functions that are linear in the distance to their most preferred
alternative. A unique prediction for the equilibrium payoﬀs is obtained in the limit as the
discount factor goes to one. The equilibrium alternative of the bargaining game is contrasted
with the prediction of both the median voter theorem and the ANBS and it is argued that there
are no general relationships. Full dimensionality of the space of payoﬀs is therefore crucial to
obtain convergence to ANBS.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the formal description of the bargaining
game and the deﬁnition of the equilibrium concept. In Section 3, we give necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for a proﬁle of stationary strategies to be an equilibrium in accordance with that
concept. We also show that such an equilibrium exists. In Section 4, the main result is
established: our non-cooperative support for the ANBS. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The Bargaining Game
We consider the bargaining game Γ(N,M, V ). The set of players is denoted by N , and its
members are indexed from 1 until n. The game is played for potentially inﬁnitely many periods
t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. In each period, one player acts as the proposer. In period t = 0, the proposer
is determined in an arbitrary way. In all later periods, the proposer is chosen by a Markov
chain. The probability distribution on the players in period t > 0 depends on the identity of
the proposer in period t − 1. The entry mij of the matrix M is the probability that player j
will propose in period t given that player i has proposed in period t− 1. All entries of M are
nonnegative and for each i ∈ N , it is true that ∑nj=1mij = 1. The set V corresponds to all
feasible payoﬀs. We denote V ∩ Rn+ by V+. Our assumptions are as follows.
(A1) The set V is closed, convex, and comprehensive from below. The origin lies in the interior
of V . The set V+ is bounded and all weakly Pareto-eﬃcient points in V+ are also strongly
Pareto–eﬃcient.
(A2) The matrix M is irreducible.
We denote the interior and boundary of a set X by int(X) and ∂X respectively. A vector η
with ‖η‖ = 1 is said to be normal to the convex set V at a point v¯ ∈ V if (v − v¯)η ≤ 0 for
every v ∈ V. The set of all vectors η normal to V at v¯ is called the normal to V at v¯.
(A3) There is a unique vector in the normal to V at every v ∈ ∂V ∩ Rn+.
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The assumption that all weakly Pareto-eﬃcient points in V+ are also strongly Pareto–eﬃcient is
essential to our results. As we show later in Section 3, this assumption implies that a proposal
of a player i gives all other players their respective reservation payoﬀs. Thus a proposer always
extracts the full surplus from all other players. Our assumptions with respect to V are similar
to those in Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Miyakawa (2006).
The game proceeds as follows. In any period t, ﬁrst the proposer is chosen in the aforemen-
tioned way. Next, the proposer oﬀers a vector v ∈ V . Then, all players (including the proposer)
decide sequentially whether to accept or reject the oﬀer v, where for the sake of simplicity we
assume that player i responds before player i + 1. We deﬁne the set S(i) consisting of player
i and all its successors by S(i) = {j ∈ N | j ≥ i}. If all players have accepted the vector v in
period t, the game ends and each player i receives a payoﬀ of vi. As soon as one player rejects
v, period t + 1 starts with probability δ, and the game ends with probability 1 − δ. In the
latter case, as well as in the case of perpetual disagreement, all players receive zero payoﬀ. We
assume that players maximize expected payoﬀs.
We denote by Hpi the set of histories after which player i has to make a proposal and by
Hri the set of histories after which player i has to respond to a proposal. Then, a strategy for
player i is a map si : H
p
i ∪Hri → V ∪ {Yes,No}, where si(Hpi ) ⊂ V and si(Hri ) ⊂ {Yes,No}.
Player i’s strategy is stationary if the same proposal is made at all histories Hpi and if the
action taken at any history Hri depends only on the current proposal and the current proposer.
2
A Nash equilibrium is a proﬁle of strategies from which no player has an incentive to uni-
laterally deviate. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) is a proﬁle of strategies such that
its restriction to any subgame is a Nash equilibrium of that subgame.
A stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPE) is a proﬁle of stationary strategies
which is an SPE.
2.3 Analysis of Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies.
Theorem 2.3.11 gives the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a strategy proﬁle to be an
SSPE and Theorem 2.3.12 asserts that an SSPE exists.
The analysis in this section resembles Kalandrakis (2004), but some important diﬀerences
should be noted: We conclude rather than assume that agreement is immediate in SSPE
and we do not impose assumptions on the behavior of players who are indiﬀerent between
acceptance and rejection of some proposal. Furthermore, Banks and Duggan (2000) have given
an equilibrium analysis similar to the one developed in this section, but not covering the general
proposer protocol under consideration here.
Consider a proﬁle of stationary strategies. It can be described by an n×n -matrix Θ, where
2This notion of stationarity is weaker than the notion of subgame consistency due to Harsanyi and Selten
[?], which implies that a player chooses the same action at any two nodes for which the continuation game is the
same. For instance, suppose that rows i and j of M are identical. Then, the continuation games after rejection
of player i’s proposal and that after rejection of player j’s proposal are identical. Yet, our deﬁnition allows Aik
to be diﬀerent from Ajk for one or more players k ∈ N .
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the entry θij is the payoﬀ proposed to player j by player i, and a collection A of n2 acceptance
sets, where the acceptance set Aij is the set of vectors in V which player j will accept when
proposed by player i. The set of vectors in V accepted by player j and his successors, if proposed
by i, is AiS(j) = ∩k∈S(j)Aik. We refer to Ai = AiS(1) =
⋂
j∈N A
i
j as the social acceptance set for
proposer i.
Suppose that in period t, the proposal of player i is rejected. With probability 1 − δ the
game ends and all players receive zero payoﬀ, and with probability δ period t+1 is reached and
play proceeds according to the proﬁle (Θ,A) of stationary strategies. The expected payoﬀ to
player j after rejection is rij(Θ,A). Omitting the argument (Θ,A) from the notation wherever
possible, we refer to rij as the reservation payoﬀ of player j when i proposes.
Proposition 2.3.1 The reservation payoﬀ ri belongs to int(V ).
Proof: Conditional on the next period being reached, the payoﬀs are determined by a prob-
ability distribution on V (notice that also 0 ∈ V ), so expected payoﬀs belong to V since V
is convex. Since with probability 1 − δ the next period is not reached, these expected payoﬀs
equal δ−1ri, so δ−1ri ∈ V. Since 0 ∈ int(V ), the convex combination (1 − δ)0 + δδ−1ri = ri
belongs to int(V ). 
One implication of Proposition 4.3.8 is that a proposer always has the option to make a
proposal that strictly exceeds the reservation payoﬀ of every player.
Proposition 2.3.2 In SSPE, for j ∈ N, if v ∈ AiS(j), then vk ≥ rik for all k ∈ S(j).
Proof: Suppose that (Θ,A) is a proﬁle of stationary strategies such that v ∈ AiS(j) but vk < rik
for some player k ∈ S(j). Consider a history in Hrk, where player k responds to the proposal
v made by player i. At that history player k could deviate from (Θ,A) by rejecting v. In
that case, an expected payoﬀ of rik would result. Hence, this deviation is proﬁtable and (Θ,A)
cannot be an SSPE. 
Proposition 2.3.2 implies that for a vector of payoﬀs v to belong to the social acceptance
set, it should satisfy vj ≥ rij for all j ∈ N.
Proposition 2.3.3 In SSPE (a) if v ∈ V is such that vn > rin, then v ∈ Ain, and (b) for each
j = 1, . . . , n− 1 if v ∈ AiS(j+1) is such that vj > rij, then v ∈ Aij.
Proof: To prove part (a) of the proposition suppose that v ∈ V satisﬁes vn > rin. Consider a
history where player n has to respond to the proposal v of player i. If n accepts, the proposal
will be implemented, so a payoﬀ of vn will result, which is strictly greater than the payoﬀ r
i
n
which would result from a rejection. Therefore, SSPE requires that v ∈ Ain.
To prove part (b) take a j = 1, . . . , n − 1 and a v ∈ AiS(j+1) such that vj > rij. Consider a
history where player j responds to the proposal v of player i. If player j accepts, the proposal
will be implemented since all the players succeeding j accept. Since rejection results in a payoﬀ
of rij, SSPE requires that v ∈ Aij. 
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Proposition 4.3.2 established a kind of converse of Proposition 3.2. One implication of
Proposition 4.3.2 is that a vector v ∈ V that satisﬁes vj > rij for all j ∈ N belongs to the social
acceptance set Ai.
Proposition 2.3.4 In SSPE, each player’s proposal θi lies in the social acceptance set Ai for
proposer i.
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that under some SSPE there is a player i ∈ N such
that θi /∈ Ai. Consider the subgame starting at a history where player i is the proposer. Since θi
is rejected, ri is the vector of expected payoﬀs by deﬁnition. By Proposition 4.3.8, ri ∈ int(V ).
Consequently, there exists v ∈ V such that vj > rij for all j ∈ N . By the previous proposition,
v ∈ Ai. Hence, it would be a proﬁtable deviation for player i to propose v instead of θi. 
Proposition 2.3.5 In SSPE, θij ≥ 0 and rij ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N .
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that (Θ,A) is an SSPE and that θij < 0 for some
(i, j) ∈ N × N . Consider a history where player j has to respond to the proposal θi. By
Proposition 2.3.4, θi ∈ Ai, so player j will receive a strictly negative payoﬀ if play proceeds
according to (Θ,A). But then, it would be a proﬁtable deviation for player j to reject the
proposal. Consequently, it holds that θij ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N. It then follows that rij ≥ 0
for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N. 
The next proposition shows that an equilibrium proposal of any player gives all other players
their respective reservation payoﬀs. Thus a proposer always extracts the entire surplus from
the other players.
Proposition 2.3.6 In SSPE, θij = r
i
j for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N such that i = j.
Proof: Since θi ∈ Ai by Proposition 2.3.4, Proposition 2.3.2 implies that θij ≥ rij for all j ∈ N .
Suppose θik > r
i
k for some k ∈ N such that k = i. Deﬁne the vector v as follows,
vj =
⎧⎨
⎩θ
i
i if j = i
rij if j = i.
The vector v is clearly non–negative and it is in V , because v ≤ θi and V is comprehensive.
Furthermore, vk = r
i
k < θ
i
k, so the vector v is dominated by θ
i and is therefore not strongly
Pareto–eﬃcient. Since we assume that all weakly Pareto–eﬃcient vectors of V+ are also strongly
Pareto–eﬃcient, the vector v is not weakly Pareto–eﬃcient. Thus, there exists a vector v′ such
that v′j > vj for all j ∈ N .
We show now that v′ ∈ Ai. Indeed, v′j > vj = rij for all j = i. And for player i we have the
inequality v′i > vi = θ
i
i ≥ rii. Thus we conclude that v′j > rij for all j ∈ N . Proposition 4.3.2
now implies that v′ ∈ Ai, as desired.
But then player i has a proﬁtable deviation at any history where he is entitled to make a
proposal, namely propose the vector v′ rather than θi. Indeed, the vector v′ is accepted and
results in a payoﬀ of v′i > θ
i
i to player i. 
Proposition 3.7 claims that all players make a proposal belonging to the boundary of V.
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Proposition 2.3.7 In SSPE, θi ∈ ∂V for each i ∈ N .
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a player i ∈ N such that θi ∈ int(V ).
Equivalently, there exists v ∈ V such that vj > θij for all j ∈ N . By the immediate agreement
property, θi ∈ Ai. This implies that v ∈ Ai as well. But then it would be a proﬁtable deviation
for player i to propose v rather than θi. 
The previous propositions are collected in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.8 Suppose (Θ,A) is an SSPE proﬁle inducing reservation payoﬀs ri. For each
i ∈ N
θi ∈ Ai ∩ ∂V ∩ Rn+, (1)
ri = δ
∑n
k=1mikθ
k, (2)
θij = r
i
j, j ∈ N \ {i}, (3)
AiS(j) ⊂ ∩k∈{j,...,n}{v ∈ V |vk ≥ rik}, j ∈ N, (4)
Ain ⊃ {v ∈ V |vn > rin}, (5)
Aij ⊃ {v ∈ AiS(j+1)|vj > rij}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. (6)
In what follows, we establish the converse; the conditions of Theorem 2.3.8 characterize the
set of SSPE. To do so, we will ﬁrst state the well-known one-shot deviation principle.
Proposition 2.3.9 Let (Θ,A) be a stationary strategy proﬁle satisfying (1)–(6). If there is a
subgame such that some player has a proﬁtable deviation, then there is a subgame where he has
a proﬁtable one-shot deviation.
Here, a one-shot deviation in a subgame is a single deviation by the player at the root of
the subgame. The proof of this principle is standard in the literature and is based on the
optimality principle from dynamic programming. We will show next that no player has a
proﬁtable one–shot deviation from a proﬁle of strategies satisfying conditions (1)–(6).
Proposition 2.3.10 Let (Θ,A) be a stationary strategy proﬁle satisfying (1)–(6). There is no
subgame where a player has a proﬁtable one-shot deviation.
Proof: Consider the subgame at a history h ∈ Hpi . Suppose player i has a one-shot deviation
involving a proposal vi diﬀerent from θi. If vi does not belong to Ai, it leads to a payoﬀ rii for
player i. Since θij = r
i
j for all j = i and ri ∈ int(V ), the Pareto-eﬃciency of θi implies θii > rii,
so the deviation is not proﬁtable. If vi belongs to Ai, then, for j = i, vij ≥ rij = θij. Now vii ≤ θii,
since otherwise the Pareto-eﬃciency of θi would be violated. The deviation is not proﬁtable.
Consider a subgame at a history h ∈ Hrj where player j has to respond to a proposal v
made by player i. If j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and v /∈ AiS(j+1), then either action by player j leads
to a payoﬀ of rij and hence the deviation is not proﬁtable. Suppose now that either j = n or
j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and v ∈ AiS(j+1). If v ∈ Aij then the original strategy leads to a payoﬀ of vj
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while the deviation yields a payoﬀ of rij. Since vj ≥ rij by condition (4), the deviation is not
proﬁtable. If v /∈ Aij then the original strategy leads to a payoﬀ of rij while the deviation yields
a payoﬀ of vj. Since vj ≤ rij by conditions (5)–(6), the deviation is not proﬁtable. 
The previous two propositions imply that the strategies conforming to the conditions of
Theorem 2.3.8 are subgame perfect. Since they are also stationary, we have the following.
Theorem 2.3.11 The strategy proﬁle (Θ,A) fulﬁlls conditions (1)–(6) if and only if it is an
SSPE.
If a matrix Θ of proposals is part of an SSPE, then it is part of many SSPE’s. This
inessential multiplicity has two sources. First, if a responding player is proposed exactly the
reservation payoﬀ, then our characterization restricts behavior only if the proposal on the table
is the equilibrium proposal. This is reﬂected by the fact that each point on the boundary of the
social acceptance set (except the relevant equilibrium proposal) may or may not be an element
of that set in SSPE. Second, if a proposal lies outside a social acceptance set, it is indeterminate
which player will reject the proposal. Consider for example the case where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
r1 = (1, 1, 1, 1). Now suppose that player 1 has proposed v = (2, 2, 0, 0) in some subgame. Since
v3 < r
1
3 and v4 < r
1
4, Proposition 2.3.2 implies that v /∈ A1, and by Proposition 2.3.4 v = θ1.
It is also true that v /∈ A14: If the node where player 4 has to respond is reached, that player
eﬀectively chooses between a payoﬀ of 1 and a payoﬀ of 0, so SSPE requires rejection of the
proposal. However, the SSPE characterization leaves indeterminate whether players 1, 2, and
3 will accept or reject v. Consequently, there is an SSPE for any conﬁguration of responses by
these players. In particular, player 3 may accept v in SSPE although v3 < r
1
3, and player 2
may reject v although v2 > r
1
2. This reasoning even extends to player 1: In SSPE, it is possible
that v /∈ A11 although v1 > r11 and player 1 is the proposer. However, this does not mean that
player 1 may reject his own proposal on the equilibrium path, since the SSPE characterization
requires the speciﬁc proposal θ1 to be made and immediately accepted by all players.
Theorem 2.3.12 An SSPE exists.
For a proof of SSPE existence, we refer to Kalandrakis (2004).
2.4 The Limit Equilibrium
Our proofs so far did not rely on Assumptions A2 and A3. They will be needed for the results
of this section. Since the matrix M is irreducible, it has a unique stationary distribution
denoted by μ. Recall that the stationary distribution μ is a probability distribution on the set
of players N satisfying the equation μM = μ. Furthermore, irreducibility of M implies that all
states occur with positive probability under the stationary distribution, that is μi > 0 for each
i ∈ N . If the matrix M was reducible, the state space of M could be partitioned into several
communicating classes. In this case, one obtains results analogous to those in the sequel within
each communicating class.
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Theorem 2.4.2 below is the main result of the paper. As the continuation probability goes to
one, along any sequence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria of Γ, the equilibrium proposal
of all players converges to the same limit. This common limit is the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution weighted by the stationary distribution μ, denoted μ-ANBS.
Deﬁnition 2.4.1 The asymmetric Nash product with weights μ is the function ρ : V+ → R
deﬁned by
ρ(v) =
∏
i∈N
(vi)
μi .
The μ–ANBS is the unique maximizer of the function ρ on the set V+.
Theorem 2.4.2 Let {δh}h∈N be a sequence of continuation probabilities in [0, 1) converging to
1. For each h, let Θ(δh) be a matrix of proposals in some SSPE of the game Γ with continuation
probability δh. Then the limits limh→∞ θi(δh) exist for each i ∈ N . All limits are equal to the
μ–ANBS.
Let δh and Θ(δh) be as in Theorem 2.4.2. The sequence {Θ(δh)} has a convergent sub-
sequence, as it lies in the compact set V n+ , the Cartesian product of n copies of V+. For the
remainder of this section, we will ﬁx any such convergent subsequence and denote its limit
by Θ¯. Since the convergent subsequence considered is arbitrary, to prove Theorem 2.4.2 it is
suﬃcient to show that each column of the matrix Θ¯ is the μ–ANBS.
We now give a brief overview of the argument. First we show that along the sequence
{Θ(δh)} of equilibria the proposals of all players converge to a common limit, say the point
θ¯ ∈ V . We then compute the tangent space to the set ∂V at the point θ¯ by considering the
pairwise diﬀerences of the equilibrium proposals of players i and n, and show they converge
to zero at the same speed as 1 − δh. In fact, we are able to compute the limits of the vectors
(θi(δh)− θn(δh))/(1− δh) explicitly, which are then shown to span the tangent space to the set
∂V at the point θ¯. Using this result we show next that the tangent space at θ¯ is orthogonal
to the gradient of the asymmetric Nash product with weights μ, thereby showing that θ¯ is the
μ–ANBS.
Proposition 2.4.3 All columns of Θ¯ are identical.
Proof: For any i = j, it follows from the SSPE characterization that
θ¯ij =
n∑
k=1
mikθ¯
k
j .
Suppose that, contrary to the proposition, not all limit proposals θ¯1, . . . , θ¯n are the same. Let
j ∈ N be such that in the limit not all players propose the same to player j, and choose θ¯j to be
either mini∈N{θ¯ij} or maxi∈N{θ¯ij}, whichever is not equal to θ¯jj . Deﬁne N = {i ∈ N |θ¯ij = θ¯j}.
For any i ∈ N, we have
θ¯j = θ¯

j
∑
k∈N
mik +
∑
k∈N\N
mikθ¯
k
j ,
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which is equivalent to
θ¯j
∑
k∈N\N
mik =
∑
k∈N\N
mikθ¯
k
j .
Suppose ﬁrst that for some i ∈ N, ∑
k∈N\N
mik > 0.
Then
θ¯j =
∑
k∈N\N mikθ¯
k
j∑
k∈N\N mik
,
which contradicts the fact that either θ¯j < θ¯
k
j for all k ∈ N \N or θ¯j > θ¯kj for all k ∈ N \N.
Therefore, mik = 0 for all (i, k) ∈ N ×(N\N) and thus N is an absorbing set. Since N = N ,
this contradicts the irreducibility assumption on M . 
We denote a column of Θ¯ by θ¯. For i ∈ N \ {n}, we deﬁne
di(δh) =
1
1− δh (θ
i(δh)− θn(δh)).
Let D(δh) be the n× (n− 1)–matrix with columns d1(δh), . . . , dn−1(δh).
The rest of the proof is organized as follows. In Proposition 2.4.5 we compute the limits of
di(δh) as h goes to inﬁnity. Proposition 2.4.6 establishes that the limit of {di(δh)} belongs to
the tangent space to ∂V at θ¯. We then proceed to show in Proposition 2.4.8 that the limits of
d1(δh), . . . , d
n−1(δh) are linearly independent and thus span the tangent space to ∂V at θ¯. And
ﬁnally, Proposition 2.4.9 establishes that the gradient of the Nash product with weights μ at
the point θ¯ is orthogonal to the tangent space of V, thereby showing that θ¯ is the μ–ANBS.
For a matrix A, we denote by A−i and A−i the matrix A without its ith row and column,
respectively. We write 1 for a column vector of ones and I for the identity matrix.
For j ∈ N, we deﬁne the matrix L(j) by
L(j) = [M − I]−j−n.
Thus L(j) is the (n− 1)× (n− 1)–matrix obtained from M− I by deleting column j and row
n. Proposition 2.4.4 is an auxiliary result used in the proof of Proposition 2.4.5.
Proposition 2.4.4 The matrix L(j) is invertible for all j ∈ N.
Proof: Suppose L(j) is singular. Let a be a non–zero vector such that [M − I]−j−na = 0.
Since the elements in any column of the matrix M − I add up to zero, we also have the
equation (M − I)−jn a = 0, so [M − I]−ja = 0. By using [M − I]−j = (M − I)I−j and
deﬁning b = I−ja, we see that (M − I)b = 0. Thus the vector b is an eigenvector of M
associated with eigenvalue 1. By the Perron–Frobenius theorem, any non-zero eigenvector of
M associated with eigenvalue 1 is a strictly positive vector. However, since bj = 0, we have
obtained a contradiction. Consequently, the matrix L(j) is invertible. 
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Proposition 2.4.5 The sequence {D(δh)} of matrices converges to the matrix D¯ with rows
given by d¯j = θ¯j1
L−1(j) for j ∈ N .
Proof: We ﬁx h and denote δh by δ, θ
i(δh) by θ
i, and di(θh) by di.
For each j ∈ N and i ∈ N \ {j, n},
dij(1− δ) = θij − θnj = δ
n∑
k=1
mikθ
k
j − θnj
= δ
n∑
k=1
mik(θ
k
j − θnj ) + δθnj − θnj ,
where we use conditions (1) and (5) for the second equality, so
dij = δ
n−1∑
k=1
mikd
k
j − θnj .
We have found that
θnj = δ
∑
k/∈{i,n}
mikd
k
j + (δmii − 1)dij, j ∈ N, i ∈ N \ {j, n}. (7)
Similarly, for j = n,
djj(1− δ) = θjj − δ
n∑
k=1
mnkθ
k
j
= θjj − δ
n∑
k=1
mnk(θ
k
j − θnj )− δθnj
= θjj − θnj − δ
n∑
k=1
mnk(θ
k
j − θnj ) + (1− δ)θnj ,
where we use conditions (1) and (5) for the ﬁrst equality, so
djj = d
j
j − δ
n−1∑
k=1
mnkd
k
j + θ
n
j .
We have found that
θnj = δ
n−1∑
k=1
mnkd
k
j , j ∈ N \ {n}. (8)
We write (7)–(8) in vector–matrix notation as
θnj 1
 = dj(δM − I)−j−n, j ∈ N.
The matrix (M − I)−j−n is invertible by Proposition 2.4.4, and so is the matrix (δM − I)−j−n
for δ close enough to one. Thus, for every j ∈ N, we can solve the above system for dj as
dj = θ
n
j 1
[(δM − I)−j−n]−1.
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As δh goes to one, the sequence θ
n
j (δh) converges to θ¯j by Proposition 2.4.3. Thus the sequence
dj(δh) converges to θ¯j1
L−1(j), as desired. 
Proposition 2.4.5 expresses each row j of the matrix D¯ as the sum of the rows of the matrix
L−1(j) multiplied by the scalar θ¯j.
We show now that each column of the matrix D¯ is orthogonal to the normal vector of V at
the point θ¯, which is unique by Assumption A3. This is equivalent to saying that each column
of the matrix D¯ belongs to the tangent space of ∂V at θ¯. We let span(D¯) denote the column
span of the matrix D¯.
Proposition 2.4.6 It holds that span(D¯) is orthogonal to the normal vector of V at θ¯.
Proof: Let ηi(δh) denote the normal vector of V at the point θ
i(δh). Since {θi(δh)} converges
to θ¯, the sequence {ηi(δh)} converges to η¯, the normal vector to the set V at the point θ¯. By
the deﬁnition of the normal vector,
ηn(δh)
(θi(δh)− θn(δh)) ≤ 0 and ηi(δh)(θi(δh)− θn(δh)) ≥ 0.
Dividing by 1 − δh and passing to the limit yields the inequalities η¯d¯i ≤ 0 and η¯d¯i ≥ 0,
therefore η¯d¯i = 0, as desired. 
Propositions 2.4.7 and 2.4.8 address the dimension of span(D¯). We show that the columns
of D¯ are linearly independent, thus establishing that span(D¯) equals the tangent space of ∂V
at θ¯.
For j ∈ N, let Kj be the sum of the rows of the matrix L−1(j), thus
Kj = 1
L−1(j).
Deﬁne K as the n× (n− 1)–matrix with rows Kj. Proposition 2.4.7 expresses all rows of K in
terms of rows of L−1(n) and the stationary distribution μ induced by M.
Proposition 2.4.7 Any combination of n − 1 distinct rows of the matrix K is linearly inde-
pendent. Furthermore,
Kj = 1
L−1(j) = 1L−1(n)− 1
μj
(L−1(n))j, j ∈ N \ {n}.
Proof: We deﬁne x = [M − I]n−n. Consider some j ∈ N \ {n}. It can be veriﬁed by a direct
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computation that
L−1(j) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(L−1(n))1 − (L
−1(n)x)1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j
...
(L−1(n))j−1 − (L
−1(n)x)j−1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j
(L−1(n))j+1 − (L
−1(n)x)j+1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j
...
(L−1(n))n−1 − (L
−1(n)x)n−1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j
1
(L−1(n)x)j
(L−1(n))j
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
The formula above is well-known in linear programming and is used to compute the simplex
tableau following from a change in basis variables. By deﬁnition of the stationary distribution
we have
L(n)μ−n + xμn = 0.
We multiply this expression by L−1(n) and rearrange to obtain
L−1(n)x = − 1
μn
μ−n.
By substitution, we ﬁnd that
L−1(j) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(L−1(n))1 − μ1
μj
(L−1(n))j
...
(L−1(n))j−1 − μj−1
μj
(L−1(n))j
(L−1(n))j+1 − μj+1
μj
(L−1(n))j
...
(L−1(n))n−1 − μn−1
μj
(L−1(n))j
−μn
μj
(L−1(n))j
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Summing up the rows of L−1(j) we get
1L−1(j) =
∑
i∈N\{j,n}
(L−1(n))i +
μj − 1
μj
)(L−1(n))j = 1L−1(n)− 1
μj
(L−1(n))j.
Therefore,
K−n = [11 − C]L−1(n),
where C is the (n− 1)–diagonal matrix with element 1/μi in column i.
The matrix [11 − C] is non–singular. Suppose not, then there is y = 0 such that [11 −
C]y = 0. It follows that 11y = Cy = (y1/μ1, . . . , yn−1/μn−1), from which it follows in
30
particular that 1y = 0. By pre-multiplying the last equality with the row vector (μ1, . . . , μn−1),
we ﬁnd that (1−μn)1y = 1y, a contradiction since μn > 0. Consequently, the matrix [11−C]
is non–singular.
It follows that K−n is non–singular. Since the labeling of players is arbitrary, we have shown
that any combination of n− 1 distinct rows of the matrix K is linearly independent. 
Proposition 2.4.8 It holds that θ¯i > 0 for all i ∈ N . The column span of the matrix D¯ has
dimension n− 1.
Proof: We know that θ¯i ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N . Partition N into the set N0 of players i such that
θ¯i = 0 and the set N+ of players i such that θ¯i > 0.
Suppose that the set N0 is non–empty, so that the set N+ consists of at most n−1 elements.
We show ﬁrst that θ¯ ∈ span(D¯) by constructing a vector z ∈ Rn−1 such that D¯z = θ¯. Since the
rows Ki of the matrix K corresponding to the elements i of the set N+ are linearly independent
by Proposition 2.4.7, there exists a vector z ∈ Rn−1 such that Kiz = 1 for all i ∈ N+. Then
d¯iz = θ¯iKiz = θ¯i for all i ∈ N+. Trivially, z also satisﬁes the equations d¯iz = θ¯iKiz = 0 = θ¯i
for each i ∈ N0.
Let η be the normal vector to V at the point θ¯. Since η is orthogonal to span(D¯) by
Proposition 2.4.6, we have ηθ¯ = 0. Since zero is in the interior of V by assumption, the vector
εη is in the set V for ε > 0 small enough. But then we have the inequality η(εη − θ¯) =
ε(ηη) > 0, contradicting the deﬁnition of a normal vector. Consequently, the set N0 is empty.
We have shown the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
To prove the second part of the proposition, notice that D¯ can be written as the product
TK, where T is a diagonal matrix with θ¯i in column i. Since θ¯i > 0 for each i ∈ N , the matrix
T has full rank n, and the matrix K has rank n− 1 by Proposition 2.4.7. This establishes the
second part of the proposition. 
We now proof that the gradient of the logarithm of the asymmetric Nash product with weights
μ is orthogonal to the column span of the matrix D¯. We observe that for v  0,
ln ρ(v) =
∑
i∈N
μi ln(vi).
Proposition 2.4.9 It holds that span(D¯) is orthogonal to the gradient of the function ln ρ at
the point θ¯.
Proof: The gradient of ln ρ at θ¯ is the vector g given by gj = μj/θ¯j, j ∈ N. We have the
following chain of equations∑
j∈N
gj d¯j =
∑
j∈N
μj1
L−1(j)
=
∑
j∈N\{n}
μj[1
L−1(n)− 1
μj
(L−1(n))j] + μn1L−1(n)
= 1L−1(n)−
∑
j∈N\{n}
(L−1(n))j
= 1L−1(n)− 1L−1(n) = 0,
31
where the ﬁrst equality uses the result of Proposition 2.4.5, and the second one Proposition 2.4.7.
This establishes the proposition. 
The proof of Theorem 2.4.2 is now immediate. The column span of the matrix D¯ is orthogonal
to the normal vector of V at θ¯ by Proposition 2.4.6, and at the same time it is orthogonal to
the gradient of ln ρ at θ¯ by Proposition 2.4.9. Since span(D¯) has dimension n− 1 (Proposition
2.4.8), it follows at once that the gradient of the function ln ρ is proportional to the normal
vector to V at θ¯. Hence, the point θ¯ is the maximizer of the function ln ρ on the strictly positive
vectors in the set V, as well as the maximizer of the function ρ on the set V+.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided further non-cooperative support to the asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining solution. We demonstrate that existing results are instances of a much more generally
valid principle. We consider a bargaining process involving any number of players, an arbitrary
irreducible Markov process that determines the selection of the proposer, and any set of feasi-
ble payoﬀs that is bounded, convex, and has a smooth boundary. As long as no agreement is
reached, negotiations break down with some ﬁxed probability.
We fully characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. We
show that at least one such equilibrium exists and argue that in general there are many such
equilibria. We continue by studying the limit of an arbitrary sequence of equilibria when the
probability of breakdown goes to zero. We establish that in the limit all players make the same
proposal. Moreover, this proposal is the same as the one corresponding to the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution, where the weights in the Nash product are equal to the stationary
distribution of the Markov process that determines the selection of the proposer.
One implication is that if players are selected as proposer in some ﬁxed order, then the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution is achieved in the limit. This can be seen as a generalization
of alternating oﬀer bargaining to more than two players. Another implication is that if players
are selected according to time-invariant probabilities, these probabilities are equal to the weights
in the Nash product. The symmetric Nash bargaining solution would again result if the time-
invariant probabilities are uniform.
It is noteworthy that the bargaining power of the players is only aﬀected by the stationary
distribution of the proposer selection process. The particular shape of the set of feasible payoﬀs
is irrelevant for the weights of the players in the Nash product, as are the particular probabilities
by which the proposer in the next period is chosen conditional on the current proposer.
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3 Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
3.1 Introduction
Two players bargain on how to divide a pie of unit size among themselves. They can only
consume the pie once they have agreed on its division. Players are impatient and thus discount
future consumption. 3
We are interested in the ability to commit as a source of bargaining power. We study this
question using a notion of commitment with the following two characteristics:
First, the commitment is not expressed as a share of the pie but rather in terms of the pie’s
time value discounted back to the beginning of the bargaining process. The simple rationale
behind this speciﬁcation is that a commitment should be stated in the terms which the impatient
player cares about. Such “value–committing” has been introduced to the literature earlier by
Li (2007) and stands in contrast to the idea of “share–committing”, which is more standard in
the literature.
Second, we will assume that the commitment to a certain time value is perfectly binding
as long as the pie has at least the committed value. However, as soon as so much time has
elapsed that even the receipt of the entire pie would not lead to the committed value anymore,
the commitment is assumed to become void. To the best of our knowledge, this notion of
commitment is new to the bargaining literature.
Our assumption simply means that we do not allow a player to remain committed to some-
thing which is not feasible (anymore). This form of commitment confronts the player with the
following dilemma: A high commitment becomes void soon, whereas a low commitment stays
in eﬀect for a long time.
It has long been recognized that an irrevocable (and perfectly credible) commitment would
be an extremely powerful tool. In fact, if only one player can make such a commitment, the
strategic situation resembles that in an ultimatum game, and the committed player captures
the entire surplus – a result which seems unattractively lopsided. The literature has looked for
ways to obtain more attractive or reasonable results by limiting the commitment’s credibility.
The standard approach which has been taken is to introduce a cost at which a commitment
can be revoked. For instance, Muthoo (1992) presents a model of bargaining which generalizes
the Nash (1953) demand game as well as Rubinstein’s (1982) well-known alternating oﬀer
bargaining procedure. The former is seen as a polar case of irrevocable commitments, and the
latter as an extreme case of revocable commitments, and the cost of revoking a commitment
is used as the parameter scaling between the two. A typical result in this literature is that
the player with the higher cost of revoking a commitment has an advantage, see, for instance,
Muthoo (1996).
A diﬀerent well-established approach is that of endogenous commitments. For instance,
Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) and Li (2007) consider the possibility that rejecting a proposal
commits a player not to accept any worse proposal in the future, an approach which can be
3This chapter corresponds to the paper V.Britz (2010), “Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining,”
METEOR Research Memorandum RM/10/056.
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motivated by shifts in players’ reference points. This approach has been extended and combined
with the cost of revoking approach by Calabuig, Cunyat, and Olcina (2002). In Cunyat (2004),
a player can choose the strength of his commitment before the bargaining starts. 4
In what follows, we will study the following game: One out of two players has access to
the aforementioned commitment device. That player announces his commitment level. Sub-
sequently, a potentially inﬁnite number of bargaining rounds follows. In each such round, one
of the two players is recognized as the proposer by a draw from a time-invariant probability
distribution. The proposing player makes an oﬀer and the game ends if this oﬀer is accepted by
the opponent. In case of a rejection the next round starts. However, any consumption in the
next round will be discounted by a constant factor δ ∈ (0, 1). In line with our earlier discussion,
the commitment device punishes the committed player if he accepts less than his commitment
level while the pie’s value is still higher than that level. But once the “moment of truth“ where
the pie’s value shrinks below the commitment level has passed, no punishment is given. One
interpretation is that the device punishes “treason“ but forgives “failure“ . Agreeing to less
than the commitment while the pie is still suﬃciently valuable is akin to giving in to the op-
ponent (treason, weakness), while making an agreement after the moment of truth is giving
in to the facts after the failure of an excessively strong bargaining posture. One alternative
commitment device would punish the player not only if he breaks his commitment before the
moment of truth, but also as soon as the moment of truth is reached. After all, in the latter
case it is clear that his promise cannot be fulﬁlled anymore. It can be shown that this seemingly
stronger commitment device does not confer any bargaining power and is therefore not useful.
We will see, however, that the more ﬂexible commitment device which we propose, does confer
substantial bargaining power.
Using a slight reﬁnement of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we ﬁnd immediate and
eﬃcient agreement on a unique division of the pie. If the pie shrinks very rapidly, then the ability
to commit is extremely valuable. The committed player can obtain almost the entire surplus
even if his proposal power is close to zero. If the pie shrinks very slowly, commitment creates
less bargaining power and the recognition probabilities become more important in determining
the allocation of the surplus. In the limit as δ goes to one, proposal power and commitment
power are “equally important” in the following sense: If one player can commit and the other
player has a recognition probability close to one, then the surplus is shared almost equally.
We present extensions of the model to games where both players can make a commitment
before the bargaining starts. If they do so sequentially, then in the limit as δ goes to one,
the ﬁrst mover receives a share between one half and two thirds of the pie, depending on the
recognition probabilities. With irrevocable and permanent commitment, one would expect the
ﬁrst mover to obtain the entire surplus.
We also consider the case where players make their commitments simultaneously. With irre-
vocable and permanent commitment, one would expect all eﬃcient pie divisions to be supported
4In a diﬀerent stream of literature, players can be of a fully rational type or of a stubborn type. Stubbornness
is then a form of commitment. A typical issue within that literature is the possible incentive of a rational player
to try and mimic a stubborn type. Well-known examples are Abreu and Gul (2000) and Kambe (1999). In this
paper, we do not consider diﬀerent types of the same player.
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by equilibria irrespective of the value of the discount factor. With the notion of commitment
which we suggest, this is no longer true. If the discount factor is chosen suﬃciently large, then
we ﬁnd a rather narrow range of eﬃcient divisions which are supported by equilibria. More
precisely, the share of the pie whose allocation is left unpredicted by the equilibrium concept
in the limit is at most one ﬁfth. Moreover, a player can never receive less than one third of
the pie in an equilibrium with δ close to one – even with arbitrarily small proposal power. The
equal split is the unique division with the property that it can be supported by an equilibrium
regardless of the parameter choices for the discount factor and the recognition probabilities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we formally describe
the game in which only a single player can make a commitment. In section 3, we study the
bargaining stage of that game and solve for the equilibrium given the choice of commitment.
In section 4, the game as a whole is solved and the optimal commitment is thus derived. In
section 5, the game is extended to the case where both players can choose a commitment before
the bargaining starts. Again, an analysis of the bargaining stage given the commitment levels
is given. The conclusions of section 4 will be essential for this analysis. Section 6 deals with
the optimal choice of commitments by both players. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 The game with one committed player
The player set is N = {1, 2}. The two players have a perfectly divisible pie of unit size at
their disposal. They consume the pie once they have agreed on its division. Each player’s
instantaneous utility is equal to his consumption of pie, but future consumption is discounted
by a constant and common factor δ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that at any time t, the players can
divide among themselves a surplus of value δt. In the sequel, we will mean by the surplus the
time value, discounted to time t = 0, of the pie to be divided.
The game G consists of a commitment stage and a bargaining stage. The game starts with
the commitment stage in which a player (without loss of generality, we suppose it is player
1) chooses a level of commitment c1 ∈ [0, 1]. The ensuing bargaining stage is set in discrete
time t = 0, 1, . . .. At the start of each such round t, one player is recognized as the proposer
according to the probability distribution (β1, β2), where β1 + β2 = 1 and βk > 0 for both
k = 1, 2. This player then proposes a division of the surplus, i.e. a pair (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ such that
x1 + x2 ≤ δt. If the other player rejects the proposal, round t + 1 starts. If the other player
accepts the proposal, it is implemented and the game ends with the following payoﬀs for the
players:
u1(x1, c1, t) =
⎧⎨
⎩x1 − λ if x1 < c1 ≤ δ
t
x1 otherwise
u2(x2) = x2
If players disagree forever, their payoﬀs are zero.
If c1 ≤ δt, we will say that the commitment c1 is eﬀective at time t. If c1 > δt, we say that
the commitment c1 is void at time t.
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The extensive form of the model admits two diﬀerent interpretations. The main interpre-
tation we use here is that a pie of size one is available but the players are impatient. Their
commitments are expressed in terms of time value rather than the underlying pie itself. An-
other interpretation of the model is that a pie of unit size is available initially but physically
shrinks by the factor δ each round, while players are indiﬀerent to the passage of time. With
this interpretation, the commitment is expressed in terms of the physical pie and expires as
soon as that pie has shrunk below the commitment level.
If player 1 agrees to receive less than c1 while the commitment is still eﬀective, he incurs
a cost λ. We are interested in commitments which are perfectly binding until they expire.
Therefore, we assume that λ is large enough so that u1(x1, c1, t) < 0 whenever x1 < c1 ≤
δt. 5 Thus, perpetual disagreement is better for player 1 than the violation of an eﬀective
commitment.
Suppose that in the game G, player 1 has chosen the commitment level c1 at his initial
decision node. Given c1, the game’s bargaining stage will start. We refer to this bargaining
stage as the bargaining (sub-)game G(c1), which will be analyzed in the next section. Moreover,
we will denote by G(c1, t) some subgame of G(c1) which begins with the move of nature in round
t ≥ 1 of bargaining. Given a bargaining subgame G(c1) and a round t, there are many such
subgames G(c1, t), all of which are, however, equivalent with regard to strategies and payoﬀs.
6
3.3 Subgame perfect bargaining equilibrium
In this section, we consider the bargaining subgame G(c1) for any given commitment level
c1, and solve for the equilibrium division of the surplus. As a solution concept, we will use
a slight reﬁnement of the well-known subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE). The purpose
of the reﬁnement is to break ties in favor of agreement. Such a behavior would follow from
SPE in the entire game G, but has to be imposed exogenously when a bargaining subgame is
considered in isolation. More formally, let sBi be the (bargaining) strategy for player i = 1, 2
in the game G(c1). In accordance with the usual deﬁnition of a strategy, s
B
i assigns to each
history of G(c1) either a proposal to be made by player i or a decision on whether to accept or
reject the opponent’s current proposal. As by the standard deﬁnition, a strategy pair (s¯Bi , s¯
B
j )
is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) if its restriction to any subgame of G(c1) is a Nash
equilibrium in that subgame. In the following deﬁnition, we introduce a reﬁnement of this
equilibrium concept.
Deﬁnition 3.3.1 A strategy pair (s¯Bi , s¯
B
j ) is a subgame-perfect bargaining equilibrium (SPBE)
of G(c1) if it is an SPE and, in addition, satisﬁes the following conditions.
1. Suppose that under the proﬁle s¯B, player j = 1, 2 rejects a particular proposal, say x, at
some history, say h. Let s˜Bj be the strategy which accepts the proposal x at h but agrees
5This is ensured for any λ ≥ 1. A diﬀerent appealing speciﬁcation is that λ(c1) = c1 for any c1.
6For the analysis, it will be convenient that the random draw of the proposer in each round gives the game a
stationary structure. Matters would be more complicated with a sequential-oﬀers protocol such as Rubinstein
(1982), although the ﬂavor of the main (limit) results in this paper would be expected to carry over to such a
setting as well.
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with strategy s¯Bj at all other histories. Then, the restriction of the proﬁle (s¯
B
i , s¯
B
j ) to the
subgame starting at h leads to a strictly greater payoﬀ for player j in this subgame than
the restriction of the proﬁle (s¯Bi , s˜
B
j ).
2. Suppose that under the proﬁle s¯B, there is a history h at which player i = 1, 2 makes a
proposal, say x, which is subsequently rejected by player j = i. Suppose further that in the
subgame following this rejection, the appropriate restriction of s¯B leads to a payoﬀ of ri
for player i. Let X˜ be the set of proposals which, if made by player i at history h, would
subsequently be accepted by player j under the proﬁle s¯B. Then, it holds that ri > x˜i for
all x˜ ∈ X˜.
The ﬁrst condition above says that a player only rejects a proposal in SPBE when accepting
the proposal would make him strictly worse oﬀ. The second condition says that a player only
makes an unacceptable proposal in SPBE if this is strictly better for him than making an
acceptable proposal.
In standard bargaining models without commitment, the fact that delay is costly implies
that in any round there is a feasible agreement which strictly Pareto-dominates the payoﬀ vector
which would result from disagreement in that round. Under such conditions, SPE strategy
proﬁles have the properties that agreement is reached immediately, and that a responder accepts
a proposal when indiﬀerent between acceptance and rejection. In the model at hand, however,
the commitment leads to a discontinuity in the utility function. Such a discontinuity makes it
possible that in some round, some feasible agreement is strictly preferred to disagreement by
one player, while the other player is indiﬀerent, and no feasible agreement makes both players
strictly better oﬀ than disagreement. In such a situation, the standard SPE concept leaves it
indeterminate whether or not an agreement will be reached. With SPBE as the solution concept,
agreement is ensured. It can be shown that delay on the equilibrium path is inconsistent with
SPE if the entire game (including the commitment stage) is considered. In this sense, the
reﬁnement from SPE to SPBE can be seen as merely technical.
We will now formalize the idea of the “moment of truth” mentioned in the introduction.
Deﬁne
τ(c1) =
⎧⎨
⎩min{t ∈ N|t > ln(c1)/ ln(δ)} if c1 ∈ (0, 1]0 if c1 = 0
so that in round τ(c1) and all later rounds, the commitment c1 is void. We will say that the
commitment c1 expires at time τ(c1).
Remark 3.3.2 The deﬁnition of τ(c1) readily implies that:
1. δτ(c1) < c1 for all c1 ∈ (0, 1];
2. δc1 ≤ δτ(c1) for all c1 ∈ [0, 1];
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3. τ(c1δ
t) = τ(c1) + t for all c1 ∈ (0, 1] and t ∈ N.
These properties of τ(c1) will be exploited repeatedly throughout the paper.
Consider a subgame G(c1, t) for any t ≥ τ(c1). Any such subgame is equivalent to a
bargaining game without commitment. In fact, the only diﬀerence compared to the game in
Rubinstein (1982) is that proposals are not made in an alternating fashion but that the proposer
in each round is determined by a ﬁxed recognition probability. The following lemma says that
in such a subgame following the expiry of the commitment, the available surplus is divided in
the proportion of the recognition probabilities.
Lemma 3.3.3 In any subgame G(c1, τ(c1)), player k’s (k = i, j) expected SPBE payoﬀ is equal
to βkδ
τ(c1).
Proof: Binmore (1987) proves that the SPE payoﬀs in such a subgame are equal to βkδ
τ(c1).
The corresponding SPE strategy proﬁle conforms to our deﬁnition of an SPBE strategy proﬁle.

By setting a commitment of zero, player 1 can eﬀectively choose to play the bargaining
game without commitment, recall that τ(0) = 0. Lemma 3.3.3 implies that in an SPBE of that
bargaining game, the surplus will be divided in the proportion of the recognition probabilities,
as stated in the following corollary. As one would intuitively expect, the possibility to com-
mit cannot weaken player 1’s bargaining position compared to an analogous bargaining game
without commitment.
Corollary 3.3.4 If c1 = 0, then the SPBE payoﬀs in G(c1) are (β1, β2).
We have earlier introduced G(c1, t) as the notation for a subgame of G(c1) which starts with
the move of nature at round t ≥ 1. Clearly, there are many such subgames, and each such
subgame may in principle have more than one SPBE.
Deﬁnition 3.3.5 We will say that the SPBE payoﬀs of G(c1, t) are essentially unique if all
SPBE of all subgames of the type G(c1, t) lead to the same payoﬀs.
In particular, Lemma 3.3.3 implies that the SPBE payoﬀs of G(c1, τ(c1)) are essentially
unique for any c1.
We now introduce the notion of a player’s aspiration, which is crucial in the equilibrium
analysis.
Deﬁnition 3.3.6 Suppose that for some t ∈ N0, the SPBE payoﬀs of G(c1, t+1) are essentially
unique and equal to (vt+11 , v
t+1
2 ). Then, the players’ aspirations at time t under the commitment
c1 are
αt1(c1) = min{x1 ∈ [0, 1]|u1(x1, c1, t) ≥ vt+11 )}
αt2(c1) = v
t+1
2 (c1)
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A player’s aspiration at some point in time is that amount of surplus which the player
would have to receive at that point in order to realize at least his reservation utility, that
is, the expected utility from delaying the agreement to the next time period. The presence of
commitment in our model creates a discontinuity in the utility function of the committed player.
This discontinuity leads to a distinction between what is commonly called the reservation utility
and what we have here deﬁned as the aspiration. More formally, the above deﬁnition implies
the following.
αt1(c1) =
⎧⎨
⎩v
t+1
1 (c1) if t ≥ τ(c1)
max{c1, vt+11 (c1)} otherwise
(9)
αt2(c1) = v
t+1
2 (c1) (10)
In particular, if τ(c1) ≥ 1, then the aspirations of players 1 and 2 at time t = τ(c1)− 1 are
αt1(c1) = c1 and α
t
2(c1) = β2δ
τ(c1). Intuitively, when we reason backwards from round τ(c1) to
round τ(c1)− 1, then player 1’s aspiration level jumps up to c1 due to the discontinuity which
occurs in the utility function. As a consequence, the sum of the aspirations before time τ(c1)
may exceed the available surplus so that there is no scope for an agreement.
Lemma 3.3.7 Suppose that for some t ∈ N0, the SPBE payoﬀs of G(c1, t + 1) are essentially
unique and equal to (vt+11 , v
t+1
2 ). Then, the SPBE of G(c1, t) are essentially unique as well and
are given by
vti(c1) =
⎧⎨
⎩α
t
i(c1) + βi
(
δt − αti(c1)− αtj(c1)
)
if αti(c1) + α
t
j(c1) ≤ δt
vt+1i otherwise
(11)
for i = 1, 2 and j = i.
Proof: Suppose without loss of generality that in round t, player i is the proposer and
player j is the responder. Consider the case where αti + α
t
j ≤ δt. (In this proof, we omit the
argument (c1) from the notation.) We claim that in SPBE, agreement will be reached on the
division (δt − αtj, αtj). By deﬁnition of αtj and the supposed essential uniqueness of SPBE of
G(c1, t+1), it holds that player j weakly prefers an agreement x at t to disagreement at t if and
only if xj ≥ αtj. By the deﬁnition of SPBE, it follows that any proposal x will be accepted by
player j at time t if and only if xj ≥ αtj. In particular, the proposal (δt − αtj, αtj) is acceptable
to player j. Indeed, proposing this division is weakly preferred by player i to disagreement
because of the supposition that δt − αtj ≥ αti. By the deﬁnition of SPBE, it follows that player
i will make an acceptable proposal. Standard arguments imply that player i will not make an
ineﬃcient proposal, and not oﬀer more than αtj to player j, so that the SPBE proposal is indeed
exactly (δt − αtj, αtj). Taking into account that the proposer is chosen from the distribution β,
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we have now shown the lemma for the case where αti+α
t
j ≤ δt. Suppose next that αti+αtj > δt.
We show that no agreement is reached at t. As we have argued before, player j weakly prefers
an agreement x to disagreement if and only if xj ≥ αtj. Thus, if an agreement x were reached
at time t, then xi ≤ δt − αtj < αti. By deﬁnition of αti, the agreement xi gives player i a strictly
lower utility than he would get if there were no agreement at t. But player i has the option to
make an unacceptable proposal to player j, for instance (x˜i, x˜j) = (1, 0). Thus, no agreement
is possible in SPBE at time t, so that the reservation utilities at t are equal to the reservation
utilities at t+ 1, as desired. 
Lemma 3.3.3 and Lemma 3.3.7 provide us with an explicit backward-induction algorithm
to compute the SPBE payoﬀs in the game G(c1). The former lemma says that the SPBE
payoﬀs of G(c1, τ(c1)) are essentially unique, and also states these payoﬀs explicitly. But the
latter lemma allows us to compute the essentially unique SPBE payoﬀs of G(c1, t) whenever
the essentially unique SPBE payoﬀs of G(c1, t + 1) are known. At each step of the backward
induction procedure, Equations (9)-(10) give the aspirations in round t as a function of the
reservation utilities vt+1. Then, Equation (11) translates the aspirations αt into the reservation
utilities vt. Since the commitment c1 expires at a ﬁnite time τ(c1), we reach the payoﬀs v
0 after
ﬁnitely many iterations and have thus computed the SPBE payoﬀs of the entire bargaining
subgame G(c1). In this way, we arrive at Theorem 3.3.8, which will conclude this section.
Before stating the theorem, however, we will now give some illustration of the computations
carried out according to the algorithm.
Let us consider ﬁrst the situation where c1+β2δ
τ(c1) > 1. (For the purpose of this illustration,
we will drop the arguments (c1) from the notation.) Then, the backward-induction procedure
begins as follows.
vτ = (β1δ
τ , β2δ
τ )
ατ−1 = (c1, β2δτ )
vτ−1 = (β1δτ , β2δτ ) = vτ
The ﬁrst line follows from Lemma 3.3.3, and the second line from Deﬁnition 3.3.6. Since
c1 + β2δ
τ > δτ−1, Lemma 3.3.7 implies the third line. Finally, we can observe that vτ−1 = vτ .
But now, since c1 + β2δ
τ > 1 ≥ δt for any t = 0, 1, . . . , τ − 1, we can iterate the argument
and eventually ﬁnd v0 = vτ = (β1δ
τ , β2δ
τ ). We depict the situation on the ﬁrst of the following
time-lines, where the solid line segment stands for periods where agreement is possible, and the
dotted line segment stands for periods where no agreement is feasible. Player 1’s commitment
is so high that no agreement can be reached while the commitment is eﬀective.
Now consider the case where c1 > 0 and, furthermore, c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1. In that case, we
deﬁne
a1(c1) = max{z ∈ N0|δz ≥ c1 + β2δτ(c1)}
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                                    
t = 0 τ(c1)
In words, round a1(c1) is the latest round of bargaining in which c1 is eﬀective and the
surplus is suﬃcient to satisfy both players’ aspirations. As in the previous case, the backward-
induction algorithm is initialized by the payoﬀs at round τ (again, we omit the arguments (c1)).
By the same token as before, we have
vτ = (β1δ
τ , β2δ
τ )
...
va1+1 = (β1δ
τ , β2δ
τ ) = vτ
But now, by deﬁnition of a1, it holds that c1+β2δ
τ ≤ δa1 . Therefore, the second case stated
in Lemma 3.3.7 applies, and we have
va11 = β1(δ
a1 − β2δτ ) + β2c1
va12 = β1β2δ
τ + β2(δ
a1 − c1)
Since va11 ≥ c1, we now have αa1−1 = va1 . In rounds t < a1, aspirations are equal to the
expected payoﬀs in round t + 1, and therefore they sum up to δt+1 < δt, so that agreement is
always possible. Iterating this argument yields
v01(c1) = β1 + β2c1 − β1β2δτ(c1)
v02(c1) = β2 − β2c1 + β1β2δτ(c1)
Again, on the second time-line a solid line indicates periods in which an agreement can be
reached and dotted lines indicate periods in which delay occurs because the sum of aspirations
is higher than the current surplus.
                                     
t = 0 a1(c1) τ(c1)
The theorem below gives the SPBE payoﬀs in the game G(c1) as computed by the backward
induction procedure in function of player 1’s choice of c1.
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Theorem 3.3.8 All SPBE of the bargaining subgame G(c1) lead to a payoﬀ for player 1 given
by the following function π1(c1).
π1(c1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
β1 + β2c1 − β1β2δτ(c1) if c1 + β2δτ(c1) ≤ 1 and c1 > 0
β1δ
τ(c1) if c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) > 1
β1 if c1 = 0
In the ﬁrst and third cases, an eﬃcient agreement is reached immediately so that the payoﬀ
to player 2 equals 1− π1(c1). Only in the second case, delay occurs, and the payoﬀ to player 2
is equal to β2δ
τ(c1).
We emphasize that the essential uniqueness of SPBE payoﬀs in the bargaining subgame
does not imply anything about uniqueness of SPBE strategies. For instance, in a round t such
that a1(c1) < t < τ(c1), no agreement is possible, since the sum of players’ aspirations exceeds
the available surplus. In SPBE, no agreement can therefore occur in such a round t. However,
it is indeterminate which proposal is made in round t.
3.4 Optimal commitment
In the previous section, we have found player 1’s expected SPBE payoﬀ in the subgame G(c1)
for any commitment level c1. Now we proceed to the analysis of the game G and ask which
level of commitment player 1 will choose in equilibrium. In the game G, a pair of strategies
is a unilateral commitment equilibrium (UCE) if player 1’s choice of commitment c¯1 satisﬁes
π1(c¯1) ≥ π1(c1) for all c1 ∈ [0, 1] and the restriction of the strategy pair to the bargaining
subgame G(c1) is an SPBE in that subgame.
So far, we have not used the assumption that each player has a strictly positive recognition
probability. It will become essential in this section.
The content of the following two lemmas is straightforward. It is shown ﬁrst that in UCE,
player 1 indeed makes use of the commitment device by choosing a strictly positive c1. On the
other hand, we show that in UCE, the commitment will be chosen suﬃciently small so that an
agreement can be reached before time τ(c1).
Lemma 3.4.1 In any UCE of the game G, it is true that c1 > 0.
Proof: Since limc1↓0[c1 + β2δ
τ(c1)] = 0, we can ﬁnd c
′
1 > 0 suﬃciently small such that
c′1 + β2δ
τ(c′1) ≤ 1. Then, it follows from Theorem 3.3.8 that π1(c′) = β1 + β2c′1 − β1β2δτ(c′1).
By deﬁnition of τ(c1), it holds that c1 > δ
τ(c1) for any c1 > 0. If β1 < 1, this implies that
π1(c
′
1) > β1 + β
2
2δ
τ(c′1), which readily implies π1(c
′
1) > β1. But by Corollary 3.3.4, β1 is the
payoﬀ to player 1 from the choice of c1 = 0. 
Lemma 3.4.2 In any UCE of the game G, it holds that c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1.
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Proof: Suppose not. Then, by Theorem 3.3.8, player 1’s UCE payoﬀ in the subgame G(c1)
equals β1δ
τ(c1) ≤ β1δ. Player 1 may deviate from his choice of c1 to a commitment level of
zero. In that case, a payoﬀ of β1 > 0 will result. Since β1 > β1δ, this deviation is proﬁtable, a
contradiction. 
The two previous lemmas show that only the ﬁrst case mentioned in Theorem 3.3.8 is
relevant in a UCE of the entire game, giving rise to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4.3 In any UCE of the game G, an eﬃcient agreement is reached immediately.
The commitment level c1 of player i satisﬁes c1 > 0 and c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1. The payoﬀ to player
1 is given by
π1(c1) = β1 + β2c1 − β1β2δτ(c1)
and the payoﬀ to player 2 equals 1− π1(c1).
The expression for player 1’s payoﬀ in the above corollary can be rewritten as π1(c1) =
c1+β1(1−c1−β2δτ(c1)), and the concomitant payoﬀ of player 2 as β2δτ(c1)+β2(1−c1−β2δτ(c1)).
Hence, given that player 1’s commitment c1 satisﬁes c1 > 0 and c1 + β2δ
τ(c) ≤ 1, the resulting
division of the surplus can be interpreted as follows: Player 1 obtains his commitment level c1,
player 2 his resulting aspiration β2δ
τ(c1), and the remainder is divided in the proportion of the
recognition probabilities – as it would be if there were no commitment.
We now deﬁne a particular commitment level (depending on δ and β) and then show that
this commitment will be chosen in UCE. Indeed, let
ψ1 =
⎧⎨
⎩δ
m˜ if δm˜ ≥ 1
2−δβ1
1− β2δm˜ otherwise
where m˜ is given by
m˜ = min
{
m ∈ N0| δm ≤ 1
1 + β2δ
}
Theorem 3.4.4 In any UCE of the game G, player 1 commits to ψ1. Moreover, agreement is
reached immediately on the division (ϕ1, 1− ϕ1), where ϕ1 = π1(ψ1).
Proof:
Step 1. In UCE, agreement is reached immediately as by Corollary 3.4.3, under an
eﬀective commitment c1 > 0 such that c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1. Using the expression for the payoﬀ
in Corollary 3.4.3, the following statement is easily veriﬁed: For some c1 > 0 such that
c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) < 1, suppose that there exists ε > 0 suﬃciently small so that τ(c1 + ε) = τ(c1)
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and c1 + ε+ β2δ
τ(c1) ≤ 1. Then, π1(c1 + ε) > π1(c1). Hence, c1 cannot be the optimal choice of
commitment. Conversely, we have shown that if c1 is optimal, then either it holds that c1 = δ
m
for some m ∈ N0, or that c1 + β2δτ(c1) = 1.
Step 2. By construction of m˜, any c1 ≥ δm˜−1 would violate the condition c1 + β2δτ(c1) ≤ 1,
and can thus not be optimal by Corollary 3.4.3. We have shown that the optimal commitment
level satisﬁes c1 < δ
m˜−1.
Step 3. We show next that c1 ≥ δm˜ in UCE. To see this, suppose by way of contradiction
that some c1 < δ
m˜ is optimal. By deﬁnition of m˜, we have c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) < 1. Since the
inequality is strict, the argument in Step 1 above implies that c1 = δ
m′ for some m′ ∈ N0. But
then m′ > m˜ because c1 < δm˜. Plugging into the payoﬀ function, we see that π1(δm˜) > π1(δm
′
).
Thus, player 1 could proﬁtably deviate from c1 = δ
m′ to a commitment of δm˜, a contradiction.
We have now established that c1 ∈ [δm˜, δm˜−1) in UCE.
For clariﬁcation, we remark that τ(δm˜) = m˜+1, whereas τ(c1) = m˜ for any c1 ∈ (δm˜, δm˜−1).
Step 4. In this step, we derive a condition under which there exists some h > 0 so
that δm˜ + h + β2δ
m˜ ≤ 1 and π1(δm˜ + h) > π1(δm˜). Rewriting the ﬁrst condition, we ﬁnd
h ≤ 1− (1 + β2)δm˜. Since we are interested in h > 0 which satisfy the ﬁrst condition, we know
from Corollary 3.4.3 that π1(δ
m˜ + h) = β1 + β2(δ
m˜ + h)− β1β2δm˜. The condition π1(δm˜ + h) >
π1(δ
m˜) can then be written as
(
β1 + β2(δ
m˜ + h)− β1β2δm˜
) − (β1 + β2δm˜ − β1β2δm˜+1) > 0.
Suitably rearranging the terms, this can be reduced to h > β1δ
m˜(1 − δ). We are now
looking for some h such that 1 − (1 + β2)δm˜ ≥ h > β1δm˜(1 − δ). Such h exists if and only if
δm˜ < 1
2−δβ1 . If δ
m˜ ≥ 1
2−β1δ , then a commitment of δ
m˜ is indeed optimal, as claimed in the lemma.
Step 5. Now turn to the case where δm˜ < 1
2−β1δ . In this case, we have shown in Step 4
that there does exist h > 0 such that δm˜ + h + β2δ
m˜ ≤ 1 and π1(δm˜ + h) > π1(δm˜). Thus,
δm˜ is not optimal, and so it follows from the conclusion of Step 3 above that the optimal c1
belongs to the open interval (δm˜, δm˜−1). Since this interval is open, the optimal commitment
level cannot satisfy c1 = δ
m for any m ∈ N0. But then, by the argument in Step 1, the optimal
commitment level must satisfy c1 + β2δ
τ(c1) = 1. Since τ(c1) = m˜ for any c1 ∈ (δm˜, δm˜−1), we
can conclude that the optimal commitment level is equal to 1−β2δm˜, as claimed in the lemma.
Step 6. We have shown that in UCE, player 1 commits to ψ1, as deﬁned in the statement
of the lemma. Corollary 3.4.3 implies immediate and eﬃcient agreement. Moreover, the payoﬀ
to player 1 is π1(ψ1), as desired.

We will now elaborate on the most important implications of the above result and its proof,
and derive a number of corollaries.
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To begin with, knowing the payoﬀ function π1(.) and the UCE commitment level ψ1, we
can explicitly state the UCE payoﬀ for player 1, which we denote by ϕ1.
Corollary 3.4.5 Player 1’s UCE payoﬀ ϕ1 is given by
ϕ1 =
⎧⎨
⎩β1 + β2δ
m˜ − β1β2δm˜+1 if δm˜ ≥ 12−δβ1
1− β2δm˜ otherwise
Given that the recognition probabilities of both players and the discount factor all lie strictly
between zero and one, we can see from the above expression for ϕ1 that β1 < ϕ1 < 1. While
player 1 strictly beneﬁts from his commitment power, he never obtains the entire pie. This is
intuitively clear since with the commitment device at hand here, player 2 can always choose to
hold out until τ(c1), in which case some strictly positive surplus will be left over.
Corollary 3.4.6 For any conﬁguration of the recognition probabilities and the discount factor,
player 1’s UCE payoﬀ strictly exceeds β1, but falls short of the entire pie.
Another implication of the above proof is that ψ1 >
1
2
. To see this, suppose by way of
contradiction that ψ1 ≤ 12 . Since 12 + β2δτ(
1
2
) < 1, the arguments in Steps 1 and 3 of the proof
above imply that ψ1 = δ
m˜. But by deﬁnition of ψ1, we have that ψ1 = δ
m˜ only if δm˜ ≥ 1
2−δβ1 .
It follows that 1
2
≥ 1
2−δβ1 , a contradiction to the assumption that δ and β1 are strictly positive.
Corollary 3.4.7 The optimal commitment level ψ1 is strictly greater than one half, irrespective
of the choices of δ and β. Moreover, since in UCE agreement is reached with the commitment
eﬀective, the UCE payoﬀ of player 1 is greater than one half.
Theorem 3.4.4 also implies that in equilibrium, player 1’s commitment is chosen high enough
so that disagreement in round t = 0 would lead to delay until the expiry of the commitment.
To see this, notice that from the deﬁnition of m˜, we have δm˜ > δ
1−β2δ . Since c1 ≥ δm˜ by the
proof of the above theorem, it holds that c1 + β2δc1 > δ. Given that δc1 ≤ δτ(c1), the corollary
follows.
Corollary 3.4.8 In UCE, the sum of players’ aspirations exceeds δt at any time t =
1, . . . , τ(ψ). Thus, a1(ψ1) = 0.
Player 1 makes a commitment which is low enough to deter player 2 from holding out until
time τ(c1). But the previous corollary means that, loosely speaking, the optimal commitment
is not “much” lower then a commitment which would lead to delay. More precisely, delay would
result from any commitment c1 such that c1 > ϕ1. To see this, notice that by Theorems 3.4.4
and 3.3.8 the maximum payoﬀ for player 1 in an SPBE with immediate agreement of a game
G(c1) is equal to ϕ1. This payoﬀ is attained when c1 = ψ1. Now consider a game G(c1) for
some c1 > ϕ1. Suppose that agreement is reached at t = 0 in this game. Since the commitment
c1 is eﬀective at time t = 0, the payoﬀ to player 1 must be at least c1. But since c1 > ϕ1, we
have a contradiction.
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Corollary 3.4.9 If c1 > ϕ1, then no SPBE of the game G(c1) involves agreement at time
t = 0.
The two previous corollaries indicate that a rather small deviation from the optimal level of
commitment can lead into a subgame with equilibrium delay. While the equilibrium prediction
in the model at hand does imply immediate agreement, this property is more fragile than in
standard Rubinstein bargaining games, where immediate agreement results in every subgame.
We have pointed out that in UCE an agreement is reached while player 1’s commitment is
eﬀective, therefore we have that ϕ1 ≥ ψ1. In the case where c1 = δm˜, there is some “friction”
between the commitment and the resulting payoﬀ, which arises from the fact that δτ(c1) changes
in a “stepwise” fashion with c1. However, in the limit as δ → 1, these steps become ever smaller
and the said friction vanishes as c1 − δτ(c1) → 0. It is not surprising, then, that ψ1 and ϕ1 do
converge to the same limit. More formally, the UCE commitment level ψ1 has been deﬁned as
equal to either δm˜ or 1− β2δm˜. But both of these terms are arbitrarily close to 11+β2 when δ is
suﬃciently close to one. Similarly, the term β1 + β2δ
m˜ − β1β2δm˜−1 used in the expression for
ϕ1 also converges to that same limit.
Theorem 3.4.10 In the limit as δ → 1, the UCE division of the surplus converges to (ϕ¯1, 1−
ϕ¯1) = (
1
1+β2
, β2
1+β2
).
The intuition behind the limit result is as follows. If δ is close enough to one, the surplus
which remains at the moment of truth is nearly equal to the commitment. Thus, player 2
can obtain β2 times the committed amount by delaying agreement until the moment of truth.
Anticipating this, player 1 chooses the commitment just low enough to make player 2 willing
to enter into an agreement immediately. Hence, the surplus is divided in the proportion 1 : β2.
Let us suppose that β2 is very high. Given that the distribution of proposal power is very
favorable to player 2, can player 1 compensate for his weakness if he is given the possibility to
commit? Theorem 3.4.10 implies that if δ and β2 are both close to one, player 1 can obtain
about one half of the pie. Hence, if δ is large, the power of one player to commit is just suﬃcient
to compensate for the fact that proposal power is concentrated with the other player. If δ is
small, however, the ability to commit is much more powerful than that. In fact, for δ close to
zero, the player who is able to commit can obtain close to the entire pie even if his proposal
power is arbitrarily small. We illustrate these ﬁndings with the following numerical example.
Example 3.4.11 Let β2 = 0.9. Suppose ﬁrst that the discount factor is very small, say,
δ = 0.1. In that case, we have that m˜ = 1. The term 1
2−β1δ evaluates to
1
1.99
≈ 0.5. Since this is
greater than δm˜ = 0.1, the optimal commitment level is given by ψ1 = 1−β2δm˜ = 1−0.1×0.9 =
0.91. Also, ϕ1 = 0.91.
Now suppose instead that δ = 0.9; then m˜ = 6. The term 1
2−β1δ evaluates to
1
1.91
≈ 0.52. Since
this is smaller than δm˜ = 0.96 ≈ 0.53, the optimal commitment level is given by ψ1 = δm˜ ≈ 0.53.
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Consequently,
ϕ1 ≈ 0.1 + 0.9× 0.96 − 0.1× 0.9× 0.97
≈ 0.1 + 0.9× 0.53− 0.09× 0.47
≈ 0.1 + 0.477− 0.0423
≈ 0.5347
This example provides a numerical illustration of the eﬀects of large vs. small discount factors
when the proposal power is prejudiced in the advantage of one player.
We see that for small δ, the implications of our notion of commitment are close to those
which one would expect of an irrevocable and everlasting commitment. For large δ, however,
the type of commitment which we propose leads to diﬀerent results. This pattern will be
observed more often in the sequel of the paper, when we deal with games in which both players
have access to the commitment device.
3.5 Bargaining with two committed players
In this section, we will consider a bargaining (sub–)game G(c1, c2). In this game, the two players
bargain according to the protocol speciﬁed earlier for the game G(c1). That is, in each round a
proposer is determined by the probability distribution β. However, in the game G(c1, c2), both
players k = 1, 2 are committed and thus have the following utility functions.
uk(xk, ck, t) =
⎧⎨
⎩xk − λ < 0 if xk < ck ≤ δ
t
xk otherwise
To prepare the analysis, a number of concepts introduced for the game G(c1) need to be
extended formally to the game G(c1, c2). To begin with, we denote by G(c1, c2, t) a subgame of
the game G(c1, c2) which starts with the move of nature at time t. An SPBE in such a subgame
is an SPE which satisﬁes the two conditions set forth in Deﬁnition 3.3.1. We say that the SPBE
payoﬀs of G(c1, c2, t) are essentially unique if all SPBE of all subgames of the type G(c1, c2, t)
lead to the same payoﬀs. We denote these payoﬀs by vt1(c1, c2) and v
t
2(c1, c2), where we will
sometimes omit the arguments (c1, c2) if no confusion arises. The deﬁnition of aspiration is
extended to the new setting as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.5.1 Suppose that for some t ∈ N0, the SPBE payoﬀs of G(c1, c2, t + 1) are es-
sentially unique, and the corresponding payoﬀ pair is (vt+11 , v
t+1
2 ). Then, player k’s aspiration
at time t under the commitments (c1, c2) is
αtk(c1, c2) = min{xk ∈ [0, 1]|uk(xk, ck, t) ≥ vt+1k )}
This deﬁnition implies that
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αtk(c1, c2) =
⎧⎨
⎩v
t+1
k (c1, c2) if t ≥ τ(ck)
max{ck, vt+1k (c1, c2)} otherwise
(12)
for both players k = 1, 2.
The above deﬁnition and the next two lemmas provide a backward-induction algorithm to
ﬁnd the SPBE payoﬀs in the game G(c1, c2). Intuitively, Lemma 3.5.2 shows how to reason
backwards from one round to the previous round, while Lemma 3.5.3 shows how to initialize
the backward induction at the time when both commitments are void.
Lemma 3.5.2 Suppose that for some t ∈ N0, the SPBE payoﬀs of G(c1, c2, t+1) are essentially
unique and equal to (vt+11 , v
t+1
2 ). Then, the SPBE payoﬀs of G(c1, c2, t) are essentially unique
as well and given by
vtk(c1, c2) =
⎧⎨
⎩α
t
k(c1, c2) + βk (δ
t − αtk(c1, c2)− αtl(c1, c2)) if αtk(c1, c2) + αtl(c1, c2) ≤ δt
vt+1k otherwise
(13)
for any player k = 1, 2 and l = k.
This result follows from the proof of Lemma 3.3.7.
Lemma 3.5.3 Let t¯ = max{τ(c1), τ(c2)}. In any subgame G(c1, c2, t¯), player k’s (k = i, j)
expected SPBE payoﬀ is equal to βkδ
t¯.
This statement corresponds to Lemma 3.3.3, and ensures the essential uniqueness of SPBE
of G(c1, c2, t¯). In previous sections, the only player who could commit was referred to as player
1. This labeling has been arbitrary. Thus, we can deﬁne ψk as the optimal level of commitment
which player k = 1, 2 chooses in the game in which he is the only player who can commit.
In a similar way, let πk(ck) be the SPBE payoﬀ in the bargaining subgame G(ck), and deﬁne
ϕk = πk(ψk). For the rest of the current section, we will use i to denote the player with the
highest commitment level. That is, we assume without loss of generality that ci ≥ cj. Let us
ﬁrst consider a subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)). That is, we are interested in a subgame which starts at
the time when the higher of the two commitments has become void. In such a subgame, only
player j remains committed. Therefore, it seems intuitive that such a subgame is equivalent to
a bargaining subgame with one committed player, as we have analyzed in Section 3. This idea
is stated more formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5.4 In any subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)), the SPBE payoﬀs are equal to
δτ(ci) πj
(
cj δ
−τ(ci)).
Proof: Consider the backward-induction algorithm described by Equations (12)-(13) at
any round t ≥ τ(ci). At such a round t, the Equations (12)-(13) reduce to
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αti = v
t+1
i
αtj =
⎧⎨
⎩v
t+1
j if t ≥ τ(cj)
max{cj, vt+1j } otherwise
vtk =
⎧⎨
⎩α
t
k + βk(δ
t − αti − αtj) if αti + αtj ≤ δt
vt+1k otherwise, k = i, j
These equations correspond to Equations (9)-(11) which describe the backward-induction
algorithm in the game with one committed player. We can view each step of this algorithm
as a function f(vt+1, cj, δ
t) which determines vt. One can easily verify from Equations (9)-(11)
that this function is linearly homogenous of degree one, that is, we have f(κvt+1, κcj, κδ
t) =
κf(vt+1, cj, δ
t) for any κ > 0. Moreover, we use the fact that τ(cjδ
t) = τ(cj) + t for t ∈ N0.
One implication of this fact is that the backward induction from τ(cj) to τ(ci) takes as many
iterative steps as the backward induction from τ(c˜j) to round zero, where c˜j = cjδ
−τ(ci). Since
in Section 3, the size of the initial surplus was normalized to one without loss of generality, the
claim follows. 
The backward-induction algorithm described by Equations (12)-(13) ﬁnds the essentially
unique SPBE payoﬀs in any bargaining (sub-)game G(ci, cj). We will write these payoﬀs to
players i and j, respectively, as ωi(ci, cj) and ωj(ci, cj).
Lemma 3.5.4 has two important implications, which we state in the following two corollaries.
In Theorem 3.4.4 we have found the optimal payoﬀ for the only committed player. Since a
subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)) is indeed a game with one committed player, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.5.5 In a subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)), player j’s SPBE payoﬀ is at most ϕjδ
τ(ci).
Given any commitment level ci chosen by player i, player j may adopt a strategy which
involves making the commitment ψjδ
τ(ci) and not entering into any agreement before time τ(ci).
Corollary 3.5.6 It holds that ωj(ci, ψjδ
τ(cj)) ≥ ϕjδτ(ci).
Intuitively, given any commitment level ci of player i, player j has the option to hold out
until time τ(ci) and then play a subgame in which he is the only committed player. In such
a subgame, the analysis of Section 3 is applicable, and player j’s commitment and proposal
power combined will allow him to capture a share of ϕj of the remaining surplus. However,
this surplus has shrunk by a factor δτ(ci) in the meantime. There is a trade-oﬀ between the
advantageous position of the only committed player and the cost of delay incurred to acquire
this position.
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We will now provide some illustration of the backward induction procedure in the game at
hand, in which the notion of ci and cj being close to each other plays a crucial role. Let us
suppose that cj is suﬃciently small so that cj + βiδ
τ(cj) ≤ 1. Then, we can deﬁne
aj(cj) = max{z ∈ N0|δz ≥ cj + βiδτ(cj)}
Deﬁnition 3.5.7 We say that the commitments ci and cj are close to each other if aj(cj) <
τ(ci).
Lemma 3.5.8 Suppose cj+βiδ
τ(cj) ≤ 1. Then, ci and cj are close to each other if cj > ϕjδτ(ci).
This statement follows from Corollary 3.4.9.
Let us suppose ﬁrst that the commitments are not close to each other. We can then illustrate
the situation with the following time-lines. Lemma 3.5.3 gives the payoﬀs in a subgame starting
in round τ(cj), allowing us to initialize the backward induction speciﬁed in Equations (12)-(13).
Applying these equations iteratively, we ﬁnd the following. Before round τ(cj), the aspirations
are βiδ
τ(ci) and cj. Thus, no agreement is possible between rounds aj(cj) and τ(cj), as indicated
by the dotted line segment. But an agreement can be reached between time τ(ci) and time
aj(cj). But going backwards from τ(ci) to τ(ci)−1, player i’s aspiration jumps to ci while player
j’s aspiration is equal to δτ(ci)πj(cjδ
−τ(ci)) as by Lemma 3.5.4. If ci + δτ(ci)πj(cjδ−τ(ci)) > 1,
then no agreement can be reached before time τ(ci), as indicated on the ﬁrst time-line below.
                                                  
t = 0 τ(ci) aj(cj) τ(cj)
If, to the contrary, it holds that ci + δ
τ(ci)πj(cjδ
−τ(ci)) ≤ 1, then we ﬁnd
b(ci, cj) := max{z ∈ N0|δz ≥ ci + δτ(ci)πj(cjδ−τ(ci))}
as the latest round in which agreement can be reached before τ(ci) – a situation depicted
in the next time-line.
                                                   
t = 0 b(ci, cj) τ(ci) aj(cj) τ(cj)
Now consider the case where ci and cj are close to each other. In this case, it is not possible
to reach agreement at round aj(cj) since player i’s aspiration has jumped up to ci already
before the backward induction procedure reached round aj(cj). Hence agreement is impossible
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                                                                                                      
t = 0 τ(ci + cj)− 1 aj(cj) τ(ci) τ(cj)
between time τ(ci + cj) − 1 (the latest point in time when the surplus is at least ci + cj) and
time τ(cj), as shown in the following time-line. Of course, if ci + cj > 1 and ci and cj are close
to each other, no agreement can be reached at all until round τ(cj).
To end the section, we provide two auxiliary results which we will use in the sequel of the
paper. The ﬁrst statement below says that in SPBE, the lower of the two commitments is
eﬀective at the time of the agreement unless the sum of commitments exceeds one.
Lemma 3.5.9 If ci + cj ≤ 1, then ωj(ci, cj) ≥ cj.
Proof: Suppose not. Then, there is (ci, cj) such that ci + cj ≤ 1 and ωj(ci, cj) < cj. By
deﬁnition of ωj(.), this function gives the payoﬀ arising from some SPBE of the game G(ci, cj).
But in an SPBE, player j does not agree to less than cj before time τ(cj). Hence, an SPBE of
G(ci, cj) must involve delay until at least round τ(cj). By Lemma 3.5.2, we have α
t
i + α
t
j > δ
t
for all t = 0, 1, . . . , τ(cj)−1. Notice that the assumption ci ≥ cj and the supposition ci+ cj ≤ 1
imply that cj ≤ 12 . But since δτ(cj) < cj and βi < 1, this in turn implies cj + βiδτ(cj) ≤ 1.
Thus, aj(cj) is well-deﬁned and agreement can be reached in that round unless ci and cj are
close to each other. Indeed, suppose now that ci and cj are close to each other. But then the
aspirations in round τ(ci+ cj)−1 are equal to the commitments ci and cj. Since ci+ cj ≤ 1, we
have that τ(ci + cj) ≥ 1 and thus agreement can be reached at some round t ∈ N0, the desired
contradiction. 
In particular, if the commitments are close to each other and sum up to exactly one, then
we have α0i + α
0
j = 1: The aspirations at t = 0 are equal to the commitments and sum up to
the total surplus. By the conditions set forth in the deﬁnition of an SPBE, agreement must be
reached on the division of the surplus according to the commitments.
Corollary 3.5.10 If ci + cj = 1 and ci and cj are close to each other, then the SPBE payoﬀs
are equal to ci and cj.
3.6 Optimal commitment for two players
In this section, we turn to the equilibrium analysis of games where both players can commit
before bargaining starts. We will consider one game in which the players make their commit-
ments sequentially, and one in which the commitments are chosen simultaneously. Recall that
the SPBE payoﬀs in a bargaining subgame with a given pair of commitments (c1, c2) are given
by ω1(c1, c2) and ω2(c1, c2). Hence, we are eﬀectively considering a game in which each player’s
action is to choose a commitment from the interval [0, 1] and the payoﬀ functions are given by
ω1(c1, c2) and ω2(c1, c2).
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In this section, we abandon the notational convention that ci ≥ cj. After giving a formal
deﬁnition of a (unique) best-response, we will state a number of auxiliary lemmas, which will
be needed to prove the main results of this section.
Deﬁnition 3.6.1 We say that the commitment c¯j is a best-response to the commitment c¯i of
player i = j if it holds that ωj(c¯i, c¯j) ≥ ωj(c¯i, cj) for all cj ∈ [0, 1]. If the inequality holds strictly
for all cj ∈ [0, 1], then we say that c¯j is the unique best-response to c¯i.
The next lemma claims that there is some intermediate range of commitments for player i
so that player j’s best-response is to commit to the exact complement.
Lemma 3.6.2 Suppose that ci ≤ 1 − ϕjδτ(ci) and ci ≥ ϕiδτ(1−ci). Then, it is a best-response
for player j to choose the commitment level cj = 1 − ci. The best-response is unique if the
inequalities hold strictly.
Proof: Indeed, suppose that ci ≤ 1− ϕjδτ(ci) and ci ≥ ϕiδτ(1−ci). By Lemma 3.5.8, ci and
1 − ci are close to each other, so that ωi(ci, 1 − ci) = ci and ωj(ci, 1 − ci) = 1 − ci. We want
to show that no choice of commitment cj gives player j a strictly higher payoﬀ than 1 − ci.
If player j chooses some cj such that the SPBE of G(ci, cj) involves agreement before τ(ci),
the payoﬀ to player j is bounded above by 1 − ci. But if j chooses cj such that delay occurs
until round τ(ci), then by Corollary 3.5.5, his payoﬀ is bounded above by ϕjδ
τ(ci) ≤ 1− ci, as
desired. 
In the next lemma, we consider the case where a player has chosen a commitment which
is too high to fall into the range of commitments to which Lemma 3.6.2 applies. In that case,
we show that it is optimal for the other player to hold out and delay agreement until this high
commitment has expired.
Lemma 3.6.3 Suppose that ci > 1−ϕjδτ(ci). Then, the unique best-response for player j is to
choose the commitment level cj = ψjδ
τ(ci).
Proof: Suppose indeed that 1 − ci < ϕjδτ(ci). Suppose ﬁrst that player j chooses some cj
such that in the essentially unique SPBE of G(ci, cj), agreement is reached before τ(ci). Since
the commitment ci is eﬀective at the time of this agreement, the payoﬀ to player j in this SPBE
is at most 1 − ci. But by Corollary 3.5.6, he can obtain ϕjδτ(ci) > 1 − ci by committing to
ψjδ
τ(ci). Thus, a commitment level cj can only be a best-response for player j if in an SPBE of
G(ci, cj), no agreement is made before round τ(ci). But from Theorem 3.4.4 and Lemma 3.5.4,
it follows that ψjδ
τ(ci) is uniquely optimal among all commitments cj which do lead to a delay
until round τ(ci) in an SPBE of G(ci, cj). 
Lemma 3.6.4 below says the following. If player i makes a “high” commitment in the sense
of Lemma 3.6.3 above, and if player j responds optimally to this by delaying agreement, then
a unilateral deviation to a commitment of zero would be proﬁtable for player i.
Lemma 3.6.4 If ci is such that 1− ci < ϕjδτ(ci), then ωi(ci, ψjδτ(ci)) < ωi(0, ψjδτ(ci)).
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Proof: Suppose that the pair of commitments (ci, cj) is such that cj = ψjδ
τ(ci) and 1− ci <
ϕjδ
τ(ci). In the SPBE of a subgame G(ci, cj, τ(ci)), the payoﬀs to players i and j, respectively,
will be (1 − ϕj)δτ(ci) and ϕjδτ(ci). But since 1 < ci + ϕjδτ(ci), no agreement can be reached
in an SPBE at any t < τ(ci). Thus, these payoﬀs are also the payoﬀs in the SPBE of the
entire bargaining game G(ci, cj). It holds that cj = ψjδ
τ(ci) ≤ ψjδ < ψj. The ﬁrst inequality
follows because ci > 0 and thus τ(ci) ≥ 1. (Suppose to the contrary that ci = 0. Then, the
supposition that 1 − ci < ϕjδτ(ci) reduces to 1 < ϕj, a contradiction.) The second inequality
follows because δ < 1. Now suppose player i deviates to the commitment cˆi = 0, while player j
remains at his commitment level cj < ψj. The induced bargaining game G(0, cj) is equivalent to
the game with one committed player, as analyzed in Section 3. Since cj ≤ ψjδ < ψj, Theorem
3.3.8 implies that an eﬃcient agreement is reached immediately in SPBE of G(0, cj). But, by
Corollary 3.5.6, it holds that the payoﬀ to player j in that agreement is at most ϕj. Thus, the
payoﬀ to player i is at least 1− ϕj. But 1− ϕj > (1− ϕj)δτ(ci), so the deviation from ci to cˆi
is proﬁtable for player i, as desired. 
For player i = 1, 2, we now deﬁne a particular commitment level ηi as follows.
ηi = max{ci|ci + ϕjδτ(ci) ≤ 1}
Loosely speaking, ηi is the maximal commitment level which is not “high” in the sense of
Lemma 3.6.3 above. It is important to realize that ηi ≥ 12 . In order to see this, suppose to
the contrary that ηi <
1
2
. Then, it follows that 1
2
+ ϕjδ
τ( 1
2
) > 1. But ϕj < 1 and δ
τ( 1
2
) < 1
2
, a
contradiction.
Remark 3.6.5 The fact that ηi ≥ 12 implies that ϕiδτ(1−ηi) < 12 ≤ ηi. Thus, the commitments
(ηi, 1− ηi) are close to each other.
The next lemma is the last auxiliary which we need to prove the main results of the section.
The lemma says that if player i commits to less than ηi, then player j can always obtain a
greater payoﬀ than 1− ηi by choosing an appropriate commitment.
Lemma 3.6.6 Suppose that ci < ηi. Then, there exists ε > 0 suﬃciently small so that ωj(ci, 1−
ηi + ε) > 1− ηi.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there is a pair of commitments (c¯i, c¯j) such that c¯i < ηi
and c¯j = 1− ηi + ε, but ωj(c¯i, c¯j) ≤ 1− ηi < c¯j. We will derive a contradiction for suﬃciently
small ε > 0. Before time τ(c¯j), player j does not agree to less than c¯j in SPBE. Thus, in any
SPBE of G(c¯i, c¯j), there must be delay until at least time τ(c¯j). Let us consider ﬁrst the case
where c¯i > c¯j. In SPBE, the smaller of two commitments expires only if c¯i+ c¯j > 1 (see Lemma
3.5.9). This inequality is equivalent to c¯i + 1− ηi + ε > 1. Since ηi > c¯i, we obtain the desired
contradiction for suﬃciently small ε > 0. Now consider the case where c¯j ≥ c¯i. Since there is
delay until round τ(c¯j), and since δ
τ(cj) < c¯j, the payoﬀ to player i in a subgame G(ci, cj, τ(cj))
is strictly smaller than c¯j = 1 − ηi + ε. In terms of the aspirations at time t¯ = τ(cj) − 1,
we have αt¯i < c¯j = 1 − ηi + ε and αt¯j = c¯j = 1 − ηi + ε. Summing up the aspirations yields
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αt¯i +α
t¯
i < 2c¯j = 2(1− ηi+ ε). Using the fact that ηi ≥ 12 , we ﬁnd αt¯i +αt¯i < 1+ 2ε. But if ε > 0
is suﬃciently small, then αt¯i + α
t¯
i ≤ 1, in which case agreement is reached in SPBE in round t¯.
Since t¯ < τ(c¯j), we have obtained the desired contradiction. 
We will now turn to the proof of the main results, for which the previous lemmas will
be crucial. We begin with the case in which players choose their commitments sequentially.
More formally, by the sequential commitment game, we mean the game in which ﬁrst player 1
chooses a commitment level c1 ∈ [0, 1], then player 2 chooses a commitment level c2 ∈ [0, 1],
and then the bargaining game G(c1, c2) is played. Let (s¯1, s¯2) be a strategy proﬁle in the
sequential commitment game, and suppose that under this strategy proﬁle, the players choose
commitments (c¯1, c¯2). The proﬁle s¯ is a sequential commitment equilibrium (SQCE) if it satisﬁes
the following conditions.
1. The restriction of s¯ to the bargaining subgame G(c¯1, c¯2) is an SPBE in that bargaining
game.
2. It holds that ω2(c¯1, c¯2) ≥ ω2(c¯1, c2) for all c2 ∈ [0, 1].
3. There is no (c˜1, c˜2) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] such that ω2(c˜1, c˜2) ≥ ω2(c˜1, c2) for all c2 ∈ [0, 1], and
ω1(c˜1, c˜2) > ω1(c¯1, c¯2).
The second condition above means that player 2 responds optimally to player 1’s commit-
ment choice in any SQCE. The third condition means that player 1 chooses his commitment
optimally, anticipating the response of player 2. The next theorem claims that there is a unique
SQCE division of the surplus, which is immediately agreed upon.
Theorem 3.6.7 In any SQCE of the sequential commitment game, an immediate and eﬃcient
agreement is reached on the division (η1, 1− η1).
Proof: Suppose ﬁrst that in some SQCE player 1 chooses c1 > η1. By Lemma 3.6.3, player
2 will choose c2 = ψ2δ
τ(c1) in response. The resulting payoﬀs for player 1 will be (1− ϕ2)δτ(c1).
But if player 1 had chosen a commitment of zero, then player 2’s best-response would have
been to choose ψ2, which would give player 1 the payoﬀ of 1− ϕ2 > (1− ϕ2)δτ(c1). Hence, we
have shown that in SQCE, player 1 chooses c1 such that c1 ≤ η1.
Suppose that player 1 chooses c1 < η1. By Lemma 3.6.6, player 1’s payoﬀ is then strictly
less than η1. However, he can obtain a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to η1. More precisely, if player
1 chooses c1 = η1 − ε for some suﬃciently small ε > 0, then by Lemma 3.6.2, player 2 will
choose c2 = 1 − c1 in response and thus player 1 can realize a payoﬀ of c1 = η1 − ε. Thus, a
commitment c1 so that c1 < η1 can never be optimal.
We have now shown that c1 = η1 in an SQCE. By Lemma 3.6.2, committing to 1− η1 is a
best-response for player 2. Since η1 and 1−η1 are close to each other, agreement is then reached
immediately on the division (η1, 1 − η1). Finally, notice that if ϕ2δτ(c1) = 1 − c1 but ψ2 < ϕ2,
then the best-response commitment 1− η1 is not unique. It would also be a best-response for
player 2 to choose ψ2δ
τ(c1). However, this would lead to aspirations of c1 and ϕ2δ
τ(c1) = 1− c1
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at round t = 0. By the deﬁnition of SPBE, agreement would also be reached immediately on
(η1, 1− η1), as desired. 
Intuitively, Theorem 3.6.7 can be understood as follows. Once player 1 has chosen c1, player
2 always has the option to delay agreement until time τ(c1) and then obtain the payoﬀ ϕ2δ
τ(c1).
Player 1 chooses his commitment just low enough so that this option becomes unattractive for
player 2. Qualitatively, the result is similar to that in the game with one committed player.
In that game, the player who is not committed can hold out until the commitment expires.
But after the commitment has expired, the bargaining powers are given by the recognition
probabilities β. In the sequential commitment case, however, once round τ(c1) is reached,
player 2’s bargaining power is given by ϕ2 rather than just by his recognition probability β2. In
sum, we obtain a unique equilibrium prediction for the division of the surplus. The player who
commits ﬁrst has a ﬁrst-mover advantage, but this advantage is weaker than the advantage of
the committed over the un-committed player in the game with a single committed player. In
the limit as δ → 1, we have that ci − δτ(ci) → 0, and thus ηi converges to the limit η¯i = 11+ϕ¯j .
But by Theorem 3.4.10, ϕ¯j =
1
1+βi
. Consequently, we have the following limit result.
Theorem 3.6.8 In the limit as δ → 1, the SQCE division of the surplus converges to (η¯1, 1−
η¯1) = (
1+β1
2+β1
, 1
2+β1
).
We will now turn to the version of the model where both players choose their commitments
simultaneously before bargaining starts. More formally, by the simultaneous commitment game,
we mean the game in which ﬁrst players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose commitment levels
c1 ∈ [0, 1] and c2 ∈ [0, 1], and then the bargaining game G(c1, c2) is played. Let (s¯1, s¯2) be a
strategy proﬁle in the simultaneous commitment game, and (c¯1, c¯2) the commitments chosen
under that proﬁle. The proﬁle s¯ is a simultaneous commitment equilibrium (SMCE) if its
restriction to the bargaining subgame G(c¯1, c¯2) is an SPBE, and if for i = 1, 2 and j = i,
it holds that ωi(c¯i, c¯j) ≥ ωi(ci, c¯j) for all ci ∈ [0, 1]. That is, each player’s commitment is a
best-response to the other player’s commitment. Theorem 3.6.9 below shows that there is a
range of divisions of the surplus which can be supported by SMCE. The endpoints of this range
are given by the divisions which occur in the sequential commitment equilibrium, when either
player acts as the ﬁrst mover.
Theorem 3.6.9 A division (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ of the surplus can be supported by an SMCE of the
simultaneous commitment game if and only if x1 + x2 = 1 and xi ≥ 1 − ηj for i = 1, 2 and
j = i.
Proof: If: Consider a pair of commitments (c¯1, c¯2) such that c¯1 + c¯2 = 1 and c¯i ≥ 1 − ηj
for both i = 1, 2 and j = i. By deﬁnition of ηi, it follows that c¯i ≥ ϕiδτ(c¯j) for both i = 1, 2
and j = i. By Lemma 3.6.2, the commitments (c¯1, c¯2) are best-responses to each other. Since
they are also close to each other, Corollary 3.5.10 implies that payoﬀs in the SPBE of G(c¯1, c¯2)
will be (c¯1, c¯2).
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Only If: We show ﬁrst that in any SMCE, we have ci ≤ ηi for both i = 1, 2. Suppose
by way of contradiction that there is some SMCE in which the commitments are (c¯1, c¯2) and
c¯i > ηi for some i = 1, 2. Then, by deﬁnition of ηi, it holds that c¯i + ϕjδ
τ(c¯i) > 1 and by
Lemma 3.6.3, it must hold that c¯j = ψjδ
τ(c¯i) for j = i. But then, by Lemma 3.6.4, setting a
commitment cˆi = 0 is a proﬁtable deviation for player i, the desired contradiction.
We show next that player i = 1, 2 obtains at least a payoﬀ of 1− ηj in SMCE. Suppose by
way of contradiction that there is some SMCE leading to payoﬀs (u¯1, u¯2) such that u¯j < 1− ηi
for some j = 1, 2 and i = j. Again, let (c¯1, c¯2) be the commitment levels in the supposed
SMCE. Lemma 3.6.6 then implies that c¯i ≥ ηi. Suppose ﬁrst that c¯i = ηi. Since ηi and 1− ηi
are close to each other, player j could obtain the payoﬀ of 1 − ηi by committing to it. Thus,
we must have that c¯i > ηi. But we have shown before that this is not consistent with SMCE,
a contradiction.
Finally, we have to show that any SMCE is eﬃcient. Suppose by way of contradiction that
there is some SMCE leading to payoﬀs (u¯1, u¯2) such that u¯i ≥ 1 − ηj for both i = 1, 2 and
j = i but u¯1 + u¯2 < 1. Let (c¯1, c¯2) be the commitments in the supposed SMCE. Lemma 3.5.2
implies that if an agreement x is reached in round t, then x1 + x2 = δ
t. Since u¯1 + u¯2 < 1, the
supposed SMCE must involve disagreement at t = 0. Disagreement continues until time τ(ck),
where we assume ck ≥ cl without loss of generality. By Corollary 3.5.5, we have u¯l ≤ ϕlδτ(ck).
But the supposition is that u¯l ≥ 1 − ηk. These two inequalities imply that ηk + ϕlδτ(ck) ≥ 1.
But by the deﬁnition of ηk, we have ηk + ϕlδ
τ(ηk) ≤ 1. We see that ck ≥ ηk. But we have
already shown that ck ≤ ηk in an SMCE; thus we can conclude that ck = ηk and, moreover,
ck+ϕlδ
τ(ck) = 1. By Lemma 3.6.2, player l has two potential best-responses, namely c′l = 1−ck
and c′′l = ψlδ
τ(ck). In the former case, immediate agreement is reached since ck = ηk and 1− ck
are close to each other, a contradiction. Consider the latter case. At round t = 0, player 2’s
aspiration will be ϕlδ
τ(ck). But since ηk+ϕlδ
τ(ηk) ≤ 1 and ck = ηk, the aspirations at time t = 0
sum up to exactly one. But any SMCE strategy proﬁle induces an SPBE when restricted to
the bargaining subgame, and in an SPBE agreement is reached when the aspirations sum to
the available surplus. Therefore, we ﬁnd immediate agreement, a contradiction. 
Passing to the limit as δ → 1, we ﬁnd the following equilibrium range.
Theorem 3.6.10 If δ is suﬃciently close to one, the surplus division (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ can be
supported by an SMCE of the simultaneous commitment game if and only if x1 + x2 = 1 and
xi ≥ 13−βi for both i = 1, 2.
One implication of Theorem 3.6.10 is that the division (β1, β2) need not be supported by
an equilibrium if it is very lopsided towards one player. Put another way, if the distribution of
proposal power is very disadvantageous for one player, then the commitment power can mitigate
this disadvantage, even if both players have access to the commitment device simultaneously.
With the conventional notion of irrevocable share–commitments, one would expect the
simultaneous commitment case to be a mere coordination problem in which any distribution
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can be supported by some equilibrium. In the model at hand, this is still nearly true if δ is close
to zero. However, if δ is close to one, the range of equilibrium divisions shrinks considerably.
More precisely, in the limit as δ → 1, the share of the surplus whose allocation is left unpredicted
by SMCE is at most one ﬁfth. Conversely, for large δ, SMCE is suﬃciently strong as a solution
concept to determine eighty percent of the allocation. Moreover, we note that each player’s
share is bounded below by one third, even with arbitrarily low recognition probability.
Comparing the results for the sequential and simultaneous commitment games, two common
points emerge.
First, our model yields predictions tantamount to what one would expect with irrevocable,
everlasting commitments if δ is close to zero, but produces very diﬀerent results if δ is close
to one. The intuition is that with a small δ, the option to hold out until the opponent’s
commitment becomes void is very unattractive and hence commitment confers a lot of power.
Second, for large δ, the ability to make a commitment of the type which we propose ensures
that a player will get at least one third of the surplus, even if his recognition probability is
arbitrarily small. In a sense, the ability to commit is worth one third of the surplus to each
player, while the value of proposal power lies in determining the allocation of the remaining
third.
Since the range of SMCE divisions depends on the recognition probabilities and the discount
factor, we ask whether there is any equilibrium division which is robust to changes in these
parameters. The following theorem claims that the equal split of the surplus is consistent with
SMCE irrespective of the aforementioned parameters. Moreover, the equal split is the only
division with this property.
Theorem 3.6.11 A surplus division (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ can be supported by an SMCE of the simul-
taneous commitment game for all δ and for all β if and only if (x1, x2) = (
1
2
, 1
2
).
Proof: If: Since ηi ≥ 12 for i = 1, 2, we also have 1 − ηi ≤ 12 . The claim follows from
Theorem 3.6.9.
Only if: Consider a pie division in which player k = 1, 2 obtains a payoﬀ of 1
2
− ε, where
ε > 0. By Theorem 3.6.10, if δ is suﬃciently large, SMCE requires 1
2
− ε ≥ 1
3−βk . This can
be rewritten as βk ≤
1
2
−3ε
1
2
−ε . But we have assumed that ε > 0, thus
1
2
−3ε
1
2
−ε < 1. Consequently,
choosing δ suﬃciently large and βk ∈
(
1
2
−3ε
1
2
−ε , 1
)
ensures that the pie division under consideration
is not supported by any SMCE. 
In the simultaneous commitment game, any division (x, 1 − x) with 0 < x < 1 can be
supported by SMCE for some choice of β and δ, but Theorem 3.6.11 shows that the equal split
is unique in being consistent with SMCE for any choice of these parameters. The equal split
emerges as a robust focal point within the range of equilibria.
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3.7 Conclusion
We have studied the division of a shrinking surplus through a bilateral bargaining procedure
with commitment. We have proposed a new notion of commitment, which has two main
characteristics. Commitment is stated in time value terms, and a commitment expires when it
has been rendered infeasible by the passage of time and the ensuing shrinkage of the surplus.
As a result of this modeling approach, there is a trade-oﬀ between the amount to which one
commits and the duration of the commitment. Relatively moderate commitments stay in eﬀect
for longer than extreme commitments.
We have focussed our analysis on three games, namely, a game in which only one player
can commit before bargaining starts, a game in which both players commit sequentially before
bargaining starts, and a game in which the two players commit simultaneously prior to the
bargaining stage. In each of these cases, we have applied slight reﬁnements of subgame-perfect
equilibrium as solution concepts. In an equilibrium, we always ﬁnd immediate agreement on
a division which corresponds to the commitments. In a sense, the agreement is already pre-
determined in the commitment stage, while the bargaining stage plays the role of a threat which
has a moderating inﬂuence on players’ choice of a commitment.
In the game with one committed player , we have uniquely predicted the division of the
surplus. The committed player obtains strictly between one half and the entire surplus, and
always does strictly better than in a benchmark game without commitment. The equilibrium
division of the surplus depends in a discontinuous and non-monotonic way on the discount fac-
tor. However, when the discount factor is very small, commitment confers the most bargaining
power. Conversely, when the discount factor is very close to one, the recognition probabilities
are relatively important as a source of bargaining power. More precisely, if the discount factor
is close to one and the recognition probability of the committed player is close to zero, then
the surplus is divided nearly equally. In this sense, proposal power and commitment power are
“equally important” in the limit.
In the game where both players commit sequentially, we have also found a unique prediction
for the division of the surplus. There is a ﬁrst-mover advantage since the ﬁrst mover obtains
between one half and two thirds of the surplus, depending on the choice of the recognition
probabilities.
In the game with simultaneous commitments, a range of surplus divisions is supported
by equilibria. If the discount factor is suﬃciently large, this range shrinks to at most one
ﬁfth of the entire range of feasible divisions. If the commitments were of unlimited duration,
then we would expect the strategic situation to collapse to a pure coordination problem, where
subgame-perfect equilibrium (or a technical reﬁnement thereof) would have no predictive power
with regard to the division. With our notion of commitment, the range of equilibrium divisions
is signiﬁcantly smaller when we choose the discount factor large enough. Moreover, in the model
at hand, the equal split emerges as a focal point within the range of equilibrium divisions. We
have established that the equal split is the only division which is supported by an equilibrium
regardless of the values of the discount factor and the recognition probabilities.
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4 Theory of the ﬁrm – Bargaining and competitive equi-
librium
4.1 Introduction
Suppose that a ﬁrm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one
out of many diﬀerent states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner’s time preference and
risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoﬀs in the diﬀerent states. It is a
well–known problem in the literature that under incomplete asset markets, a conﬂict about the
ﬁrm’s objective function tends to arise among its owners.
We take a non-cooperative bargaining approach to this conﬂict, which is new to the lit-
erature. We present a model in which the internal decision making of the ﬁrm is formalized
explicitly as a strategic bargaining game. In contrast to standard theory, we thus consider the
ﬁrm as a coalition of owners who use strategic power in order to inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s production
decision and thereby maximize their own payoﬀs. 7
The standard approach in the existing literature on incomplete markets with production
originates from contributions by Diamond (1967), Dre`ze (1974), and Grossman and Hart (1979).
Diamond (1967) formulates the notion of constrained Pareto optimality, an optimality notion
that takes the incompleteness of asset markets into account. Dre`ze (1974) shows that necessary
ﬁrst-order conditions for constrained Pareto optimality require that the ﬁrm should choose a
production plan which is optimal when evaluated against a weighted average of the shareholders’
utility gradients, where the weights are given by the ownership shares. This objective function
for the ﬁrm is usually referred to as the Dre`ze criterion.
Standard notions of constrained Pareto optimality allow for arbitrary redistributions in the
initial period, and so does Dre`ze (1974), pp. 141–142:
“The deﬁnition does not place any restrictions on the allocation among consumers
of the adjustments in current consumption required to oﬀset the adjustment in the
input level aj − a¯j. Alternatively stated, the deﬁnition is consistent with arbitrary
transfers of initial resources among consumers.”
Arbitrary redistributions in the initial period leads to indeterminateness of equilibrium. One
would in general expect a multiplicity of one degree less than the number of shareholders.
Grossman and Hart (1979) use the Dre`ze criterion as the objective function for the ﬁrm,
but with ﬁnal ownership shares replaced by initial ones. Contrary to Dre`ze (1974), they also
require that at equilibrium no transfers are made in the initial period. The advantage of
this approach is that it leads to determinateness of equilibrium, its downside is inconsistency.
Indeed, initial period transfers are used in Grossman and Hart (1979) in their deﬁnition of
constrained Pareto optimality, which motivates the decision criterion for the ﬁrm. At the same
time, the equilibrium decision of the ﬁrm is imposed to involve no transfers itself. Absence
7This chapter corresponds to the paper V.Britz, P.J.J.Herings, and A.Predtetchinski (2010), “Theory of the
ﬁrm – Bargaining and competitive equilibrium, METEOR Research Memorandum RM/10/057.
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of initial-period transfers has become the standard concept of equilibrium, called stock market
equilibrium, see for instance the treatment in the authoritative book of Magill and Quinzii
(1996) and in the paper by Dierker, Dierker, and Grodal (2002) on the constrained ineﬃciency
of stock market equilibria.
Recognizing that the Dre`ze criterion is normative in nature, some authors have tried to link
it to outcomes of majority voting. A typical approach in this stream of literature is to ask: If
a certain production plan was given as a default option, would there exist an alternative plan
preferred by more than at least a certain (super-)majority of the shareholders? If no winning
alternative can be found, the default plan is considered “stable.” Tvede and Cre`s (2005) discuss
the relationship between the Dre`ze criterion and such a voting approach and ﬁnd conditions
under which both lead to compatible predictions. Another voting analysis is given by DeMarzo
(1993) who emphasizes the importance of the largest shareholder. Kelsey and Milne (1996)
give a proof for equilibrium existence in a more general model which emphasizes externalities
between ﬁrms and shareholders. However, both stock market equilibria and the approaches
related to majority voting seem to suﬀer from a common problem. Both approaches ask only
which production plans are stable to being replaced by other plans through a certain mechanism.
However, there is no explanation why a particular plan would serve as a default setting or how
any one particular plan is to be chosen in case there are several plans satisfying the criterion
used.
Few papers have taken a truly positive approach to decision making within the ﬁrm, as is
the case in this paper.
In our setup, there is a single ﬁrm which exists in an environment of competitive but
potentially incomplete markets. We take the ownership structure of the ﬁrm as exogenously
ﬁxed to focus attention on the decision making within the ﬁrm, rather than on the role of
expectations regarding future stock price as a consequence of current production decisions and
the identity of future shareholders as in Bonnisseau and Lachiri (2004) and Dre`ze, Lachiri,
and Minelli (2009). When applied to our setting without stock markets, we refer to the stock
market equilibrium concept as competitive equilibrium.
The ﬁrm will be active in two time periods. A production plan and a transfer scheme have
to be chosen knowing the state of the world in the ﬁrst period, but under uncertainty about
the state of the world in the second period. There are assets which the owners can use to shift
consumption across time periods and states. Owners are price–takers in the asset markets.
We address the issue raised in Magill and Quinzii (1996), who write on p. 364 when referring
to the concept of partnership equilibrium:
“A weakness of this concept of equilibrium is that it does not provide a well-deﬁned
bargaining process by which partners could come up with such an agreement.”
In this paper, we propose such a bargaining process. We have the owners of the ﬁrm bargain
in order to determine a production plan for the ﬁrm. In each round of bargaining, an owner is
chosen to make a proposal. This owner oﬀers a production plan as well as a transfer scheme
of side-payments in terms of ﬁrst-period consumption. If the owners unanimously agree, the
proposal is implemented. Otherwise, the negotiation breaks down with some probability, in
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which case no production takes place and no transfers are made. With the complementary
continuation probability, bargaining continues to another bargaining round. In the case of
perpetual disagreement, the ﬁrm will not produce, and no transfers will be made. Through
the bargaining process, the owners of the ﬁrm collectively decide on a production plan and a
transfer scheme. Moreover, as individuals they may invest in the asset markets to determine
their amounts of consumption at each state of the world. We refer to our notion of equilibrium
as bargaining equilibrium.
Our main results are the following. We show that the bargaining equilibrium corresponds
to a weighted Nash Bargaining Solution; a unique prediction for a production plan as well as
a system of transfer payments in terms of good 0 is derived. In the special case where markets
are complete, the bargaining equilibrium selects the proﬁt–maximizing production plan and is
therefore in line with the predictions of the Arrow–Debreu model as far as the ﬁrm’s production
decision is concerned. However, contrary to the Arrow–Debreu model, owners make use of their
bargaining power to redistribute the proﬁts among themselves via the transfer scheme. Hence,
owners obtain payoﬀs which are generically diﬀerent from those in standard economic theory,
even if markets are complete.
In the case of incomplete markets, we ﬁnd that the production plan which the ﬁrm adopts
under the bargaining equilibrium is almost always diﬀerent from the competitive equilibrium
one. Moreover, non–zero transfers are made in general. At the same time, bargaining equilibria
are constrained Pareto optimal, and are therefore consistent with the use of the Dre`ze crite-
rion. However, since contrary to competitive equilibrium transfers are made, the shareholders’
utility gradients are not the same as the competitive equilibrium ones, explaining why the cho-
sen production plan does typically not coincide with the one corresponding to a competitive
equilibrium. The bargaining equilibrium satisﬁes the requirements of an equilibrium as deﬁned
in Dre`ze (1974). Like the competitive equilibrium, the bargaining equilibrium can therefore be
viewed as selecting a particular Dre`ze equilibrium.
In Section 2, we present the model and the most important assumptions formally. In
Section 3, we show how bargaining on the production plan and a transfer scheme can be
reformulated as bargaining on the implied payoﬀs. In Section 4, we characterize the relevant
bargaining outcome. In Section 5, this bargaining outcome is interpreted in light of the existing
literature and, in particular, compared to the Dre`ze criterion. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Model Description
We study a ﬁrm with several owners in a setting with incomplete markets. Each owner i =
1, . . . , I holds a share θi > 0 of the ﬁrm so that
∑I
i=1 θ
i = 1. The set of owners {1, . . . , I} will
be denoted by I.
The ﬁrm carries out some productive activity which extends over two periods. In the ﬁrst
period, the state of the world is known to be s = 0. In the second period, any one of the states
of the world s = 1, . . . , S may be realized; we write S = {0, 1, . . . , S}. A particular productive
activity of the ﬁrm is described by a production plan y ∈ RS+1. If ys < 0 for some s ∈ S, then
each owner i has to provide the ﬁrm with an input of |θiys| in state s. Similarly, if ys > 0, then
61
this output will be distributed to the owners in the proportion in which they own the ﬁrm.
The set of all production plans which are feasible for the ﬁrm is called its production set and
is denoted by Y .
Each owner i has initial endowments ωi ∈ RS+1++ , which can be used to ﬁnance the provision
of inputs. Consumption in state s = 0 can be transferred across owners and assets can be
used to shift consumption across states. Transfers and assets will be introduced in detail in the
sequel.
A production plan can be chosen only by unanimous consent of the owners. In order to reach
agreement, the following bargaining procedure is used. Bargaining takes place in a, potentially
inﬁnite, number of rounds r = 0, 1, . . .. In the beginning of any round r, a draw from a given
probability distribution μ ∈ ΔI , where ΔI is the set of strictly positive vectors in the unit
simplex in RI , determines the proposer in round r. 8
This proposer then makes an oﬀer (y, t) ∈ Y × T , where T = {t ∈ RI |∑i∈I ti ≤ 0}. Here
ti denotes the transfer owner i receives, and which is made in terms of consumption in state 0.
The owners then either accept or reject the oﬀer in some given order. It is assumed that an
owner cannot accept a proposal which leads to his insolvency irrespective of his choice of an
asset portfolio. This assumption will be stated more formally later on.
If unanimous agreement 9 on the production plan and transfer scheme is reached, the bar-
gaining stage ends and the chosen production plan and transfer scheme are implemented. If,
however, an owner rejects a proposal, bargaining moves to round r+1 with probability δ. With
probability 1−δ, a breakdown of bargaining occurs. In that case, we assume that no production
will take place and no transfers are made. Each individual owner is merely left to choose his
asset portfolio. Likewise, perpetual disagreement means that no production takes place. One
interpretation of the breakdown probability is that the investment opportunities implicit in the
production set may slip away if one waits too long to exploit them.
Once bargaining has led to an agreement (or broken down), the sequel of the model does
not incorporate any strategic interaction anymore. Each owner individually decides on an asset
portfolio. The owner can purchase assets j = 1, . . . , J at exogenously given prices q1, . . . , qJ .
Owners act as price takers in the asset markets. In state s = 1, . . . , S, each unit of asset j
will give a payoﬀ of ajs. We summarize the asset structure in the (S × J)-matrix A, which we
assume to be of full column rank. Redundant assets are ignored without loss of generality. It
8We do not place further restrictions on the distribution of bargaining power. In particular, bargaining power
may but need not be determined by the shares of ownership. The model can accommodate the case where, for
example, everybody has equal bargaining power, but also the case where bargaining power does increase with
the share of ownership. Bargaining power may therefore capture strengths (such as bargaining skill) which are
not derived from the ﬁrm’s ownership structure.
9We mainly have in mind rather small ﬁrms (such as partnerships) where the unanimity rule is a realistic
assumption at least for major decisions. Considering decision-making among the shareholders of a corporation,
one can easily extend the model to a more general approval rule (such as majority voting). However, this would
greatly complicate the equilibrium analysis. In particular, we expect that it would require considering equilibria
in mixed strategies.
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will sometimes be convenient to use the notation
W =
(
−q
A
)
.
Assets are perfectly divisible and may be sold short. We write zij for owner i’s holdings of asset
j.
Economic activity in state 0 therefore consists of the implementation of the agreed pro-
duction plan and transfers, the choice of asset portfolios, and consumption. Next, one state
of nature s ∈ {1, . . . , S} realizes, and contingent on s the assets pay oﬀ, the ﬁrm realizes its
output, and the owners consume.
Owner i has preferences over consumption plans xi ∈ RS+1++ , which are represented by a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : RS+1++ → R. Given the bargaining outcome
(y, t) ∈ Y × T , owner i solves the following maximization problem:
max
xi∈RS+1++ ,zi∈RJ
ui(xi) subject to xi0 = ω
i
0 + θ
iy0 + t
i − qzi,
xis = ω
i
s + θ
iys + Asz
i, s = 1, . . . , S.
Let e(0) denote the (S + 1)–dimensional column vector (1, 0, . . . , 0). For i ∈ I, we deﬁne
Bi = {(y, t) ∈ Y × T |∃zi ∈ RJ , ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi  0},
and B = ∩i∈IBi. The set B contains all bargaining outcomes which allow each owner to remain
solvent by an appropriate portfolio choice. Solvency in this context means a strictly positive
consumption in each state. Owner i can only accept a proposal if it belongs to Bi. Since ωi  0
for all i ∈ I, it holds that (0, 0) ∈ B and thus B is non-empty.
The results in this paper are derived under a number of assumptions on the utility functions,
the production possibility set, and the asset structure. These assumptions are now introduced.
Assumption 4.2.1 (Production Set)
1. Y is closed, strictly convex, and bounded from above.
2. Y ⊃ RS+1− : Output can be freely disposed of and inaction is possible.
3. Y ∩ RS+1+ ⊂ {0}: One cannot produce a positive output without inputs.
4. ∂Y is a C2 manifold with nonzero Gaussian curvature.
Assumption 4.2.2 (Utility functions)
For all i ∈ I we assume the following.
1. ui is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on RS+1++ .
2. ui is diﬀerentiably strictly concave on RS+1++ , i.e. the Hessian matrix of u
i is negative
deﬁnite on RS+1++ .
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3. For any s = 0, 1, . . . , S, and any xi−s ∈ RS++ it holds that ui(xis, xi−s) goes to negative
inﬁnity in the limit as xis approaches zero.
We deﬁne the set of normalized state prices Π by
Π = {π ∈ RS++|(1, π)W = 0}.
Asset markets are said to be complete if Π is single-valued. If Π is not single-valued, markets
are called incomplete. We also note that Π is a convex set.
Assumption 4.2.3 (Asset Structure)
1. The matrix A has full column-rank.
2. The set Π is non-empty.
3. There is π ∈ Π such that π is not normal to Y at y = 0.
Assumption 2.3.2 would be satisﬁed in general equilibrium, but has to be imposed here since
we conduct our analysis in a partial equilibrium context. Assumption 2.3.3 rules out the
(uninteresting) special case in which markets are complete and the unique proﬁt-maximizing
production plan is y = 0.
4.3 Reduced Form Bargaining Game
When the owners bargain about a production plan and a transfer scheme, they implicitly
bargain about the associated payoﬀs. In this section, we will analyze the bargaining problem
in payoﬀ space. In order to motivate this approach, we will show that, given eﬃciency and
individual rationality, there is a one–to–one correspondence between both problems. In other
words, any Pareto–eﬃcient and individually rational outcome of the bargaining problem in the
payoﬀ space is supported by a unique combination of a production plan, a transfer scheme, and
asset portfolios for each owner. This result is driven by the assumptions of strict convexity of
the production set and strict concavity of the utility functions.
Consider some (y, t) ∈ B. By deﬁnition of B, there must be some z ∈ RIJ such that the
vector xi = ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi is strictly positive for all i ∈ I. Using Assumption 2.3,
we see that the set of portfolio choices for owner i which lead to a utility of at least ui(xi)
is compact. Hence, the indirect utility u¯i(y, t) is well-deﬁned. We write u¯(y, t) for the proﬁle
of utilities (u¯1(y, t), . . . , u¯I(y, t)). It holds that the optimal consumption bundle, denoted by
ξi(y, t), is unique. Suppose to the contrary that there are two distinct feasible consumption
bundles xi and x¯i leading to utility u¯i(y, t) Since any convex combination of xi and x¯i is feasible
and gives strictly higher utility than u¯i(y, t), we have a contradiction. The uniqueness of ξi(y, t)
combined with the full column-rank of A implies that the optimal portfolio choice is unique.
The set V of feasible payoﬀs for the owners is given by V = u¯(B), a subset of RI .
We denote by V + the individually rational part of V , and by ∂V and ∂V + the weak Pareto
boundaries of the sets V and V +. Individually rational payoﬀs are here deﬁned as the payoﬀs
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that exceed the payoﬀs v0 = u¯(0, 0) owners could achieve without relying on ﬁrm production
and transfers, but by making use of trades in the asset market. We deﬁne
V + = {v ∈ V |v ≥ v0},
∂V = {v ∈ V |  ∃v′ ∈ V, v′  v},
∂V + = V + ∩ ∂V.
The next ﬁve lemmas state that the set V + satisﬁes a number of desirable properties. In
particular, we demonstrate that V + is compact and convex, that V is comprehensive from
below, that all points in ∂V + are strongly Pareto eﬃcient, and that there is a unique vector in
the normal to V at any point in ∂V +.
Lemma 4.3.1 The set V is comprehensive from below.
Proof: Take v¯ ∈ V. We want to show that any v ∈ RI such that v ≤ v¯ belongs to V . Let
(x¯, y¯, t¯, z¯) ∈ R(S+1)I++ × B × RJI be such that v¯ = u¯(y¯, t¯) and let (x¯, z¯) correspond to optimal
consumption choices and portfolio plans given (y¯, t¯). Consider a particular i ∈ I, and deﬁne
the set Li as follows.
Li = {xi ∈ RS+1+ |∃zi ∈ RJ , xi = ωi + θiy¯ + e(0)t¯i +Wzi}.
The set Li is non–empty, closed, and bounded. Thus, there exists xˆi ∈ Li such that xˆi0 ≥ xi0
for all xi ∈ Li. Let zˆi be the asset portfolio associated with xˆi.
For some κ ∈ (0, 1), deﬁne x˜i = κx¯i + (1 − κ)(0, xˆi1, . . . , xˆiS). The consumption plan x˜i
results from the production plan y¯, the transfer t˜i := t¯i − (1 − κ)xˆi0, and the asset portfolio
z˜i = κz¯i + (1− κ)zˆi.
Since κ is strictly positive by construction, we have that x˜i ∈ RS+1++ , and therefore (y¯, t˜) ∈ Bi.
By construction of xˆi and t˜i, it holds that ξi0(y¯, t˜) ≤ xˆi0 − t¯i + t˜i = κxˆi0.
We can use a direct argument to show that ξi is continuous in (y, t) ∈ Bi, and we have
assumed that the direct utility function ui is continuous on RS+1++ . Thus, the indirect utility
function u¯i = ui ◦ ξi is continuous and reaches any value in the interval [u¯i(y¯, t˜), u¯i(y¯, t¯)]. The
statement follows from passing to the limit as κ ↓ 0, in which case ξi0(y¯, t˜) becomes arbitrarily
small and Assumption 2.2.3 implies that u¯i(y¯, t˜) becomes arbitrarily negative. Finally, notice
that our construction for owner i only involves the transfer ti, so that we can deal with the
functions u¯1, . . . , u¯I independently. 
We have deﬁned ∂V + as the weak Pareto-boundary of V +. We will show next that it
coincides with the strong Pareto-boundary. That is, v¯ belongs to ∂V + if and only if there is no
v ∈ V such that v ≥ v¯, with strict inequality in at least one component.
Lemma 4.3.2 All points in ∂V + are strongly Pareto–eﬃcient.
Proof: Consider some v ∈ ∂V +. Let (x, y, t, z) ∈ R(S+1)I++ ×B×RJI be such that v = u¯(y, t)
and let (x, z) correspond to an optimal consumption choice and portfolio plan given (y, t).
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Suppose that there is v¯ ∈ V such that v¯i′ > vi′ for some i′ ∈ I and v¯i ≥ vi for all i ∈ I\{i′}.
Let (x¯, y¯, t¯, z¯) ∈ R(S+1)I++ × B × RJI be such that v¯ = u¯(y¯, t¯) and let (x¯, z¯) correspond to
an optimal consumption choice and portfolio plan given (y¯, t¯). For ε ∈ (0, x¯i′0 ), we construct
the consumption plan x˜i
′
= x¯i
′ − εe(0) and x˜i = x¯i + (ε/(I − 1))e(0) for i ∈ I\{i′}. Since
ui
′
is continuous, ui
′
(x˜i
′
) > ui
′
(xi
′
) for ε suﬃciently small. Assumption 2.2.2 implies that
ui(x˜i) > ui(xi) for all i ∈ I\{i′}. We deﬁne the transfer scheme t˜ ∈ T by t˜i′ = t¯i′ − εe(0) and
t˜i = t¯i+(ε/(I−1))e(0) for i ∈ I \{i′}. Then u¯(y¯, t˜) ≥ (u1(x˜1), . . . , uI(x˜I))  v, a contradiction
to the weak Pareto eﬃciency of v. 
Lemma 4.3.3 The set V + is compact.
Proof:
We deﬁne the set X as follows,
X = {x ∈ R(S+1)I+ |∃(y, t, z) ∈ B × RJI , ∀i ∈ I, xi = ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi}.
We will show ﬁrst that X is bounded.
Since X is a subset of R
(S+1)I
+ , it is clearly bounded from below. To show it is bounded from
above, take any x ∈ X and compute∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i∈I
ωi + y + e(0)
∑
i∈I
ti +W
∑
i∈I
zi ≤
∑
i∈I
ωi + y +W
∑
i∈I
zi.
By Assumption 2.3.2, the set Π is non-empty. For π ∈ Π it holds that π ∈ RS++ and (1, π)W = 0,
so
(1, π)
∑
i∈I x
i ≤ (1, π)(∑i∈I ωi + y).
It follows that (1, π)
∑
i∈I x
i is bounded from above since Y is bounded from above by Assump-
tion 2.1.1. Since xi is bounded from below for all i, (1, π)
∑
i∈I x
i bounded from above implies
that xi is bounded from above for all i ∈ I. We have shown that X is bounded.
The boundedness of X and Assumption 2.2.3 imply that for each i ∈ I there is a vector
bi ∈ RS+1++ such that x ∈ X and ui(xi) ≥ v0i imply xi ≥ bi.
Now deﬁne the set
X∗ = X ∩ {x ∈ R(S+1)I+ |xi ≥ bi, ∀i ∈ I}.
Since X∗ ⊂ X, it is immediate that X∗ is bounded. We will show next that X∗ is closed.
To this end, we deﬁne the sets
Y˜ = {(θ1y, . . . , θIy) ∈ R(S+1)I | y ∈ Y },
T˜ = {τ ∈ R(S+1)I |∑i∈I τ i0 ≤ 0; ∀i ∈ I, ∀s = 0, τ is = 0},
W˜ =
∏
i∈I R(W ),
where R(W ) denotes the column space of W. We can write X∗ as the intersection of the closed
set {x ∈ R(S+1)I+ |xi ≥ bi, ∀i ∈ I} and the set {ω} + Y˜ + T˜ + W˜ . We show the latter set to be
closed, thereby proving that X∗ is closed.
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To show that {ω} + Y˜ + T˜ + W˜ is closed, we show that the asymptotic cones of the
terms in the sum are positively semi-independent. Since {ω} is bounded, the asymptotic cone
A({ω}) = {0}. Since Y˜ is bounded from above, A(Y˜ ) is contained in −R(S+1)I+ . Since T˜ and W˜
are cones themselves, they coincide with their asymptotic cones.
Let y, τ, and w be elements of A(Y˜ ), A(T˜ ), and A(W˜ ) summing up to zero. We show
that y, τ, and w are zero vectors, thereby proving that the asymptotic cones are positively
semi-independent. For i ∈ I, let zi ∈ RJ be such that wi = Wzi. We have that
yi0 + τ
i
0 − qzi = 0, i ∈ I,
yi−0 + Az
i = 0, i ∈ I.
We take a weighted sum of these equalities, with weights equal to (1, π) for some π ∈ Π and
obtain
yi0 + τ
i
0 − qzi + πyi−0 + qzi = 0, i ∈ I.
Finally, we take the sum over i ∈ I and ﬁnd∑
i∈I
yi0 +
∑
i∈I
τ i0 + π
∑
i∈I
yi−0 = 0.
Since the vector π is strictly positive,
∑
i∈I τ
i
0 ≤ 0, and yi ∈ −RS+1+ , we ﬁnd that yi = 0 for all
i ∈ I and ∑i∈I τ i0 = 0. For all i ∈ I, since 0 = yi−0 = −Azi, the full column-rank of A implies
that zi = 0, and consequently that wi = 0. Now it holds that τ i0 = −yi0 − wi0 = 0. We have
shown that the set X∗ is closed.
We have assumed the utility functions to be continuous on the strictly positive orthant. By
deﬁnition, X∗ ⊂ R(S+1)I++ , and so the utility functions are continuous on X∗, which we have just
shown to be a compact set. Hence, the set U = {v ∈ RI | ∃x ∈ X∗, v = (u1(x1), . . . , un(xn))}
is compact as well. We argue next that V + coincides with U ∩ {v ∈ RI | v ≥ v0}, so is the
intersection of a compact set and a closed set, and therefore compact, proving the result. It
follows from the deﬁnition of the vectors b1, . . . , bI that V + ⊂ U ∩ {v ∈ RI | v ≥ v0}.
Consider some v ∈ U ∩ {v ∈ RI | v ≥ v0}. Let (x, y, t, z) ∈ X∗ × B × RJI be such that, for
all i ∈ I, xi = ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi, and ui(xi) = vi. Since u¯(y, t) ≥ v ≥ v0 and since V is
comprehensive from below by Lemma 3.1, we have that v ∈ V +. 
Lemma 4.3.4 The set V + is convex.
Proof: Let v, v¯ be distinct elements of V +, and v˜ = αv + (1− α)v¯ for some α ∈ (0, 1).
There are (y, t), (y¯, t¯) ∈ B such that u¯(y, t) = v and u¯(y¯, t¯) = v¯. Let z and z¯ be such that
for all i ∈ I, ξi(y, t) = ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi, and ξi(y¯, t¯) = ωi + θiy¯ + e(0)t¯i +Wz¯i.
We deﬁne (y˜, t˜) = α(y, t)+ (1−α)(y¯, t¯) and, for i ∈ I, x˜i = αξi(y, t)+ (1−α)ξi(y¯, t¯). Since
B is convex, we have that (y˜, t˜) ∈ B. Furthermore, since
x˜i = ωi + θiy˜ + e(0)t˜i +W (αzi + (1− α)z¯i),
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the consumption plan x˜i is attainable for i. Therefore, it holds that u¯i(y˜, t˜) ≥ ui(x˜i) ≥ v˜i for
all i ∈ I, where the last inequality follows from the concavity of ui. Since V is comprehensive
from below, we have v˜ ∈ V . Since v ≥ v0 and v¯ ≥ v0, it follows that v˜ ∈ V +. 
The normal of a convex subset C of Rm at a point c¯ in C is deﬁned as the set of vectors
c∗ ∈ Rm satisfying ‖c∗‖ = 1 and (c− c¯) · c∗ ≤ 0 for every c ∈ C. Equivalent to the uniqueness
of the normal at every point in the boundary ∂C, we may assume that ∂C is a C1 manifold;
see Rockafellar (1970).
Lemma 4.3.5 At any point of ∂V + there is a unique vector in the normal to V.
Proof: Take any v¯ ∈ ∂V +. Let (y¯, t¯) be such that v¯ = u¯(y¯, t¯) and deﬁne x¯i = ξi(y¯, t¯), i ∈ I.
We deﬁne the set T ′ by
T ′ = {(τ 1, . . . , τ I−1, τ I) ∈ RI−1 × R+ | x¯I0 −
∑
i∈I
τ i > 0; ∀i ∈ I \ {I}, x¯i0 + τ i > 0}.
The interpretation of τ ∈ T ′ is that owner i = 1, . . . , I − 1 receives a transfer τ i in period 0
additional to x¯i0, whereas owner I receives an additional transfer −
∑
i∈I τ
i. Notice that τ I
corresponds to an amount of resource that is wasted. We deﬁne the function f : T ′ → R(S+1)I
by f I0 (τ) = x¯
I
0 −
∑
i∈I τ
i, f i0(τ) = x¯
i
0 + τ
i, i ∈ I \ {I}, and f is(τ) = x¯is, i ∈ I, s ∈ S \ {0}.
We deﬁne K(v¯) as the image of T ′ under the function φ = (u1 ◦ f 1, . . . , uI ◦ f I). Then φ−1
serves as a C2 coordinate system for K(v¯) around v¯, i.e. φ−1 is injective and surjective, φ is
twice diﬀerentiable, and we can show that φ−1 is twice diﬀerentiable by means of the inverse
function theorem using the property that for all i ∈ I, ∂xi0ui(x¯i) > 0. It follows that K(v¯) is a
C2 manifold with boundary. Since K(v¯) is convex, it has a unique outward normal vector at
v¯, say v∗.
We want to show that v∗ is also the unique normal to V at v¯. Suppose to the contrary
that there is a normal vector v′ = v∗ to V at v¯. Since v′ cannot be normal to K(v¯), there is
v ∈ K(v¯) such that (v− v¯) · v′ > 0. But K(v¯) ⊂ V, so that v ∈ V as well, contradicting that v′
is normal to V at v¯. 
It may be interesting to note that the proof of diﬀerentiability of ∂V does not rely on the
diﬀerentiability of ∂Y, though we have assumed the latter for later purposes.
We have established that the set V + is compact and convex, that the set V is comprehensive
from below, that all points in ∂V + are strongly Pareto-eﬃcient, and there is a unique vector
in the normal to V at any point in ∂V +. In the non–cooperative bargaining literature, one
considers abstract sets of feasible payoﬀs which are assumed to have these properties. Therefore,
our preceding analysis of the set V + demonstrates that the model we study in this paper lends
itself to the application of results already established in the bargaining literature. In particular,
given an I–player bargaining protocol of the type which we have in our model, and a set
of feasible payoﬀs with the aforementioned properties, a characterization of subgame–perfect
equilibria in stationary strategies is known in the literature. All such equilibria lead to the
selection of payoﬀs in ∂V + and are characterized by absence of delay in reaching an agreement.
68
Moreover, it is known that in the limit as δ goes to one, the payoﬀs implied by such equilibria
converge to a weighted Nash Bargaining Solution, where the weights are given by the vector
μ of recognition probabilities, see Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), Miyakawa (2008), and Laruelle
and Valenciano (2007). Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski (2010) have shown that the result
can be suitably generalized to the case where proposers are chosen according to an irreducible
Markov process. In this case, the weights of the Nash Bargaining Solution are given by the
stationary distribution of this Markov process.
Below, we ﬁrst give a deﬁnition of the weighted Nash Bargaining Solution, and then state
the aforementioned convergence result formally as Theorem 4.3.7.
Deﬁnition 4.3.6 The μ-weighted Nash Bargaining Solution (μ-NBS) is the payoﬀ allocation
v∗ ∈ V + which solves
max
v∈V +
∏I
i=1(v
i − v0i)μi .
The μ-weighted Nash Bargaining Solution can be interpreted as the choice of a social planner
who has a Cobb-Douglas social welfare function with weights μ and set of feasible alternatives
given by V +. The convexity of V + as demonstrated in Lemma 4.3.4 implies that the μ-weighted
Nash bargaining solution is unique.
Theorem 4.3.7 In the limit as δ ↑ 1, the payoﬀs of all subgame perfect bargaining equilibria
in stationary strategies converge to the μ-NBS.
We ﬁnally argue that it is irrelevant whether negotiations are on the implied payoﬀs directly
or on a production plan and transfers since they are in a one to one relationship between each
other.
Theorem 4.3.8 For every v¯ ∈ ∂V + there is a unique (y¯, t¯) ∈ B such that v¯ = u¯(y¯, t¯).
Proof: Consider a payoﬀ vector v¯ ∈ ∂V + and (y, t), (y¯, t¯) ∈ B such that u¯(y, t) = u¯(y¯, t¯) =
v¯. We want to show that (y, t) = (y¯, t¯). We have that ξi(y, t)  0 and ξi(y¯, t¯)  0 for all i ∈ I.
Suppose that there exists some i′ ∈ I such that ξi′(y, t) = ξi′(y¯, t¯). Since utility functions
are strictly concave on RS+1++ by Assumption 2.2.3, it holds that u¯
i′(y˜, t˜) ≥ ui′(x˜i′) > v¯i′ , where
x˜i
′
= αξi
′
(y, t) + (1−α)ξi′(y¯, t¯) and (y˜, t˜) = α(y, t) + (1−α)(y¯, t¯) for some α ∈ (0, 1). But then
u¯(y˜, t˜) ≥ v¯ with strict inequality in component i′. Thus, we have found an element of V + which
Pareto–dominates v¯, a contradiction. We have shown that ξ(y, t) = ξ(y¯, t¯).
Now suppose that y = y¯ and deﬁne (y˜, t˜) as before. By strict convexity of Y , there is y′ ∈ Y
such that y′  y˜, and it follows that u¯(y′, t˜)  v¯, a contradiction to v¯ ∈ ∂V +. We have shown
that y = y¯.
For all i ∈ I, we know that u¯i is strictly increasing in the transfer, given the production
plan. It follows that t = t¯. 
Theorem 4.3.7 characterizes the equilibrium payoﬀs of the bargaining procedure. Now, we
will analyze the production and transfer decisions which lead to these payoﬀs.
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Deﬁnition 4.3.9 The tuple (x, y, t, z) ∈ R(S+1)I++ × B × RJI is a bargaining equilibrium if
u¯(y, t) = v∗, where v∗ ∈ V + is the μ–weighted Nash Bargaining Solution, and (x, z) are optimal
consumption bundles and asset portfolios given (y, t).
The convexity of V + implies that the μ–NBS v∗ is unique. We have shown in Theorem 4.3.8
that any eﬃcient and individually rational payoﬀ allocation, and thus the μ–weighted NBS, is
supported by a unique (y, t) ∈ B, and indeed by a unique (x, y, t, z) ∈ R(S+1)I++ ×B×RJI , since
optimal consumption plans and portfolio choices were argued to be unique for (y, t) ∈ B. We
have therefore obtained the following result.
Theorem 4.3.10 The bargaining equilibrium is unique.
4.4 Weighted Nash Bargaining Solution
To characterize the bargaining equilibrium, we introduce a twice diﬀerentiable quasi-convex
transformation function f : RS+1 → R to describe the production possibility set. We choose f
such that Y = {y ∈ RS+1|f(y) ≤ 0}. If y ∈ ∂Y , the gradient of f(y) corresponds to the outward
normal vector to Y at y. It holds that ∂f(y)  0 and α∂2f(y)α > 0 for all α ∈ RS+1 \ {0}
such that ∂f(y)α = 0.
It may be the case that the set V + contains only the point v0. Then, the μ–weighted Nash
product is equal to v0. It follows immediately from Theorem 4.3.8 that y = 0 and t = 0, but
owners might still be active on the asset markets. In this case owners have nothing to gain
from production by the ﬁrm, which renders the bargaining problem uninteresting. At a later
stage, we will show formally that this uninteresting case can only occur degenerately.
In what follows, we will focus on the case in which V + contains points diﬀerent from v0. In
that case, Lemma 4.3.2 implies that the set V ++ = {v ∈ V +|v  v0} of strictly individually
rational elements of V is non–empty. Since all the weights μ are strictly positive, it follows that
the μ–NBS v∗ strictly exceeds v0 in each component. Moreover, the set ∂V ++ = ∂V ∩ V ++ of
strictly individually rational and Pareto–eﬃcient payoﬀ allocations is parameterized by all the
μ–Nash Bargaining Solutions when we vary μ. We proceed to derive the ﬁrst–order conditions
for maximizing the μ–weighted Nash product.
Let (x, y, t, z) be a bargaining equilibrium. It is immediate that the feasibility constraints
f(y) ≤ 0 and ∑i∈I ti ≤ 0 hold with equality. The optimization problem involved leads to the
following ﬁrst–order conditions:
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∑
i∈I
θiμi
ui(xi)− v0i∂xisu
i(xi) = λ ∂ysf(y), s ∈ S (14)
μi
ui(xi)− v0i∂xi0u
i(xi) = ν, i ∈ I, (15)
(∂xi0u
i(xi), ∂xi1u
i(xi), . . . , ∂xiSu
i(xi))W = 0, i ∈ I, (16)
ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi − xi = 0, i ∈ I, (17)
f(y) = 0, (18)∑
i∈I
ti = 0, (19)
where λ and ν are Lagrangian parameters corresponding to the equations specifying the feasibil-
ity of the production plan and the transfer scheme, respectively. Equation (16) corresponds to
the standard conditions for optimal portfolio choice. We remark that the ﬁrst–order conditions
are both necessary and suﬃcient.
We denote the S-dimensional vector of marginal rates of substitution by ∇ui(xi), so
∇sui(xi) = ∂xisui(xi)/∂xi0ui(xi) for s = 1, . . . , S. Similarly, we denote the S-dimensional vector
of marginal rates of transformation by ∇f(y), so ∇sf(y) = ∂ysf(y)/∂y0f(y) for s = 1, . . . , S.
When we substitute μi/(ui(xi)− v0i) = ν/∂xi0ui(xi) in the system of equations (14), we ﬁnd
ν = λ∂y0f(y),∑
i∈I
θi∇ui(xi) = ∇f(y).
The last equality implies that the marginal rates of transformation vector is equal to the
θ–weighted average of the owners’ marginal rates of substitution vectors. Notice that due to
potential market incompleteness, it is not guaranteed that marginal rates of substitution vectors
are all equal or are equal to the marginal rate of transformation vector. Since the marginal
rate of transformation vector corresponds to the outward normal vector to Y at y, we ﬁnd that
(1,∇f(y))y ≥ (1,∇f(y))y′ for all y′ ∈ Y, and therefore it holds that the production plan chosen
in a bargaining equilibrium maximizes
y0 +
(∑
i∈I
θi∇ui(xi)
)
y−0
over all production plans in Y. The corresponding objective function of the ﬁrm is known as
the Dre`ze criterion. We have thereby shown the following result.
Theorem 4.4.1 In a bargaining equilibrium, the production plan is chosen according to the
Dre`ze criterion.
For i ∈ I, for xi with ui(xi) > v0i, deﬁne ηi(xi) = ∂xi0ui(xi)/(ui(xi) − v0i). Then, (15) is
equivalent to
μiηi(xi) = ν, i ∈ I.
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In Aumann and Kurz (1977), ηi(xi) is considered a measure of the owner’s boldness. Con-
sider a gamble where an owner i receives utility v0i with probability p and ui(xi + εe(0)) with
probability 1 − p, where ε > 0. Let pi(xi, ε) be the maximum probability for which owner i
weakly prefers the gamble over consuming xi for sure. As pointed out in Roth (1989), boldness
corresponds to the maximum probability for which owner i is willing to accept the gamble,
per dollar of additional gains, when ε tends to zero. That is, ηi(xi) = limε↓0 pi(xi, ε)/ε. Au-
mann and Kurz (1977) identify the point where boldness is equal across all owners as the Nash
Bargaining Solution. The above condition says that a weighted Nash Bargaining Solution is
the point where the product of boldness and probability to propose is equal for all owners. In
the special case where all owners have the same probability to propose, it follows that at a
bargaining equilibrium, all owners have equal boldness. Although Aumann and Kurz (1977)
deﬁne boldness in a context with a single good, here we obtain a similar speciﬁcation since only
the marginal utility of consumption in state 0 enters ηi(xi).
By deﬁnition of ∇ui(xi), we can write Equation (16) as
∇ui(xi)A = q, i ∈ I.
These are simply the conditions for optimal portfolio choice for each owner. When markets
are complete, for instance when A is the identity, marginal rate of substitution vectors are all
equal to each other and to the marginal rate of transformation vector.
The next result speciﬁes the ﬁrst–order conditions for constrained Pareto optimality and
relates them to the ones corresponding to the bargaining equilibrium.
Theorem 4.4.2 It holds that u¯(y, t) ∈ ∂V if and only if (x, y, t, z) ∈ R(S+1)I++ ×B×RJI satisﬁes
ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi = xi, i ∈ I, (20)∑
i∈I
θi∇ui(xi) = ∇f(y), (21)
∇ui(xi)A = q, i ∈ I, (22)
f(y) = 0, (23)∑
i∈I
ti = 0. (24)
Moreover, (x, y, t, z) is a bargaining equilibrium with u¯(y, t) ∈ V ++ if and only if it satisﬁes
Equations (20)–(24), and
μiηi(xi)− μIηI(xi) = 0, i ∈ I\{I}.
Proof: Equations (20)–(24) follow from the same derivations as in this section when
applied to the maximization of the function
∏I
i=1(v
i)μ
i
for arbitrarily chosen strictly positive
weights μi and correspond to standard constrained Pareto optimality conditions. For a
bargaining equilibrium with utilities in V ++, the equations follow from the derivations in the
beginning of this section. 
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The requirement u¯(y, t) ∈ V ++ is added in the second part of Theorem 4.4.2 to rule out
the less interesting case where the bargaining equilibrium satisﬁes u¯(y, t) = v0. In that case
Equations (20)–(24) are still valid, but ηi(xi) is not well–deﬁned since ui(xi) is equal to v0i.
We have shown that in the limit of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies, the
owners’ bargaining procedure leads to payoﬀs corresponding to the μ–weighted Nash Bargaining
Solution. Moreover, in the previous theorem, we have translated this result on the equilibrium
payoﬀs into a result on the production plan and transfer scheme chosen by the bargaining pro-
cedure. We will now give a formal deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium and begin contrasting
it with our ﬁndings.
Deﬁnition 4.4.3 The tuple (x, y, t, z) ∈ R(S+1)I++ × B × RJI is a competitive equilibrium if
xi = ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi, i ∈ I∑
i∈I θ
i∇ui(xi) = ∇f(y),
∇ui(xi)A = q, i ∈ I,
f(y) = 0,
t = 0.
The deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium corresponds to what Magill and Quinzii (1996)
deﬁne as a stock market equilibrium, when taking into account that shares are not traded.
Because of this latter property, the name stock market equilibrium would be inappropriate,
and we have chosen the name competitive equilibrium. We see that both the bargaining equi-
librium and the competitive equilibrium require constrained Pareto–optimality, optimal choice
of portfolios by all owners, and eﬃcient production. Moreover, both notions are consistent
with the Dre`ze criterion. The diﬀerence between both approaches is the selection made from
the outcomes which satisfy constrained Pareto optimality, and which would be called pseudo
equilibria or Lindahl equilibria in Dre`ze (1974). We next present a formal deﬁnition of such
equilibria, and call them Dre`ze equilibria.
Deﬁnition 4.4.4 The tuple (x, y, t, z) ∈ R(S+1)I++ × B × RJI is a Dre`ze equilibrium if
xi = ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi, i ∈ I,∑
i∈I θ
i∇ui(xi) = ∇f(y),
∇ui(xi)A = q, i ∈ I,
f(y) = 0,∑
i∈I t
i = 0.
The competitive equilibrium chooses a Dre`ze equilibrium allocation which does not require
transfers. Bargaining power or the disagreement point play no role in this selection. Under the
bargaining equilibrium, one chooses the unique allocation which can be reached by non–wasteful
transfers and at which the μ–weighted boldness of all owners is equal. Both the bargaining
equilibrium and the competitive equilibrium are Dre`ze equilibria.
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4.5 Producer Choice
We have studied the equilibrium production and transfer decision of the ﬁrm resulting from the
bargaining procedure. In the last section, we have characterized the outcome of the bargaining
procedure and given a ﬁrst comparison to the competitive equilibrium. In this section, we make
use of the characterization given in Theorem 4.4.2 in order to study the bargaining equilibrium
in much more detail and explore its relation to important concepts well–established in the
literature, such as value–maximization and the competitive equilibrium.
Any matrix of security payoﬀs W implies a set Π of (normalized) state prices. A production
plan is said to be value-maximizing if it is optimal with regard to some element of Π (DeMarzo
1993). It turns out that the set of value-maximizing production plans is closely related to the
strictly individually rational Pareto–boundary of V , parameterized by the weights μ of the Nash
Bargaining Solution, which are in turn given by the recognition probabilities of the bargaining
procedure.
Deﬁnition 4.5.1 A production plan y¯ ∈ Y is value–maximizing if there is a state price vector
π ∈ Π such that for all y ∈ Y,
πy ≤ πy¯.
In what follows, we show how our previous characterization of the μ-weighted NBS relates
to the value-maximization concept:
Lemma 4.5.2 A production plan y¯ ∈ Y is value–maximizing if and only if it satisﬁes
∇f(y¯)A = q,
f(y¯) = 0.
Proof: This follows from the standard ﬁrst–order conditions. 
Theorem 4.4.2 and Lemma 4.5.2 imply that ∂V is supported only by production plans
which are value–maximizing. In the special case with complete markets, Π is single–valued and
value–maximization reduces to the usual proﬁt–maximization.
Corollary 4.5.3 If S = J , then every v ∈ ∂V is supported by the proﬁt–maximizing production
plan.
If markets are complete, the production decision of the ﬁrm in a bargaining equilibrium
is thus consistent with the usual proﬁt–maximizing predictions of competitive equilibrium.
However, the distribution of bargaining power will determine how the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are to be
divided among its owners. The bargaining equilibrium utilities may therefore diﬀer from the
competitive equilibrium utilities even if markets are complete.
For the remainder of the section, we use the notation
uiss′ = ∂
2ui(xi)/∂xis∂x
i
s′ ,
∇sui(xi) = (∂ui(xi)/∂xis)/(∂ui(xi)/∂xi0), s ∈ S\{0},
uˆiss′ = ∂ (∇sui(xi)) /∂xis′ .
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We summarize the second–order derivatives in matrices
U i =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ui00 u
i
01 · · · ui0S
ui10 u
i
11 · · · ui1S
...
...
. . .
...
uiS0 u
i
S1 · · · uiSS
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ and Uˆ i =
⎛
⎜⎝
uˆi10 uˆ
i
11 · · · uˆi1S
...
...
. . .
...
uˆiS0 uˆ
i
S1 · · · uˆiSS
⎞
⎟⎠.
Similarly, we write
fss′ = ∂
2f(y)/∂ys∂ys′ ,
∇sf(y) = (∂f(y)/∂ys)/(∂f(y)/∂y0), s ∈ S\{0},
fˆss′ = ∂ (∇sf(y)) /∂ys′ .
and use the matrices
F =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
f00 f01 · · · f0S
f10 f11 · · · f1S
...
...
. . .
...
fS0 fS1 · · · fSS
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ and Fˆ =
⎛
⎜⎝
fˆ10 fˆ11 · · · fˆ1S
...
...
. . .
...
fˆS0 fˆS1 · · · fˆSS
⎞
⎟⎠.
Theorem 4.5.4 The set of value–maximizing production plans is an (S−J)–dimensional man-
ifold.
Proof: We have to show that the matrix of partial derivatives of the following system of
equations
∇f(y)A− q = 0,
f(y) = 0,
has row rank J +1 when evaluated at a solution y, after which the result follows from counting
equations and unknowns. To this end, we have to show that the rows of the matrix(
AFˆ
∂f(y)
)
are linearly independent. We ﬁrst rewrite the entry in row j and column s′ of AFˆ as follows:
[AFˆ ]s
′
j =
S∑
s=1
Ajsfˆss′
=
S∑
s=1
Ajs
(
fss′f0 − fsf0s′
(f0)2
)
=
1
f0
[
S∑
s=1
Ajsfss′ −
S∑
s=1
Ajs∇sff0s′ ]
=
1
f0
[
S∑
s=1
Ajsfss′ − qjf0s′ ]
= [
1
f0
WF ]s
′
j .
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The second line follows by applying the quotient rule, and the fourth line results from∇f(y)A =
q. Hence, we have that AFˆ = (1/f0)WF . Now suppose by way of contradiction that there
is a row vector α ∈ RJ and β ∈ R with (α, β) = 0 such that
αAFˆ + β∂f(y) = 0.
From right-multiplication by W and ∂f(y)W = 0, we obtain αAFˆW = 0. From right-
multiplication by α and substitution of the previously derived expression for AFˆ , we
ﬁnd that αWFWα = 0. Since f is diﬀerentiably quasi–convex, the last equation implies
∂f(y)Wα = 0, contradicting the fact that ∂f(y)W = 0. 
We have assumed that U i is negative deﬁnite, implying that it is of full rank. In order to
prove the next theorem, an important auxiliary result is that also the matrix of normalized
second–order derivatives Uˆ i has linearly independent rows. This is shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.5.5 The matrix Uˆ i has linearly independent rows.
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a row vector α ∈ RS\{0} such that
αUˆ i = 0. By deﬁnition of Uˆ i and the quotient rule
S∑
s=1
αs
[
uiss′
ui0
− u
i
su
i
0s′
(ui0)
2
]
= 0, s′ = 0, . . . , S,
so we have that
S∑
s=1
αsu
i
ss′ −
S∑
s=1
αs
uis
ui0
ui0s′ = 0, s
′ = 0, . . . , S.
Now deﬁne a vector α′ = (−∑Ss=1 αs uisui0 , α1, . . . , αS). Then, ∑Ss=0 α′suiss′ = 0, contradicting the
assumption that U i is negative deﬁnite. 
Consider a particular v ∈ ∂V . If there exists a production plan y ∈ Y and asset portfolios
z1, . . . , zI such that ui(ωi + θiy + Wzi) = vi for all i ∈ I, then we say that the point v is
supported without transfers. Notice that competitive equilibria lead to points in ∂V which are
supported without transfers.
In what follows, we will parameterize the economy by the initial endowments ω and the
bargaining weights μ. From now on, we will make this explicit by using the notation ∂Vω.
We state a number of results which all rely on a similar proof strategy. In each case, we
phrase the problem of interest in such a way that it amounts to ﬁnding the dimension of the
solution set of some system of equations. Each equation in this system can be identiﬁed with
the zero of a function in which the endowment schedule ω and/or the bargaining weights μ are
parameters, while the variables are production plans, transfer schemes, and asset portfolios. We
summarize the relevant partial derivatives of these functions with respect to the parameters
and the variables in a matrix, and prove that this matrix has linearly independent rows. The
parametric transversality theorem then implies that the equations are linearly independent
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for almost all choices of the parameters. The pre–image theorem is then invoked to ﬁnd the
dimension of the solution set.
An important auxiliary result is that, generically in ω, the disagreement point v0ω lies in the
interior of the bargaining set.
Lemma 4.5.6 There is an open set Ω∗ ⊂ R(S+1)I++ of full Lebesgue measure such that for all
endowments ω ∈ Ω∗, the payoﬀ allocation v0ω which arises from the optimal portfolio choice of
all owners given no production and no transfers, does not belong to ∂V +ω .
Proof: Consider the following system of equations in ω and z, where ω ∈ R(S+1)I++ and
ωi +Wzi ∈ RS+1++ for all i ∈ I.∑
i∈I
θi∇ui(ωi +Wzi)−∇f(0) = 0, (25)
∇ui(ωi +Wzi)A− q = 0, i ∈ I, (26)
∇f(0)A− q = 0. (27)
It holds that v0ω ∈ ∂V +ω if and only if (25)-(27) has a solution, as follows from the char-
acterization of the boundary in Theorem 4.4.2 by setting y = 0 and t = 0. We observe that
condition (27) is independent of ω. If (27) does not hold, then v0ω ∈ ∂V +ω . In particular, by
Assumption 2.3.3, condition (27) fails whenever markets are complete. Now consider the case
where condition (27) does hold, and hence S > J . Consider the derivatives of conditions (25)
and (26) above with respect to ωI , ω1, . . . , ωI−1, which can be written in matrix form as
N =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
θIUˆ I θ1Uˆ1 · · · · · · θI−1Uˆ I−1
0 AUˆ1 0 · · · 0
0 0
. . . 0 0
...
... 0
. . . 0
0 0 · · · 0 AUˆ I−1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Lemma 4.5.5 and the full column rank of A imply that the diagonal blocks θIUˆ I and
AUˆ i, i = 1, . . . , I − 1, have linearly independent rows. Therefore, the rows of N are inde-
pendent. By the parametric transversality theorem, this implies that the derivatives of the
aforementioned expressions with respect to z alone are linearly independent for almost all
ω ∈ R(S+1)I++ . Applying the pre-image theorem and counting unknowns and equations, we ﬁnd
that the set of solutions to the above system is a manifold of dimension J − S < 0 for almost
all ω. We have shown that the set Ω∗ of endowments ω such that v0ω ∈ ∂V +ω is of full Lebesgue
measure. It holds that v0ω is a continuous function of ω, and ∂V
+
ω is an upper-hemi-continuous
correspondence in ω. Hence, if v0ω¯ ∈ ∂V +ω¯ for some particular ω¯ ∈ Ω∗, then v0ω ∈ ∂V +ω for all ω
in a suﬃciently small neighborhood of ω¯. Therefore, Ω∗ is open, and the lemma follows.

Theorem 4.5.7 There is an open set P ∗ ⊂ R(S+1)I++ × ΔI of full Lebesgue measure such that
for all (ω, μ) ∈ P ∗, the bargaining equilibrium involves non–zero transfers.
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Proof: We will introduce a system of equations in ω, μ , y, z, and z, where the variables
are restricted to satisfy the following conditions.
μi > 0, i ∈ I,
ωi  0, i ∈ I,
ωi + θiy +Wzi  0, i ∈ I,
ωi +Wz¯i  0, i ∈ I,
ui(ωi + θiy +Wzi)− ui(ωi +Wz¯i) > 0, i ∈ I.
The set of (ω, μ, y, z, z) satisfying these restrictions is open, and therefore a manifold. The
system of equations is as follows.
∇f(y)A− q = 0, (28)
f(y) = 0, (29)
∇ui(ωi + θiy +Wzi)A− q = 0, i ∈ I\{I}, (30)∑
i∈I
θi∇ui(ωi + θiy +Wzi)−∇f(y) = 0, (31)
γ1(ω1, μ1, y, z1, z¯1)− γI(ωI , μI , y, zI , z¯I) = 0, (32)
∇ui(ωi +Wz¯i)A− q = 0, i ∈ I, (33)
where we have deﬁned
γi(ωi, μi, y, zi, z¯i) =
ui(ωi + θiy +Wzi)− ui(ωi +Wz¯i)
μi∂0ui(ωi + θiy +Wzi)
, i ∈ I.
Given (ω, μ), the solution to this system is a tuple (y, z, z¯) such that the production plan
y, the asset portfolios z, and zero transfers correspond to a μ-bargaining equilibrium with
v0ω ∈ ∂V +ω and, moreover, z¯ are asset portfolios corresponding to the disagreement point. We
want to show that for generically chosen (ω, μ), this system is over-determined. This amounts
to proving that the derivatives of the above equations are linearly independent.
Consider a block matrix M in which the ﬁrst row corresponds to the J + 1 derivatives of
equations (28)-(29), the second row to the IJ + S − J + 1 derivatives of equations (30)-(32),
and the third row to the IJ derivatives of equation (33). Moreover, the ﬁrst column gives the
derivatives with respect to y, the second column with respect to (ω, μ), and the third column
with respect to z¯. The proof strategy is to show that M is of the lower-triangular form,
M =
⎛
⎜⎝ ∗ 0 0∗ 0
∗
⎞
⎟⎠
where the diagonal blocks have rank J + 1, IJ + S − J + 1, and IJ , respectively.
The proof of Theorem 4.5.4 shows that the ﬁrst diagonal block is of rank J + 1. The
corresponding equations do not involve (ω, μ) nor z¯. This explains the form of the ﬁrst row of
M .
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Now consider the last diagonal block of M . It corresponds to the block-diagonal matrix
M33 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
AUˆ1W 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 AUˆ IW
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Each block of the matrix above is of rank J , reﬂecting the fact that there is a unique optimal
asset portfolio for each agent, given the endowments, production decision, and transfers (which
are zero in the case at hand).
We now proceed to the second row of M . We argue ﬁrst that the derivatives of equations
(30)-(32) with respect to z¯ are all zero. This is obvious for equations (30)-(31) which do not
involve z¯. With regard to equation (32), the derivative of any γi with respect to z¯i is of the
form κ ∂ui(ωi+Wz¯i)W , where κ is a scalar. But at the solution to the equation system above,
z¯i is chosen optimally as by equation (33), so that ∂ui(ωi +Wz¯i)W = 0, as desired.
Now it remains to show that the block in the center of the matrix M is of full rank. It
corresponds to the derivatives of equations (30)-(32) with respect to (ω, μ). Omitting the
derivatives with respect to μi for i = 1, . . . , I − 1, it can be spelled out as follows.
M22 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
AUˆ1 0 · · · · · · 0 0
0
. . .
...
...
...
. . . 0 0
0 · · · · · · AUˆ I−1 0 0
θ1Uˆ1 · · · · · · · · · θIUˆ I 0
∂ω1γ
1 0 · · · 0 ∂ωIγI ∂μIγI
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
The linear independence of the ﬁrst (I−1)J+S−J rows ofM22 has been shown in the proof
of Lemma 4.5.6. We can write ∂μIγ
I = −κI (μI)(−2), where the factor κI is strictly positive by
the restriction that ui(ωi + θiy +Wzi) > ui(ωi +Wz¯i) for all i ∈ I. Also, we have assumed
μ  0, thus ∂μIγI < 0, as required.
We have now shown that the rows of M are linearly independent. By the parametric
transversality theorem, we can conclude that the set of (ω, μ) ∈ R(S+1)I++ × ΔI for which the
derivatives with respect to the remaining variables are linearly independent is of full Lebesgue
measure. By the preimage theorem, we may then count equations and unknowns and ﬁnd that
the set of (ω, μ) ∈ R(S+1)I++ × ΔI for which the equation system is over-determined is of full
Lebesgue measure. Denote the intersection of that set with Ω∗ by P ∗. If (ω, μ) ∈ P ∗, then
the bargaining equilibrium involves non-zero transfers. The set P ∗ is of full Lebesgue measure.
Moreover, the (unique) bargaining equilibrium is a continuous function of (ω, μ). Therefore, if
the property of non-zero transfers holds for some (ω¯, μ¯) ∈ R(S+1)I++ ×ΔI , then it also holds for
(ω, μ) ∈ R(S+1)I++ ×ΔI in a suﬃciently small neighborhood of (ω¯, μ¯). Hence, the set P ∗ is open.

Theorem 4.5.7 says that generically in endowments and bargaining weights the bargaining
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procedure will lead to transfers. Since competitive equilibria involve zero transfers, bargaining
equilibria are generically distinct from competitive equilibria.
Corollary 4.5.8 There is an open set P ∗ ⊂ R(S+1)I++ × ΔI of full Lebesgue measure such that
for all (ω, μ) ∈ P ∗, the bargaining equilibrium is not a competitive equilibrium.
Since by Theorem 4.3.8 points in ∂V + are supported by uniquely deﬁned production plans
and transfer schemes, the bargaining equilibrium utilities and the competitive equilibrium util-
ities are diﬀerent for almost all endowments and bargaining weights.
Corollary 4.5.9 There is an open set P ∗ ⊂ R(S+1)I++ × ΔI of full Lebesgue measure such that
for all (ω, μ) ∈ P ∗, the bargaining equilibrium utilities are not equal to competitive equilibrium
utilities.
This diﬀerence in payoﬀ allocation holds for both complete and incomplete markets. In
the case of complete markets, we have previously shown that the proﬁt-maximizing production
plan is selected by the bargaining procedure. Thus, with complete markets, any diﬀerence in
payoﬀ allocation must be due to the transfers. With regard to incomplete markets, however,
we will show in the sequel of this section that the diﬀerence in payoﬀ allocation is not only the
result of transfers, but that the chosen production plan is diﬀerent as well.
Theorem 4.5.10 Suppose that markets are incomplete, that is, J < S. Then, there is an open
set P ∗∗ ⊂ R(S+1)I++ ×ΔI of full Lebesgue measure such that for all (ω, μ) ∈ P ∗∗, the bargaining
equilibrium production plan is not a competitive equilibrium production plan.
Proof: We introduce a system of equations in (ω, μ), y, t, z, zˆ, and z, where the variables
are restricted as follows.
μi > 0, i ∈ I,
ωi  0, i ∈ I,
ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi  0, i ∈ I,
ωi + θiy +Wzˆi  0, i ∈ I,
ωi +Wz¯i  0, i ∈ I,
ui(ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi)− ui(ωi +Wz¯i) > 0, i ∈ I.
The set of variables satisfying these restrictions is open, and is therefore a manifold. The
system of equations under consideration is as follows.
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∑
i∈I
ti = 0, (34)
∇f(y)A− q = 0, (35)
f(y) = 0, (36)
∇ui(ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi)A− q = 0, i ∈ I\{I}, (37)∑
i∈I
θi∇ui(ωi + θiy + e(0)ti +Wzi)−∇f(y) = 0, (38)
γi(ωi, μi, y, ti, zi, z¯i)− γI(ωI , μI , y, tI , zI , z¯I) = 0, i ∈ I\{I}, (39)
∇ui(ωi + θiy +Wzˆi)A− q = 0, i ∈ I\{I}, (40)∑
i∈I
θi∇ui(ωi + θiy +Wzˆi)−∇f(y) = 0, (41)
A∇ui(ωi +Wz¯i)− q = 0, i ∈ I. (42)
In words, the equations specify that –given (ω, μ)– (y, t, z) is the μ-bargaining equilibrium,
and (y, 0, zˆ) is the competitive equilibrium, where for i ∈ I, we have xi = ωi+θiy+e(0)ti+Wzi
and xˆi = ωi+θiy+Wzˆi. We want to show that for generically chosen (ω, μ), this system is over-
determined whenever markets are complete. This is equivalent to proving that the equations
in the system above are all linearly independent.
Let N be a matrix where the ﬁrst row corresponds to the derivative of equation (34), the
second row corresponds to the J+1 derivatives of equations (35)-(36), the third row corresponds
to IJ + S − J + I − 1 derivatives of equations (37)-(39), the fourth row to the IJ + S − J
derivatives of equations (40)-(41) and the ﬁfth row corresponds to the IJ derivatives of equation
(42). Moreover, the ﬁrst column refers to derivatives with respect to t, the second column with
respect to y, the third column with respect to (ω, μ), the fourth column with respect to zˆ, and
the ﬁfth column with respect to z¯.
We will show that N is of the lower triangular form,
N =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∗ 0 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0
∗ 0
∗
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
where the diagonal blocks are of full row rank 1, J + 1, IJ + S − J + I − 1, IJ + S − J ,
and IJ , respectively. By the parametric transversality theorem, this means that for generic
(ω, μ), the matrix of derivatives with respect to the remaining variables (y, z, zˆ, z¯, t) has linearly
independent rows. Applying the pre-image theorem, this will imply that the set of (y, z, zˆ, z¯, t)
which solve the above equation system given a generic (ω, μ) is a manifold of dimension J −S,
and corresponds therefore to the empty set when J < S.
Equation (34) involves only t, which explains the form of the ﬁrst row of N . Equations
(35)-(36) involve only y. This together with Theorem 4.5.4 explains that the second row of N
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is of the form indicated above. The linear independence of the IJ rows in the last diagonal
block of N follows by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.5.7. Aside from equation
(42), the portfolios z¯ are only involved in equation (39). But the derivative of (39) with respect
to z¯ must be zero at the solution to the equation system, whence the zero entries in the ﬁfth
column of N – the argument is as in the proof of Theorem 4.5.7. Similarly, the portfolios zˆ are
involved only in equations (40)-(41), explaining the zero entries in the fourth column of N .
Consider the third diagonal block of N . After appropriate permutations of the rows and
columns, it can be spelled out as follows.
N33 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
AUˆ1 0 · · · · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 · · · · · · AUˆ I−1 0 ... ... ... ... ...
θ1Uˆ1 · · · · · · · · · θIUˆ I 0 0 0 0 0
∂ω1γ
1 0 · · · 0 ∂ωIγI ∂μ1γ1 0 · · · 0 ∂μIγI
0
. . .
... 0
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . . 0
...
0 · · · 0 ∂ωI−1γI−1 ∂ωIγI 0 · · · 0 ∂μI−1γI−1 ∂μIγI
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
The block in the upper left corner has previously been shown to be of rank IJ + S − J , see
the proof of Lemma 4.5.6. We have argued in the proof of Theorem 4.5.7 that the terms of the
form ∂μiγ
i are strictly positive, which readily implies the full rank I−1 of the block in the lower
right corner. Let P ∗∗ be the intersection of Ω∗ with the set of all (ω, μ) ∈ R(S+1)I++ ×ΔI for which
the matrix under consideration has linearly independent rows. We have shown that P ∗∗ is of
full Lebesgue measure. The bargaining equilibrium is a continuous function of (ω, μ), and the
competitive equilibria are an upper-hemi-continuous correspondence of (ω, μ). If the property
of strictly positive distance between the bargaining and competitive equilibrium production
plans holds for some (ω¯, μ¯) ∈ R(S+1)I++ ×ΔI , then it is preserved for (ω, μ) ∈ R(S+1)I++ ×ΔI in a
suﬃciently small neighborhood around (ω¯, μ¯). 
We had previously shown that generically in endowments and bargaining weights the payoﬀ
allocation resulting from the bargaining equilibrium and that resulting from a competitive
equilibrium are diﬀerent. We have seen that in the case of complete markets, the production
plan chosen under both approaches is the same, so that the diﬀerent payoﬀ allocation is merely
a result of redistribution via transfers. The last theorem complements these ﬁndings by saying
that for the case of incomplete markets, the two approaches almost always lead to diﬀerent
production plans.
4.6 Conclusion
We have introduced a non–cooperative bargaining procedure to resolve the conﬂict among
shareholders of a ﬁrm when markets are incomplete. In contrast to many existing models, we
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obtain a unique prediction for the production plan as well as for the resulting payoﬀ allocation.
This solution is parameterized by the distribution of bargaining power across the diﬀerent
owners. This bargaining power distribution is independent of the shares of ownership.
An important feature of the model is that transfers are possible in equilibrium. The well–
known Dre`ze criterion rules out a production plan which can be Pareto–improved upon by
an alternative plan and transfers. The well–known solution concept of a stock market equi-
librium satisﬁes this criterion but requires that the chosen production plan itself should be
implemented without transfers. Our solution concept, called a bargaining equilibrium, satisﬁes
the Dre`ze criterion but does allow for transfers to be made in equilibrium. Indeed, it turns out
that transfers will almost always be used. Furthermore, the bargaining equilibrium is derived
from an explicit non–cooperative bargaining model. The outcome of the bargaining procedure
proposed in this paper is diﬀerent from the predictions of standard economic theory. If markets
are complete, the production decision of the ﬁrm is driven by proﬁt–maximization as in the
Arrow–Debreu model. However, the proﬁts are redistributed among the owners of the ﬁrm in
accordance with their bargaining power, which derives from the ability to make a proposal and
from the disagreement payoﬀ. In the case of incomplete markets, the production plan adopted
under the bargaining procedure almost always fails to be a competitive equilibrium production
plan. Non–zero transfers are almost always made. We have given positive support for the use
of the Dre`ze criterion, though the utility gradients of owners implied by our theory diﬀer from
the competitive equilibrium ones.
In our bargaining game we have not considered the option for owners to modify ownership
shares and/or to sell the ﬁrm to outsiders. An intriguing question for future research is whether
allowing such possibilities would give support for the criterion proposed by Bisin, Gottardi
and Ruta (2009), which loosely speaking corresponds to the maximal utility gradient in the
population rather than a weighted average of the owner’s utility gradients as a criterion.
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Summary
This dissertation has addressed the problem of dividing gains from cooperation through a
bargaining process. It has discussed two models where such gains from cooperation are abstract
and one where they result from a particular economic situation, namely the cooperation among
diﬀerent owners of a ﬁrm. In each of the three models under consideration, a bargaining process
in the spirit of Rubinstein is used as the mechanism by which agreement on the payoﬀ allocation
is found.
Chapter 2 has focussed on the Rubinstein bargaining process itself and, more in particular,
on the relationship between the proposer selection rule and the equilibrium outcome in the limit
as bargaining friction goes to zero. The chapter concludes that a player’s relative bargaining
power converges to the fraction of the time that this player expects to be the proposer in the
long run.
Chapter 3 considers a setup where such a Rubinstein bargaining process (now with two
players only) is preceded by a commitment stage. In that stage, players can make binding
commitments not to enter into certain agreements. Their ability to do so is subject to two
straight-forward restrictions. A commitment must be expressed in the terms which the player
derives utility from, and a player cannot remain committed to something which has become
impossible. In this setup, it turns out that there is an intermediate optimal level of commitment;
that is, a player does not optimally choose to commit to the entire surplus. Moreover, Chapter
3 contains a result which suggests that the equal split is a uniquely robust focal point within a
range of surplus divisions which can be supported by equilibria.
Chapter 4 applies bargaining theory to the conﬂict of interest which tend to arise among the
owners of a ﬁrm when ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, thereby contributing a new approach
to the literature on the theory of the ﬁrm. The decision-making problem within a ﬁrm has
typically been looked at from a normative perspective, and criteria to resolve the conﬂict have
not so far been based on explicit bargaining foundations. Chapter 4 aims to begin ﬁlling this
gap in the literature.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht hoe spelers door een onderhandelingsproces een akkoord
bereiken over de verdeling van winsten uit samenwerking. Het proefschrift omvat twee modellen
waarin die winst abstract is en e´e´n waarin die winst voortvloeit uit een speciﬁeke vorm van
samenwerking, namelijk die tussen de verschillende aandeelhouders van een bedrijf. Er worden
methoden uit de (micro-)economische theorie en in het bijzonder uit de speltheorie toegepast.
Hoofdstuk 2 richt zich op het onderhandelingsproces zelf en op de uitbetalingen van de
spelers in een evenwicht van zo’n onderhandelingsspel. In elke onderhandelingsronde heeft een
van de spelers het recht om een voorstel te doen waarmee iedereen zich vervolgens wel of niet
akkoord verklaart. Er zijn regels die bepalen wanneer welke speler dit recht heeft. Die regels
worden ook het protocol genoemd en vormen een belangrijke bron van onderhandelingsmacht.
De uitbetaling van een speler is dan ook gekoppeld aan de fractie van de tijd waarin hij op
lange termijn verwacht voorstellen te kunnen doen.
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt een andere bron van onderhandelingsmacht, namelijk commitment.
Er is sprake van commitment wanneer een speler voorafgaand aan de onderhandeling bepaalde
opties geloofwaardig kan uitsluiten. Bijvoorbeeld zou de speler minimale eisen kunnen stellen
en beloven dat hij nooit met een voorstel zal instemmen die daar niet aan voldoet. In hoofdstuk
3 wordt verondersteld dat de geloofwaardigheid van een commitment in twee opzichten beperkt
is: De speler mag niets eisen waar hij niet om geeft, en de speler mag niets blijven eisen wat
onmogelijk is geworden. Die modellering van commitment is nieuw in de literatuur en leidt tot
inzichten over de optimale keuze van commitments.
In hoofdstuk 4 worden inzichten uit onderhandelingsspelen toegepast op de besluitvorming
in een bedrijf met meerdere aandeelhouders. Als hun gemeenschappelijk bedrijf een onzekere
toekomst tegemoet gaat willen de aandeelhouders zich tegen die onzekerheid beschermen door
een verstandige individuele keuze van beleggingen. Als echter de ﬁnancie¨le markten hun hiertoe
onvoldoende mogelijkheden bieden (incomplete markets) dan ontstaat er een conﬂict tussen de
aandeelhouders. Dit conﬂict wordt in de literatuur meestal normatief benadert. Hoofdstuk 4
voegt hier op basis van de speltheorie een positieve benadering aan toe.
87

References
Abreu, D. and F. Gul (2000), “Bargaining and reputation,” Econometrica, 68, 85-117.
Aumann, R.J., and M. Kurz (1977), “Power and Taxes,” Econometrica, 45, 1137–1161.
Banks, J. and J. Duggan (2000), “A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice,” American Political
Science Review, 94, 73–88.
Bester, H. (1993), “Bargaining versus Price Competition in Markets with Quality Unvertainty,”
The American Economic Review, 83 (1993), 278–288.
Binmore, K.G. (1987), “Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models,” in K.Binmore and P.Dasgupta
(Eds.), The Economics of Bargaining , Blackwell, Oxford.
Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky (1986),“The Nash Bargaining Solution in
Economic Modelling,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 17, 176–188.
Bisin, A., P. Gottardi, and G. Ruta (2009), “Equilibrium Corporate Finance,” Working Paper,
European University Institute.
Bonnisseau, J.-M., and O. Lachiri (2004), “On the Objective of Firms under Uncertainty with
Stock Markets,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40, 493–513.
Britz, V. (2010), ”Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining,” METEOR Research
Memorandum RM/10/056.
Britz, V., P.J.J. Herings, and A. Predtetchinski (2010), “Non-cooperative Support for the
Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution,” Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 1951–1967.
Britz, V., P.J.J. Herings, and A.Predtetchinski (2010), “Theory of the Firm – Bargaining
and Competitive Equilibrium,” METEOR Research Memorandum RM/10/057.
Calabuig, V., A. Cunyat, and G. Olcina (2002),“Commitment and choice of partner in a
negotiation with a deadline,” Spanish Economic Review, 4, 61-87.
Carlsson, H. (1991), “A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors,” Econometrica, 59, 1487–
1496.
Chae, S. and J.A. Yang (1994),“An N-Person Pure Bargaining Game,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 62 (1994), 86–102.
Cho, S.J., and J. Duggan (2005), “Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem,”
Working Paper, 1–32.
Cunyat, A. (2004), “The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline,” Eco-
nomic Theory, 23, 455-465.
DeMarzo, P. (1993), “Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Share-
holder,” Review of Economic Studies, 60, 713–734.
Diamond, P.A. (1967), “The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model with Tech-
nological Uncertainty,” American Economic Review, 57, 759–776.
Dierker, E., H. Dierker, and B. Grodal (2002), “Nonexistence of Constrained Eﬃcient Equi-
libria When Markets Are Incomplete,” Econometrica 70, 1245–1251.
Dre`ze, J.H. (1974), “Investment under Private Ownership: Optimality, Equilibrium, and Stabil-
ity,” in J.H. Dre`ze, ed., Allocation under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Optimality (New York:
Macmillan, 1974) 9.
89
Dre`ze, J.H., O. Lachiri, and E. Minelli (2009), “Stock Prices, Anticipations and Investment
in General Equilibrium,” CORE Discussion Paper, 2009/83, 1–46.
Fershtman, C. and D. Seidmann (1993), “Deadline eﬀects and ineﬃcient delay in bargaining
with endogenous commitment,” Journal of Economic Theory, 60, 306-321.
Grossman, S.J., and O. Hart (1979), “A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market
Economies,” Econometrica, 47, 293–330.
Grout, P.A. (1984), “Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bar-
gaining Approach,” Econometrica, 52 , 449–460.
Harsanyi, J.C. and R. Selten (1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games,
MIT Press, Cambridge.
Hart, S. and A. Mas-Colell (1996), “Bargaining and Value,” Econometrica, 64, 357–380.
Herings, P.J.J., and A. Predtetchinski (2009), “One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov
Recognition Probabilities,” Journal of Economic Theory , doi:10.1016/j.jet.2009.10.002.
Hyndman, K., and D. Ray (2007), “Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements,” Review of
Economic Studies, 74, 1125–1147.
Kalai, E. (1977),“Nonsymmetric Nash Solutions and Replications of 2-Person Bargaining,” Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 6, 129–133.
Kalandrakis, T. (2004), “Equilibria in Sequential Bargaining Games as Solutions to Systems of
Equations,” Economics Letters, 84, 407–411.
Kambe, S. (1999),“Bargaining with imperfect commitment,” Games and Economic Behavior, 28,
217-237.
Kelsey, D., and F. Milne (1996), “The Existence of Equilibrium in Incomplete Markets and the
Objective Function of the Firm,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 25, 229–245.
Krishna, V., and R. Serrano (1996), “Multilateral Bargaining,” The Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 63, 61–80.
Kultti, K., and H. Vartiainen (2007),“Multilateral Non-Cooperative Bargaining in a General
Utility Space,” Working Paper, downloadable from http://personal.inet.ﬁ/tiede/yjs-hv.
Laruelle, A., and F.Valenciano (2007), “Bargaining in Committees as an Extension of Nash’s
Bargaining Theory,” Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 291-305.
Laruelle, A., and F. Valenciano (2008),“Noncooperative Foundations of Bargaining Power in
Committees and the Shapley-Shubik Index,” Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 341–353.
Lensberg, T. (1988),“Stability and the Nash Solution,” Journal of Economic Theory, 45, 330–341.
Li, D. (2007), “Bargaining with history-dependent preferences,” Journal of Economic Theory, 136,
695-708.
Magill, M., and M. Quinzii (1996), Theory of Incomplete Markets, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Merlo, A., and C. Wilson (1995),“A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete
Information,” Econometrica, 63, 371–399.
Miyakawa, T. (2008), “Noncooperative Foundation of n-Person Asymmetric Nash Bargaining
Solution,” Journal of Economics of Kwansei Gakuin University, 62, 1–18.
90
Muthoo, A. (1992),“Revocable commitment and sequential bargaining,” The Economic Journal,
102, 378-387.
Muthoo, A. (1996),“A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 69, 134-152
Nash, J.F. (1950),“The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica, 18, 155–162.
Nash, J.F. (1953),“Two-Person Cooperative Games,” Econometrica, 21, 128–140.
Rockafellar, R.T. (1970), Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Roth, A.E. (1989), “Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash’s Solution and Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, 353–365.
Rubinstein, A.(1982),“Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model,” Econometrica, 50, 97-109.
Schelling, T.C. (1956),“An essay on bargaining,” American Economic Review, 46, 281-306.
Schelling, T.C. (1960), “The Strategy of Conﬂict,” Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1984),“Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a
Bargaining Model,” Econometrica, 52, 1351-1364.
Tvede, M., and H. Cres (2005), “Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets,”
Economic Theory, 26, 887–906.
91

Short Curriculum Vitae
Volker Britz was born on May 26, 1982 in Bonn, Germany. He attended the Rurtal-Gymnasium
in Du¨ren for secondary school and graduated in 2001. Afterwards, he studied Economics at
Maastricht University and graduated in 2005 with the B.Sc. degree in the graduate option
International Economic Studies. In 2006, Volker obtained his M.Sc. degree in Economics
from Maastricht University. As a M.Sc. student, he focussed on growth theory and wrote his
thesis on the resource curse. Afterwards, his main interests have been in microeconomic theory
and, in particular, game theory. From 2006 until 2011, Volker prepared his dissertation under
the supervision of Prof. Dr. P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Dr. Arkadi Predtetchinski in the
Department of Economics, Maastricht University.
93
